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The doctoral thesis deals with the theoretical and experimental analysis of hand 
gestures, addressing the relations between gestures and language. In the articles 
that form the thesis, I have examined gestures in dialogue, in the context of 
spatial relations, and in connection with metaphorical expressions from the 
socio-cultural and cognitive perspective. I have also studied the hypothesis of 
the gestural origin of language, and some medieval views on gestures. Along 
with the discussion of the experiments, the articles provide an overview of 
theoretical approaches to gestures, classifications of gesture and the relation of 
gesture theories to some other theoretical paradigms such as theories of spatial 
cognition and metaphor. The thesis focuses on iconic and metaphoric gestures, 
and addresses, more particularly, the following topics:
(1)The occurrence of gestures before the associated lexical unit. In the 
majority of cases, the onset of iconic gesture is known to precede the onset of 
the related speech unit, suggesting that the gestural phrase may find a more 
direct route than the speech unit with which they “started out” together. Iconic 
gestures in speech are largely attributable to aspects of lexical search and such 
gestures play an important functional role in lexical retrieval.
(2) Conversational gestures in dialogues in Estonian. Gestures play an im­
portant role in maintaining and supporting conversation as a social system. 
Interactive gestures help to involve the listener and to regulate conversation. 
Gestures receive the attention of the listener and thereby become components of 
conceptual understanding. Gestures are functionally adapted to the requirements 
of understanding in human communication.
(3) Pointing and referring gestures in space. Pointing gestures which indicate 
spatial relations perform a strongly communicative role as they may substitute 
the word which marks spatial relations. Such gestures do not depend on a 
specific language and vice versa.
(4) The fourth topic is more theoretical. I have offered a suggestion con­
cerning the relationship between iconicity and metaphoricity in language. The 
primary ‘metaphorical transfer’ occurred when the iconic meanings of hand 
gestures became meanings expressed by voice. They came to be used as 
symbols with a certain meaning. In the course of time there occurred a ‘second 
metaphorical transfer’ —  the expression was permanently transferred to other 
similar situations. It would be more accurate to say that, from this moment on, 
one is dealing with ‘metaphorical transfer’ as a certain process, where symbols 
become new metaphors and new meanings emerge. In this process the hand 
cannot perform the primary role any more because this role has been delegated 
to language.
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(5) Metaphoric gestures and linguistic relativity. Metaphors in gestures are 
comparable to metaphors in verbal expressions. Metaphor plays an important 
role in thought. Metaphors are situated in the verbal layer, but metaphor 
originates in the intermediate layer. Each language has a language-specific 
layer that gives rise to metaphors and gestures.
(6) The sixth topic, underlying most of the articles, relates to gestures and 
cognition. I have claimed that gestures connect to cognition through a flow; 
process or flow of information. The points of contact between language and 
hand gestures are related to the overall human cognition. Gestures can be 
construed as embodied information between intending and understanding 
minds. There should be an overlapping area between gestures and concepts. It 
shows connections on the deep psychological level in the human mind.
2. Overview of the articles
The aim of the thesis was to investigate relations between gestures and language 
from a socio-cultural and cognitive perspective on the basis of examples 
provided by a particular language (Estonian). The study was undertaken within 
the interdisciplinary field of gesture studies. The theoretical foundation for the 
thesis was also provided by theories of the origins of language, spatial cognition 
and metaphor. The human ability to use both language and hands in com­
munication is part of the overall human cognition. One of the objectives was 
thus to identify universal and/or language-specific tendencies in the use of hand 
gestures. The objective was achieved: it was possible to identify both ‘univer­
sal’ hand gestures, as well as gestures that seemed to provide evidence for 
linguistic relativity. Universality appeared in the use of gestures in spatial rela­
tions. This is, however, somewhat in contrast with Haviland’s (1996) findings 
concerning the Australian language Guugu Yimithirr. Storytellers speaking 
Guugu Yimithirr were found to orient pointing gestures in what we can 
calculate to be the “correct” directions. In the Guugu Yimithirr case this means 
correct compass directions. Rather than calculating horizontal angles by 
reference to a body-centered left/right asymmetry, Guugu Yimithirr uses four 
roots — denoting roughly the same directions as the English words north, 
south, east and west — insistently and with extraodinary frequency in ordinary 
talk about all sorts of spaces. The roots denote quadrants of the horizontal plane, 
rather than idealized “cardinal points,” and the whole scheme is rotated slightly 
clockwise by the Western compass. Gestures seem to be tied to the system of 
cardinal quadrants (Haviland 1996: 12).
My experiments with speakers of Estonian revealed that in face-to-face 
interaction pointing gestures have strongly communicative value in the context 
of direction with regard to the egocentric coordinate system ( ‘left’, ‘right’, 
‘here’, ‘there’). Pointing in space is similar to the use of pointing gestures by
speakers of English. Language-specificity appeared in the use of metaphors in 
gestures and speech (Tenjes 2001a, and 2001b (submitted)).
Iconic gestures, which have been my main focus of interest, depict, by the 
form of the gesture, some feature of the action or event being described; such as 
“he climbed up the pipe” accompanied by the hand raising upwards to show the 
path (Cassell, McNeill, McCullough 1999: 5). “An iconic gesture is one that in 
form and manner of execution exhibits a meaning relevant to the simultaneously 
expressed linguistic meaning. Iconic gestures have a formal relation to the 
semantic content of the linguistic unit” (McNeill 1985: 354). He also says that 
“Iconic gestures are typically large complex movements that are performed 
relatively slowly and carefully in the central gesture space” . He also claims that 
such gestures accompany “only sentences classified as narrative” (1985: 359).
The articles discuss and compare the most influential contemporary theories 
of gesture, and test the applicability of the theories to the results of experiments 
conducted with speakers of Estonian. Two articles are concerned only with 
theoretical approaches to gestures, and are not based on experiments.
The first of the two addresses the intriguing issue of the gestural origin of 
language (Keele žestilise päritolu hüpotees (“The hypothesis of the gestural 
origins of language”) Tenjes 2001 (in press)). The study attempts to clarify the 
relationship between hand gestures and speech in the context of language 
acquisition. Our ancient pre-ancestors communicated with manual gestures 
before switching to vocal mode. Language emerged not from vocalization, but 
from manual gestures. This hypothesis is supported by (1) investigations in 
human evolution; (2) contemporary investigations in hand gestures and speech;
(3) investigations in sign languages; (4) brain-investigations. The paper studies 
more closely the first two aspects —  the primacy of the hand in ancestors’ 
communication (Place 1998; Corballis 1999) and contemporary investigations 
in hand gestures and speech (Kendon 1991, and others), and discusses, additio­
nally, some questions concerning metaphors in gestures (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980) and iconicity in language (Jakobson and Waugh 1979; Haiman 1985; 
Kendon 1991; Battey 1998). The paper aims to contribute to the exciting and 
important inquiries into (1) language acquisition and (2) iconicity in language. 
The hypothesis about the predominance of hand gestures over vocalization is 
explained, and iconicity in language is taken under closer investigation as an 
issue that might help to clarify many problems pertaining to language acquisi­
tion and to realize the nature of language. The 20th century linguistics has put 
much emphasis on the arbitrariness in language, displacing iconicity. Human 
language may have evolved not from vocalization but from manual gestures and 
switched to vocalization late in hominid evolution. It may have coincided with 
the emergence of Homo sapiens. Pointing may have been among the earliest 
communicative gestures on the savanna. Indeed, young children learn to point 
very early in their development, whereas nonhuman primates never point. It is 
unlikely that the switch from gestural to spoken language was sudden.
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Vocalized grunts and squeals would surely have punctuated early gestural 
language, just as gestures embellish modem vocal language. Analysis of the 
movement phrases of co-speech gesturing shows how they are coordinated with 
co-occurrent speech phrases. When gesticulation is going on, for each sense- 
group in speech there is a corresponding gesture phrase. Further, it has been 
found that when a gesture phrase expresses utterence content, the relevant 
characteristics develop either in advance of, or simultaneously with the nuclear 
syllable of the sense-group, which also corresponds to the point of the most 
important information in the phrase (Kendon 1991: 2, Tenjes 2000). The gesture 
phrase can often be observed to be under way before the speech phrase with 
which it is associated begins. This provides clear evidence that the gesture 
phrase is fully organized either prior to, or at the same time as the spoken 
phrase.
The second article —  Žestid keskajal (“Gestures in the Middle Ages”, Tenjes a 
(in press)) —  discusses gestures in the Middle Ages. Christianity, the central 
ideology of the Middle Ages, changed the world view and attitudes of people, 
including the attitudes to gestures. Gestures had to fit new social and religious 
models. Gestures expressed the moral values, feelings, the ‘inner motions of the 
soul’ of a human being. The symbolical values of the Word changed the balance 
between speech and gestures. The social conditions of public communication 
were changing as well. Space and time shifted from the agora and the antique 
theatre to the medieval pulpit. As for the principal actors gesturing on the social 
stage, the rhetorician was replaced by the priest, the teacher, or the jugglers. The 
third axis was concerned with efficacy, in its double meaning: the practical 
efficacy of technical gestures (sawing, moving, writing, etc.) and the symbolical 
efficacy of political or sacramental rituals.
We can study medieval gestures, referring to a single illustrated manuscript, 
to one kind of gesture (e.g., of prayer, despair) or to the work of a single artist. 
The best source of material for the study of gestures in the Middle Ages is 
medieval art and illustrations in manuscripts such as Sachsenspiegel, one of the 
most famous legal manuscripts from the beginning of the 13th century. There is 
a detailed study of the treatment of gestures by the artist Giotto (Barasch 1987). 
One can find gestures also in iconography, or in the ornaments of sarcophagi.
The article Gestures in Dialogue (Tenjes 1996) studies the applicability of the 
conversational gesture models proposed by Bavelas and her colleagues to Estonian 
dialogue. One of the main functions of a speaker’s gesture is to help convey 
meaning to the addressee in an immediate conversational context. Both the 
addressee and the moment-by-moment context in which the gesture occurs are 
important. A gesture can simultaneously have more than one function (Tenjes 
1996: 190). Bavelas and her associates thus proposed a new distinction for 
conversational gestures: most function as topic gestures, which refer directly to 
the topic of the conversation; some function as interactive gestures, which refer
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instead to the addressee (Bavelas, Chovil, Coates, Roe, in press). Conversatio­
nal gestures are part of speech, in two senses:
(1) they contribute to meaning just as words and phrases do;
(2) their meaning depends upon the whole of which they are a part of (Bavelas,
in press).
An interpretation of gestures as interactive or topical in function depends on the 
interpretation of the meaning of the gesture at the particular moment it occurred. 
In other words, we must “translate” or explicate the gesture’s meaning. This 
means taking into account both its physical encoding and what it seemed to be 
conveying in conjunction with the accompanying words, intonation, and facial 
displays at that precise moment. Conversational gestures are spontaneous and 
transient.
The functions served by individual interactive gestures in conversation are 
heterogeneous. What they all have in common is a reference to the addressee. 
Topic gestures work closely with the verbal narrative, illustrating it. Interactive 
gestures have also verbal equivalents. The speaker can insert an interactive 
gesture quickly and with the minimal interruption of the topical flow. Topic 
gestures convey meaning fully or partially dependent on the words.
The following three articles study iconic gestures. The paper Gestures and 
space relationships in Estonian (Tenjes b (in press)) focuses on iconic gestures 
that accompany speech in the context of spatial relations. Iconic gestures that 
indicate space can be called pointing gestures or deictics. Iconic gestures 
expressing spatial relations have been discussed in connection with cognition 
and language. Human cognition appears to comprehend certain relatively 
distinct major cognitive systems, which include language; perception in general 
or in its several modalities like vision, hearing, kinesthesia, etc.; a cognitive 
system for cultural structure, etc., as Talmy (1996: 231) has pointed out. Each 
major cognitive system has certain organizational properties; many of them are 
comparable across systems, which means that the systems overlap to some 
extent. The article contains a reference to the significance of language among 
other cognitive systems. The study indicates that pointing gestures have two 
simultaneous roles: (1) to point to spatial relations and (2) to image (to denote) 
the most important concept in the sentence that followed. There is a clear 
semantic link between the gesture and the emphasized word in the accom­
panying speech (Hadar and Butterworth 1997: 152). It means that gestures and 
language have a common base. The point of connection between the gesture and 
the word may be a process or a certain type of information. There should be an 
overlapping area between gestures and concepts.
Providing clear definitions for referring and pointing gestures is not easy. 
The papers Gestures and spatial relationships in Estonian (Tenjes b (in press)) 
and Gestures in communication and their use fo r  pointing and referring in 
space: Estonian examples (Tenjes 2001b) focus on pointing gestures that 
accompany speech in the context of spatial relations. In the article Gestures in
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communication and their use fo r  pointing and referring in space: Estonian 
examples the theoretical part deals with problems related to the classification of 
gestures. In the case of pointing and referring gestures classifying is not always 
easy: gestures can be thought of as partly iconic (i.e., referring gestures), partly 
purely pointing (i.e., pointing gestures). A brief overview is given of C. S. 
Peirce’s “classical” views of the iconic and indexical dimension of signs. A 
summary is provided of McNeill’s and Kendon’s, but also other authors’ 
approaches to gesture, with an emphasis on the comparison of M cNeill’s and A. 
Kendon’s classifications of gestures; their views of connections between 
pointing gestures and speech, and the cognitive foundations of M cNeill’s work 
(Vygotsky, Slobin). Relations between space and cognition are treated more 
thoroughly. The final section of the theoretical part addresses the relationship 
between gestures and mental representation.
In addition to the theoretical considerations, the article discusses the results 
of an experiment on pointing gesture accompanying verbal expressions in 
Estonian. The subjects had to go on an imaginary journey and describe it to 
another person, the “guest” . Two aspects were analyzed: (1) the gestures that 
indicated space, spatial relations, or spatiotemporal relations, (2) the concomi­
tant words or phrases. The gestures that indicated spatial relations were studied 
together with the concomitant Estonian-language expressions. The aim of this 
experiment, which involved face-to-face interaction, was to study space-relation 
gestures and the со verbal speech.
It may be concluded from the research that (1) gestures appear not at the 
beginning of face-to-face interaction but some time later; 2) pointing gestures 
indicating spatial relations perform a strongly communicative role and may 
substitute the word which marked the spatial relations. Spatial information is 
encoded both in spoken language and the concomitant iconic gesture.
The emergence of the imagistic language paradigm in the 1980s gave rise to 
new ideas in linguistics as well as other disciplines. According to Langacker, 
language analysis should posit that language is symbolic at all its levels, i.e., 
that grammatical constructions are “schematic, less specific, symbolic units”, 
which “embody conversational imagery.” While languages are repertoires of 
symbolic units and supply “conventional imagery” (Langacker 1988) for con­
ceptualization and expression, there is no categorical boundary between reper­
toire and use. Conceptualization is incorporated in material forms. Fully evol­
ved languages provide speakers with vast resources for “alternative” conceptua­
lizations, and since everything that has become part of the repertoire ultimately 
derives from creative, situated inventions, much of language structure is in­
herently metaphorical. This “imagistic” view of language differs from the 
majority position in communication studies by declaring that “meaning” is a 
feature of — and at the same time inseparable from —  “material symbols”.
Communication is, thus, an “embodied” process. Rather than using “verbal” 
and “nonverbal” aspects as separate systems, interactants use all the sensory 
modalities associated with the body. The word “gesture” serves as a label for
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the domain of visible action that participants routinely separate out and treat as 
governed by openly acknowledged communicative intent.
In the article Gestures as pre-positions in communication (Tenjes 2001a 
(submitted)) I concentrate on iconic hand gestures. Iconic gestures occur during 
continuous speech and show in their form a meaning related to the meaning 
articulated in speech. In most cases the related speech unit is a word, called the 
“lexical affiliate” (Schegloff 1984) of the gesture (Hadar, Butterworth 1997). I 
also explore the use of iconic gestures in interaction.
In the article some examples are presented about iconic gestures as points or 
foreshadowed gestures used in an interview. The gestures convey a sense of 
ambiguity: they visualize time and a forthcoming object; they foreshadow the 
importance of this object. As iconic gestures, they “project” upcoming com­
ponents of talk. Generally, all gestures are initiated far before the speech unit to 
which they “belong”. They preface speech units and prefigure the concepts 
communicated by them (Streeck 1995).
Many gestures have a pointing component, and many seem to be “pure” 
points. These gestures are under closer investigation also in the paper. Pointing 
gestures —  or rather, gestures which have a clear pointing component (Kendon 
1998) —  represent a relatively simple kind of gestural action where, by 
examining the combinations of movement, body part and handshape types 
employed, we might rather easily gather data that bear on the issue of “com- 
positionality” in gesture. The aim of the experiment in the article was to under­
stand space-relation gestures and со verbal speech in face-to-face interaction. 
During the experiment the gesture indicating “this over there”, “this over here”, 
etc. appeared very often before the most important concept of the sentence. The 
concept mostly denoted an object or the shape of a path. According to Kendon, 
the depictive movement combines with pointing.
According to Schegloff (1984) the word to with the gesture is presumed to 
be related is its “lexical affiliate”. The underlying assumption here, accepted by 
most researchers in the field, is that if there is cognitive coordination between 
the verbal and gestural channels, the related processes must temporally overlap. 
Iconic gestures usually start before the related speech event (Butterworth and 
Bettie 1978; Kendon 1980; McNeill 1985; Morrel-Samuels and Krauss 1992).
McNeill (1992) holds a very different view of speech production. In his 
view, linguistic processing evolves from generic units, “growth points”, con­
taining the meaning of the whole idea-to-be-expressed in an embryonic form. In 
this view, only the analysis of temporal, pragmatic and semantic relations, but 
not the eventual size of the verbal unit, is relevant to understanding the gesture. 
According to McNeill, gesture and speech arise together from an underlying 
propositional representation that has both visual and linguistic aspects; the 
relationship between gesture and speech is essential to production and 
comprehension of meaning (Cassell, McNeill, McCullough 1999).
Now, in the majority of cases, the onset of iconic gesture is known to 
precede the onset of the related speech unit (Butterworth and Beattie 1978;
4 13
Morrel-Samuels and Krauss 1992). Hadar and Butterworth have presented a 
model to explain the relation between iconic gesture generation and speech 
production (Hadar and Butterworth 1997: 161-162). The first fundamental as­
sumption of the model is that conceptual processing activates visual imagery, 
presumably automatically and presumably to the extent that the features in­
volved in the conceptual processing are imageable. The second fundamental 
assumption is that a visual image mediates between conceptual processing and 
the generation of iconic gestures. The model (see also Hadar and Butterworth 
1997: 163) proposes that the visual image facilitates word-finding in three 
distinct ways: by focusing on conceptual processing, by holding core features 
during semantic reselection, and by directly activating word forms in the phono­
logical lexicon. Word-finding failures tend to elicit imagery and the associated 
gestures. Conceptual (“message level”) processing constructs or selects a set of 
semantic features to be realized linguistically. The processing may also activate 
a visual image via the preverbal route. The visual image may, in turn, feed into 
the conceptualization process, and hence into the subsequent processes of word- 
finding. The idea here is that the visual image will be translated back into 
semantic features that can then engage in conceptual processing. This influential 
model proposes that there is a “direct route” from a visual image to the 
phonological form, which can facilitate the activation of the form.
The study Metaphoric gestures and concomitant verbal phrases: Estonian 
evidence (Tenjes 2001b (submitted)) investigates how metaphoric gestures and 
verbal expressions are related in Estonian, As Cienki (1998) has already shown, 
verbal metaphoric expressions do not necessarily co-occur with metaphoric 
gestures, or vice versa. This paper focuses on the hand gestures that accompany 
speech. Two slightly different aspects have been studied: (1) which type of 
gestures co-occur with Estonian verbal metaphoric expressions, if any; (2) how 
metaphoric gestures work in different conversational situations in Estonian.
Metaphor is the use of an expression in a novel and figurative sense on the 
basis of similarity. The understanding of metaphor as a figurative use of word 
makes it ubiquitous; however, it also blurs the concept of the metaphor. One of 
the main functions of metaphor is that it enables us to name things by means of 
other things. Word meanings are multifaceted, and the content of both poetic 
and philosophical thinking is primarily a kaleidoscopic association of meanings 
and semantic components in new combinations. There is no doubt that one of 
the aims of this kaleidoscope game is to maintain order and stability in people’s 
attitudes (Kaplinski 1997: 220). It could well be one of the functions of 
metaphor.
It is not always clear, which types of gesture co-occur with a verbal phrase. 
As we know, on the one hand, metaphor entails iconicity. On the other hand, 
iconicity entails metaphor (Hiraga 1998). Hiraga’s views help to establish the 
mutual relationships between hand gestures and language more clearly.
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When we examine examples of discourse, we can also find evidence that 
mode of expression in gesture and mode of expression in speech have much in 
common. Thus co-speech gesturing is often employed to provide concrete 
visual images of actions, shapes, spatial relationships or movements through 
space that are metaphors for abstract concepts (McNeill 1987, Calbris 1990). It 
is notable that the metaphors employed in gesture are the same as the metaphors 
that find expression verbally.
The paper focuses on metaphoric gestures accompanying verbal expressions 
in Estonian. In everyday conversation, metaphoric gestures either accompany 
metaphoric expressions or act independently, supporting either the entire phrase 
or concept. Without language, however, comprehension would be more diffi­
cult. Thus, metaphor belongs rather to language, and iconicity belongs rather to 
the hand. It may be that language has developed from manual pointing to 
symbolic meaning, and metaphor gives a new (meaning) facet to a bleached 
word. These theoretical considerations are under closer discussion in this article.
An investigation of how metaphoric expressions and metaphoric gestures 
function in Estonian we can see that in many cases the Estonian metaphoric 
expressions and gestures do not have a metaphoric equivalent in English. 
Therefore, I had to ask from myself Why is it so after all? Where is the place 
where the gesture and language meet before the expression is uttered (many 
studies of gestures have indicated that they do meet)? Professor Haldur Õim 
(2001, personal communication) has suggested that the solution may be offered 
by the ideas about relativity in language. These ideas, originally associated with 
the 19th-century linguist W. von Humboldt, are discussed in the article.
3. Data and methodology
In the article Gestures in Dialogue (Tenjes 1996), I have used the data recorded at 
a TV studio in Tartu, Estonia. For about a year, it was possible to observe in 
detail materials recorded in the studio. I reduced the choice to the dialogues in 
the recordings. The studio had envisaged a series called Men o f stagnation (it 
was aired later under a different name). The interviewer (marked by initials PU) 
talks to people well-known in Estonia from the Soviet period, the so-called 
stagnation period. The minimal length of one conversation is 60 minutes, the 
maximum 90 minutes. Three different men were interviewed at different times 
in 1994. The researcher could observe the all the ‘raw’ material. The dialogue 
has been noted down in detail: a question, the answer and all accompanying 
hand movements, expressive facial movements and, when possible, also the 
movements of legs.
The preceding question or text is presented in brackets to make the following 
utterance easier to understand. The dotted line between utterances indicates that 
there is a sentence (or more) between the preceding question and the following
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answer. The underlined part of the utterance indicates at what moment (parallel 
to) the words the gesture was performed. If there were more than one gesture 
during an utterance then each subpart of the utterance is followed by the number 
of the gesture. Descriptions of the gesture and its possible verbal counterpart are 
provided just after the utterance. In case of multiple gestures the enumeration of 
description corresponds to the number of the gesture. Where possible, the 
features of oral speech have been preserved. Dots in the middle of an utterance 
denote pauses in the natural flow of speech.
The article makes use of part of the material from conversations with all the 
three men. The processed material contains interactive and topic gestures 
corresponding to the classification by Bavelas et aL While the processed 
material generally confirms their theory, some new possibilities and hypotheses 
have also opened up. Although the material can be classified as interviews, it is 
dialogic in essence.
In one of the interviews the interviewer PU and the respondent KK are 
sitting in a backstage room, evidently on a bigger box-like thing/item. The 
camera is placed so that KK faces it directly; PU is to the right of KK and 
sidewise to the camera (from the viewer’s point of view) but to the left of KK 
(from his position). The right-left dichotomy has been considered in the analysis 
from the interlocutors’ own point of view when describing the interactive 
gestures (when KK looks left then he looks towards the interviewer PU) but 
from the viewers’point of view when describing topic gestures. It has no impact 
on the analysis of the content of topic gestures. The left-right dichotomy has 
been considered in a similar way in all the dialogues. KK uses a stationary 
microphone and PU a directed one. In all cases, the question and answer contain 
more than one utterance.
In the second dialogue the interlocutors are sitting in the storeroom of the 
theatre on comfortable period-style chairs. The respondent JA has a table in 
front of him; thus we can speak about certain movements or leg positions in a 
minimal way.
The third interview has been recorded at different places, but mostly in the 
respondent KR home, where they are sitting on a sofa. They also walk around 
and visit a church. Part of the interview takes place on a building site.
In the papers Gestures and spatial relationships in Estonian (Tenjes b (in 
press)) and Gestures in communication and their use fo r  pointing and referring 
in space: Estonian examples (Tenjes 2001b) the pointing gestures were studied 
together with Estonian verbal expressions. The examples come from an 
experiment where the subjects had to go on an imaginary journey and describe 
it to another person, the “guest”. En route the “guest” was shown some historic 
and cultural sights. The subjects did not know that the goal of the experiment 
was to investigate the gestures. They worried about their knowledge of history. 
All of them know the region of the town well enough to image the journey and 
to describe it. Each “guide” “went” from the starting point to the destination in
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10 minutes (narrative time). 11 subjects were videotaped. Two aspects were 
analyzed: (1) the gestures that indicated space, spatial relations, or spatio- 
temporal relations, (2) the concomitant words or phrases. The gestures that 
indicated spatial relations were studied together with the concomitant Estonian- 
language expressions.
In the article Gestures as pre-positions in communication (Tenjes 2001a (sub­
mitted)) there are some examples about iconic gestures as points or 
foreshadowed gestures used in an interview. Here I have used one of the TV 
interviews —  the one where the interviewer PU and the respondent KK are 
talking in the backstage room. The underlined part of the utterance indicates at 
what moment (parallel to) the words the gesture was performed. In all cases, the 
question and answer contain more than one utterance. In this article I have also 
used the results of the experiment where the subjects had to go on an imaginary 
journey and describe it to another person.
In the article Metaphoric Gestures and Concomitant Verbal Phrases: Estonian 
Evidence (Tenjes 2001b (submitted)) metaphoric gestures were studied together 
with Estonian verbal expressions. The examples come from four different
sources:
(1) From the Estonian TV weekly-review program Brauser (videotaped);
(2) The experiment where the subjects had to go an imaginary journey and 
described it to another person;
(3) Students’ free conversation about an Estonian historian finding the oldest 
Estonian settlement place, dated from 11 000 years ago;
(4) The 1999 election campaign in Estonia (videotaped).
All the experiments involved students from the University of Tartu.
4. Structure of the thesis
The thesis consists of six articles in two languages (Estonian, English), an 
introduction describing the topic, overview of the articles, data and methodo­
logy of the thesis and summarizing previous research of relevance to the study. 
The summary gives the most important results of the study. Two of the articles 
discuss theoretical approaches related to gestures; four articles focus on gesture- 
related studies and experiments, addressing primarily the iconic and metaphoric 
gestures accompanying Estonian speech. The studies also make reference to 
theories of spatial cognition and metaphor.
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5. An overview of the previous research 
of relevance to the studies
The question of the meaning and functions of gestures has arisen time and again 
throughout the long history of the investigation of gestures. Gestures have been 
treated together with language and used in providing explanation to the rise and 
origin of language. The history of investigating gestures dates back to ancient 
times. Expressive behaviour caught the attention of several Greek philosophers, 
the most influential among whom was Aristotle, whose analyses were recorded 
in Physiognomia, De Anima, Parva Naturalia. Roman studies of gestures did 
not transcend delimiting certain types of gestures and notifying some of their 
specific features. Thus, Cicero differentiates between significative and de­
monstrative gestures and Quintilian distinguishes between gestures that natu­
rally accompany words and gestures that signify something by imitating it 
(Payrato 1985).
The Middle Ages inherited many gestures from Antiquity (e.g., rhetorical 
gestures for declamatio, legal gestures of dextrarum iunctio, the or ans gesture of 
prayer), as well as the intellectual tools with which to think and speak about 
gestures. The words and notions of gestus, gesticulatio, motus, came from Anti­
quity along with their intellectual, moral or scientific context: the ethics of 
social behaviour; the art of rhetoric; music; and the medical inquiry. Christianity 
deeply transformed that legacy and took up all of these notions, combining them 
with other patterns inherited from the Bible (Schmitt 1992).
The earliest book devoted exclusively to gestures appeared at the beginning 
of the 17th century. We know the work under the name Chirologia: Or the 
Natural Language o f the Hand by J. Bulwer (1644). John Bulwer was an 
English physician who invented the deaf-and-dumb language and who also 
dreamed of an international language of gestures. Man has two sources of 
discourse, “his mouth and his hand”, words and gestures; “ ... the Hand, that 
busie instrument, is most talkative, whose language is easily perceived and 
understood as if Man had another mouth or fountaine of course in his Hand” 
(Barasch 1987: 2). John Bulwer published his first two books, Chirologia and 
Chironomia, in 1644. Forming a natural pair, they were issued together and are 
most conveniently described as a unit, although they have separate pagination 
and Bulwer always refers to them as separate works. The full titles read Chiro­
logia; or the Natvrall Lanvage o f the Hand. Composed o f  the Speaking Motions 
and Discoursing Gestures thereof, and Chironomia; or the Art o f Manuall 
Rhetoricke. Consisting o f  the Naturall Expressions, digested by Art in the Hand, 
as the chiefest Instrument o f Eloquence, by Historicall M anifesto’s, exemplified 
out o f  the Authentique Registers o f Common Life, and Civill Conversation. 
Chirologia/Chironomia is a tour de force  of single-minded scholarship, an 
encyclopedic compendium of manual gesture (Wollock 1996: 3).
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The 18th century French philosopher Etienne Condillac1 has presented the 
idea that language emerged not from vocalization, but from manual gestures and 
switched to vocal mode in human evolution.
La mirnica degli antichi investigata nel gestire napoletano (The Mimic Art o f  
the Ancients Investigated in Neopolitan Gesture) (1832), written by Andrea de 
Jorio (1769-1851) is perhaps one of the most complex and systematic treatises 
of kinesics published in the 19th century. His work provides us with one of the 
most valuable traditional collection of gestures (Kendon 1993). Andrea de Jorio 
found in his study that the gestural system used in ancient Italy was the same as 
the one used by his contemporaries. He concluded that on the basis of the 
existing language of gestures one could successfully interpret gestural images 
on Greek vases, in reliefs and sculptures. An extended study of Andrea de 
Jorio’s classic work on Neapolitan gesture has been published in an annotated 
English translation of the book with an Introduction and Notes by Adam 
Kendon. De Jorio’s book is a valuable source of ideas leading to hypotheses 
about the adaptive functions of gesture as a communicative strategy in the 
Neapolitan context, and it may also contribute to the development of ideas for a 
modem description of the gestural repertoire of the Neapolitan region (Kendon 
2000).
The 19th-century scholars studied facial expressions and the effect of various 
external influences on facial expressions. G. Duchenne (1862) published a study 
of facial muscles in which he used mild electrical stimulation to produce the 
appearance of emotional expressions on the paralyzed face of an old man. 
Duchenne took photographs of his subject’s electrically stimulated expressions, 
and these photos were used by Darwin in his study of facial expressions. 
Charles Bell (1865) published his investigation of facial expressions about the 
same time. Both Duchenne and Bell influenced C. Darwin (1965/1872), who 
published “The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals” in 1872. 
Darwin argued that facial expressions are innate, thus suggesting certain non­
verbal universals. Some of his ideas about emotional response shape research 
more than a century later (Knapp 1963; Ekman 1973).
As Darwin’s ideas were getting established in Europe, the behaviourist 
paradigm was beginning to gain ground in America. Studies of nonverbal 
communication relied on the views of Sherman (1927a, 1927b) and Landis 
(1924; 1929). They argue that expressions were socially learned habits. By the 
1930s interest in gestures had increased considerably both in Europe and 
America, which is reflected in the number of books written and experiments 
carried out on gestures during the period. In 1924, Maurice Haim Krout wrote a 
treatise on understanding the social and psychological significance of gestures.
1 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780), French philosopher, born at Grenoble. 
He based all knowledge on the senses, his works including Essai sur l ’origine des 
connaisances humaines (1746, ‘Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge’) and Traite 
des sensations (1754, ‘Treatise on Sensations’).
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In his “Course in Public Speaking” in 1924, Joseph Albert Mosher emphasized 
the importance of gestures in speaking.
The anthropological-linguistic foundations for the study of nonverbal 
communication were being set by F. Boas, E. Sapir, L. Bloomfield. D. Efron 
and E. Sapir were the students of F. Boas. In the 1930s, Boas was concerned 
with countering the Nazi theories of a master race. He encouraged D. Efron to 
study the gestural communication of immigrant Jews and Italians in New 
York’s Lower East Side. In 1941, Efron wrote “Gesture and Environment”. 
This much-quoted work is also one of the studies regarding gestures from a 
cross-cultural perspective. Studying the gesticulation of Southern Italians and 
East-European Jews, Efron found that while Italians made extensive use of 
illustrative gestures, as if illustrating conversation with slides, Jews used 
gestures of a rather ‘abstract’ nature (Efron 1941/1972).
Building on the linguistic tradition in anthropology, R. Birdwhistell (1952) 
advanced an alternate scheme for analyzing body communication. Stimulated 
by Sapir, Bloomfield, Bateson and Mead, Birdwhistell attempted to frame a 
comprehensive coding scheme for body motion, just as the linguists had done 
for spoken language. Where the linguist identified a phone, a minimal sound, 
Birdwhistell proposed the kine, a minimal movement. Where the linguist 
isolated a phoneme, a group of interchangeable sounds, Birdwhistell sought the 
kineme, a set of interchangeable movements. Where the linguist looked for the 
meaningful morpheme, Birdwhistell searched for the kinemorph, a range of 
movement that would be meaningful in the context of larger patterns. The aim 
of the structural approach to nonverbal communication, represented by 
Birdwhistell, is to provide a set of normative examples used by the interacting 
parties. The behaviour of the interacting parties is assumed to be regulated, to 
an extent, by hidden communicative codes. The structuralist ambition was to 
establish the degree to which the hidden codes of action form an organized 
structure. The theoretical foundations of these views share several features with 
descriptive, or structural, linguistics; cultural anthropology and structural 
sociology. The study of bodily movements performing communicative func­
tions in interaction is referred to as kinesics, by analogy with linguistics. This is 
another term suggested by Birdwhistell, who has published several well-known 
works on kinesics (Birdwhistell 1952, 1970). His greatest contribution to the 
field is his claim about the emphasizing function of kinesics in verbal speech. 
Where bodily movements are closely tied with the flow of speech, various 
kinesic markers can perform an important function. Birdwhistell’s views have 
been criticized by Dittmann (1971), who argues that although bodily move­
ments may have a communicative function, there is not much overlap with the 
structure of speech. Goffman, an early student of Birdwhistell, moved away 
from the linguistic tradition to provide a sociological perspective in his works. 
He has focused on the presentation of self and the collaborative efforts of 
participants in social interaction.
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Nonverbal communication has also captured the attention of psychiatrists. 
Nonverbal symbols had been part of the psychiatrist’s tool kit since the days of 
Freud and Jung. In the 1950s, clinicians were becoming increasingly aware of 
the nonverbal interaction taking place in therapy (Ruesch 1955; Ruesch and 
Bateson 1951; Ruesch and Kees 1956). Ruesch proposed a categorization of 
nonverbal signs into three “languages” ; (a) sign language, where nonverbal 
symbols replaced words, numbers, and punctuation; (b) action language, where 
behaviours not intended as communication actually do have informational value 
to the perceiver; and (c) object language, the intentional and unintentional 
display of objects, including the body and clothing.
The views of the experimental psychologists of the 1950s might best be 
represented by Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum. Osgood later extended his 
dimensional theory to nonverbal signs (Osgood 1959). Since the book, research 
has been reported on art objects, colour, music, and film.
This sampling of book-length contributions of the decade reflects the state of 
research at midcentury: (a) a growing number of scholars, from a range of 
disciplines, was becoming aware of, and interested in, nonverbal communica­
tion; (b) much of the research was anecdotal, based on insightful observation, 
but with little attempt to systematically record or replicate; (c) theory was 
primitive, the most comprehensive paradigm being an extension of the linguistic 
model; (d) potential major issues were not as yet being framed into testable 
hypotheses; and (e) methodology, and particularly technology, limited the range 
of nonverbal phenomena being studied (Harrison 1973).
Anthropology and psychology were the strongest early forces in the field. 
Their encounter in language led to the emergence of psycholinguistics. Psycho­
therapists have a strong pragmatic interest in the field. Sociologists and social 
psychologists found their place between psychology and anthropology.
During the 2nd half of the 20th century, the field was dominated by gestural 
studies. By convention, the term ‘gestures’ refers only to hand movements. A 
number of studies have focussed on classifying gestures. As a result, there is a 
multitude of excellent classification of gesture, which makes selecting the ‘best’ 
ones a difficult task.
Efron first distinguished emblems, which are gestures that replace words and 
are encoded arbitrarily and with intent (e.g., the hand signals of a baseball 
catcher or coach). Next, he identified several types of gestures that are used in 
conjunction with speech: (a) batons, movements that accent a particular word or 
phrase; (b) ideographs, movements that trace the flow of an idea; (c) deictic 
gestures, movements that point to available referents; (d) spatial gestures, 
movements that portray relationships in space; and (e) kinetographs, move­
ments that depict a bodily action (Efron 1972/1941). The classifications most 
often referred to today are those building on Efron, especially the ones sug­
gested by Kendon and McNeill. The broadest division of gestures proposed by 
Kendon is into two large categories: gestural systems and sign languages. Ken­
don draws a distinction between speech-associated gesturing, which somehow
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provides a direct representation of some aspect of the content of what is being 
said, and gesturing that appears to have a more abstract sort of relationship to 
the content of speech (Kendon 1986: 31). McNeill distinguishes between four 
types of gestures, which have been shown to occur with narrative discourse 
(McNeill 1992): 1) iconics depict, by the form of the gesture, some feature of 
the action or event being described; 2) metaphoric gestures are also repre­
sentational, but the concept being depicted has no physical form; 3) deictics 
spatialize, or locate aspects of the story being narrated in the physical space in 
front of the narrator; 4) beat gestures: small baton like movements that do not 
change in form with the content of the accompanying speech.
Most researchers divide hand gestures into two large groups: (1) gestures in 
conversation, and (2) stereotypic hand signals used in non-speech contexts (e.g., 
hitchhiking, the OK sign, etc.). This division is compatible with Kendon’s 
classification. These topics have been discussed in more detail in the publica­
tions listed below. Of the many definitions of hand gesture, the following could 
be provided here: a gesture is a hand movement accompanying speech and 
acquiring its meaning in the context o f  conversation or possessing a language- 
independent meaning (Tenjes 1996: 171).
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CONCLUSIONS
The most important conclusions from the research can be summarized under six
headings:
(1) the occurrence of gestures before the related lexical unit;
(2) the occurrence of conversational gestures in Estonian dialogue;
(3) the universality of pointing gestures;
(4) theoretical considerations in explaining iconicity and metaphoricity in 
language;
(5) metaphorical expressions, gestures and linguistic relativity;
(6) the connection of gestures to cognition through a flow, a process or a flow 
of information.
1. The occurrence of gestures before the related lexical unit.
During the experiments the gesture indicating “this over there”, “this over 
here”, etc. appeared very often before the most important concept of the sen­
tence. The concept mostly denoted an object or the shape of a path. It may be 
concluded from the data that three points, gestures that refer briefly to then, he 
and this, appear just before the word.
Generally, all gestures are initiated far before the speech-unit to which they 
“belong” . They preface speech units and prefigure the concepts communicated 
by them. The semantic relationship between the profiles supplied by the gesture 
and those encoded in lexical units are manifold. If there is cognitive coordi­
nation between the verbal and gestural channels, the related processes must 
temporally overlap. Iconic gestures usually start before the related speech event. 
In the majority of cases, the onset of iconic gesture is known to precede the 
onset of the related speech unit. The data show that the onset of a gesture pre­
cedes its lexical affiliate. Iconic gestures in speech are largely related to lexical 
search and such gestures play an important role in lexical retrieval.
2. The occurrence of conversational gestures in Estonian dialogue.
Gestures receive the attention of the listener and thereby become components of 
conceptual understanding. Gestures are functionally adapted to the requirements 
of understanding in human communication.
The analysis of Estonian dialogue demonstrated that the classification of 
conversational gestures suggested by Bavelas and her colleagues is largely 
applicable to Estonian. Naturally, there could not have been a hundred percent 
overlap. However, that certain overlap does exist shows that the nature of 
human gestures is more ‘basic’ than language. It is possible to say that the 
model developed by Bavelas and her colleagues functions also in Estonia. A 
gesture can simultaneously have more than one function. The functions served 
by individual interactive gestures in conversation are heterogeneous. What they 
all have in common is a reference to the addressee. Interactive gestures have
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also verbal equivalents. The speaker can insert an interactive gesture quickly 
and with the minimal interruption of the topical flow.
3. The universality of pointing gestures.
The research on pointing and referring gestures revealed that for some concepts 
the interlocutor must add a gesture to make oneself fully understood. The data 
indicate that people often use words like ‘this’, ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘this over there’ 
and ‘on the left’ or ‘on the right’. It appears that pointing gestures which 
indicate spatial relations perform a strongly communicative role. It means that 
subjects pointed to the left or to the right, etc. with or without concomitant 
words. The extra meaning is communicated by means of the gesture. The 
pointing gesture has an independent meaning and it substitutes the word which 
marked the spatial relations. In face-to-face interaction, the pointing gestures 
have strongly communicative value in the context of direction with regard to the 
egocentric coordinate system (left, right, here, there).
This study indicates that referring gestures have two simultaneous roles: (a) 
to point to spatial relations and (b) to image (to denote) the most important 
concept in the sentence that follow s . There is a clear semantic link between the 
gesture and the emphasized word in the accompanying speech. It shows 
connections on the deep psychological level in the human mind. The pointing 
gestures in spatial relations do not depend on a specific language.
4. Theoretical considerations in explaining iconicity and metaphoricity in 
language.
If metaphor belongs to language, and if one speculates that language originated 
from hand gestures, then iconicity, metaphoricity, and symbolism in language 
become fully understandable. Pointing and referring hand gestures were the first 
means of communication. The transition to articulated speech occurred step by 
step, and the role of the hand diminished. The primary ‘metaphorical transfer’ 
occurred when the iconic meanings of hand gestures became meanings 
expressed by voice. They came to be used as symbols with a certain meaning. In 
the course of time, there occurred a ‘second metaphorical transfer’ —  the 
expression was permanently transferred to other similar situations. It would be 
more accurate to say that from this moment on, one is dealing with ‘metaphori­
cal transfer’ as a certain process, where symbols become new metaphors and 
new meanings emerge. In this process, the hand cannot act any more as the 
performer of the primary role because this role has been delegated to language. 
On the other hand, it has still maintained many functions that are not fully clear 
as yet.
5. Metaphorical expressions, gestures and linguistic relativity.
The idea of linguistic relativity was first associated with the 19th-century 
linguist Wilhelm von Humboldt. Language classifies the world, and each 
language does it differently. Language may have a deeper layer, the inner form
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according; to Humboldt (G. innere Sprachform). Both gestures and language- 
specific metaphors are associated with this layer. Metaphors are located in the 
verbal layer, but originate in the intermediate layer. Language-specific 
metaphors are thus not ‘bound’ by language. Metaphors emerge from the inter­
mediate layer as a result of very different and complicated kinds of ‘refraction’. 
‘Refraction’ is similar to the way light is refracted on the sphere. This is what 
finding the ground for metaphors, gestures, and word meanings in general so 
complicated and interesting. Language may also have a sub-linguistic deep 
layer, which is universal. Thus, language is a multi-layered phenomenon, and 
metaphor is not universal. Each language has an intermediate, language- 
specific, layer that gives rise to metaphors and gestures. Gestures, too, have an 
intermediate layer, where everything is refracted and reflected. The universal 
layer enters the intermediate layer, is refracted, and the fragments are scattered 
all over the surface layer of language. How can we then establish how what is 
universal is expressed in a certain language? It cannot be easy.
6. The connection of gestures to cognition through a flow, a process or a 
flow of information.
Gestures are fully organized at the outset of speech units. Evidently, then, 
meanings are not transformed into gestural form by way of spoken language 
formats. They are transformed directly, and independently. This means that 
meanings, in whatever way they are stored, are stored separately from the 
formats of spoken language, however abstractly these may be conceived. The 
evidence from gestures thus provides that knowledge is stored in complex 
configurational structures.
The gesture and language have a common base. The connection between the 
gesture and the word may be a process or certain type of information. There 
should be an overlapping area between gestures and concepts. The unit point or 
the unit process lies deeper in human cognition.
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN
Suhtluskäigu reguleerimise mitteverbaalsete vahendite 
sotsiokultuurilised aspektid
Doktoridissertatsioon käsitleb käežestide teoreetilist ja  eksperimentaalset ana­
lüüsi. Uurimistöös vaadeldakse käežestide ja  keele seoseid. Dissertatsiooni 
moodustavates artiklites olen vaadelnud žeste dialoogis, ruumisuhete kontekstis 
ja  seoses metafoorsete väljenditega sotsiokultuurilisest ja  kognitiivsest aspek­
tist. Samuti olen käsitlenud hüpoteesi keele tekkimisest käežestidest ja  seisu­
kohti žestidest keskajal. Artiklites, kus käsitletakse eksperimente ja  nende tule­
musi, vaadeldakse ka teoreetilisi seisukohti žestidest, nende olemusest, klassifi­
katsioonist ja  seostest teiste teoreetiliste paradigmadega, nagu ruumi kognitiiv- 
sus ja  metafooriteooria. Vaatluse all on peamiselt ikoonilised ja  metafoorsed 
žestid. Dissertatsiooni käsitlevate artiklite aluseks olnud uurimistööst selguvad 
järgmised tulemused.
1. Žestide esiletulemine enne nendega seotud leksikaalset üksust
Žest võib alata hulk aega enne temaga assotsiatiivselt seotud leksikaalset üksust. 
Zestifraas võib sageli leida otsetee enne kõnefraasi, millega nad assotsiatiivse 
seose kaudu koos alustasid. Seda teemat olen lähemalt käsitlenud artiklis Žestid 
kui pre-positsioonid suhtluses.
Eksperimendi tulemusena oli näha, et žest, mis osutab “see seal”, “see siin” 
jne, ilmub väga sageli enne kõige olulisemat mõistet lauses. Mõiste märgib 
enamasti kas objekti või tee kuju ja  suunda. Andmetest võis järeldada, et nt 
kolm osutajat —  žestid, mis viitavad lühikese viipega “siis”, “ta” ja  “see” — 
ilmusid just enne vastavat sõna.
Üldistatult võib väita, et kõik žestid algavad palju varem nende juurde 
kuuluvatest kõneüksusest. Nad eelnevad kõneüksustele ja  kujutavad eelnevalt 
nendega suhestunud mõisteid. Semantiline seos žestiga kujutatu ja  leksikaal­
setesse üksustesse kodeeritu vahel on mitmekesine. Kui verbaalse ja  žestilise 
kanali vahel on kognitiivne koordinatsioon, siis peavad need seotud protsessid 
osaliselt ajaliselt kattuma. Ikoonilised žestid algavad tavaliselt enne nendega 
seotud kõneüksust. On kindlaks tehtud, et enamikul juhtudel eelneb ikoonilise 
žesti algus temaga seotud kõneüksuse algusele. Uuringud näitasid, et žesti algus 
eelnes tema leksikaalsele liitlasele. Ikoonilised žestid kõnes on suures osas 
suunatud leksikaalsele otsingule ja  sellistel žestidel on oluline funktsionaalne 
roll sõna taas leidmisel.
2. Vestlusžestide esiletulemine eestikeelses dialoogis
Žestide ülesandeks on vestluse kui sotsiaalse süsteemi alalhoidmine ja  toeta­
mine. Interaktiivsetel žestidel on dialoogis nii kuulaja kaasamise kui ka 
vestluste reguleerija funktsioon. Žest saavutab kuulaja tähelepanu ja  muutub
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seeläbi kontseptuaalse mõistmise komponendiks. Žestid on funktsionaalselt 
kohandatud vajadusele hõlbustada arusaamist inimestevahelises suhtluses.
Eestikeelse dialoogi analüüsimisel selgus, et see toetab küllaltki hästi J. B. Ba- 
velase ja  tema kolleegide pakutud käežestide jaotust vestlusžestideks. Loomulikult 
ei saanud kattuvus olla täielik ja  selle tuvastamine polnud ka töö eesmärk. Et 
mingid kattuvused on võimalikud, näitab žestide algsemat olemist inimeses, kui 
võib olla on seda keel. J. B. Bavelase ja  tema kolleegide pakutud mudel töötab ka 
väljaspool nende uuritud piirkonda —  Eestis. Žestidel võib olla rohkem kui üks 
funktsioon korraga. Interaktiivsete žestide funktsioonid on juba ühel isikul vestluse 
jooksul küllaltki heterogeensed. Kuid kõigil neil on ühine joon — viitamine 
adressaadile. Interaktiivsetel žestidel on verbaalselt sõnastatav vaste. Kõneleja saab 
interaktiivseid žeste teha kõnevoolu katkestamata.
3. Osutavate žestide teatud universaalsus
Osutavatel žestidel, mis näitasid ruumisuhteid, on tugev kommunikatiivne roll 
ja  nad võivad asendada sõna, mis tähistab ruumiseoseid. Antud uuring näitas, et 
osutavatel žestidel on kaks rolli samal ajal: 1) esile tuua ruumisuhteid ja  2) 
kujutada kõige olulisemat mõistet, mis lausungis järgneb. See tähendab, et 
katseisikud osutasid vasakule või paremale jne koos kaasneva sõnaga (“vasakul, 
näed” + liigutus vasakule) või ilma kaasneva sõnata (“siin” + liigutus vasakule/ 
paremale). Lisatähendus kaasnes žestiga. Osutavad žestid ruumisuhetes ei sõltu 
keelest ja  vastupidi.
4. Teoreetilised seisukohad ikoonilisuse ja metafoorsuse selgitamiseks 
keeles
Kui metafoor kuulub keele juurde ja  kui spekuleerida teemal, et keel arenes 
käežestidest, siis on nii ikoonilisus, metafoorsus kui ka sümbol keeles täiesti 
mõistetavad. Käe osutavad ja  viitavad žestid olid suhtluses esmasteks vahen­
diteks. Esmane nn metafoorne ülekanne toimus siis, kui käežestide ikoonilised 
tähendused läksid üle häälega väljendatud tähendusteks. Neid hakati kasutama 
kui sümboleid, millel on kindel tähendus. Ajajooksul toimunud väljendi perma­
nentne ülekandumine teistesse samasugustesse situatsioonidesse oli nn teine 
metafoorne ülekanne. Õigem oleks öelda, et sellest alates toimubki nn meta­
foorne ülekandumine kui protsess, kus sümbolid muutuvad uuteks metafoori­
deks ja  tekivad uued tähendused. Käsi ei saa selles protsessis olla enam esmase 
rolli kandja, kuna ta on selle rolli delegeerinud keelele.
5. Keeleline relativism seoses metafoorsete žestide ja eestikeelsete meta­
foorsete väljenditega
Metafoorid töötavad žestides nii, nagu metafoore võib leida verbaalsetes väljen­
dites. Metafoor on mõtlemisprotsessi oluline osa. Olles uurinud, kuidas meta­
foorsed väljendid ja  metafoorsed žestid funktsioneerivad eesti keeles, pean vaja­
likuks viidata teatud keelelisele relativismile. Keeles võib olla sügavam kiht, 
sisevorm W. von Humboldti järgi (sks innere Sprachform). Sealt tulevad žestid
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ja  seal sünnivad keelespetsiifilised metafoorid. Meie igapäevakeeles — verbaal­
ses kihis —  on vormistatud sõnad ja  žestid. Metafoorid on verbaalses kihis, aga 
metafoor sünnib vahekihist. Viidates äsjaöeldud vahekihile keeles, võib öelda, 
et need keelespetsiifilised metafoorid pole keeles “kinni” . Teatud keeleline 
relativism on olemas, samuti skeem. Metafoorid mitte niivõrd ei asu, vaid 
sünnivad vahekihist väga erinevate ja  keeruliste murdumiste tulemusena. 
Murdumine on nagu valguse murdumine sfääril. Keeles võib olla ka n-ö keele­
alune süvakiht, mis on universaalne. Seega, keel on mitmekihiline ja  metafoor 
pole universaalne. Igas keeles on keelespetsiifiline kiht, millest sünnivad 
metafoorid ja  žestid. See on vahekiht. Vahekiht on ka žestidel, kus kõik murdub 
ja  peegeldub. Universaalne kiht tuleb vahekihti, murdub ja  killud lendavad 
pindmisse keelekihti laiali.
6. Žestide seos kognitiivsusega võib toimuda, protsessi, voo või infovoo 
kaudu
Keele ja  käežestide puutepunktid on seotud inimese üldise kognitiivsusega. 
Vastavalt inimese üleüldisele kognitiivsusele võib aluseks olev seos žesti ja  
sõna vahel olla protsess või teatud liiki informatsioon. Žestid võivad olla 
kehastunud info tõlgendused kavatsusliku ja  arusaava vaimu vahel. Žestidel ja  
mõistetel peab olema kattuv ala. See näitab seoseid sügaval inimmõistuse või 
inimvaimu psühholoogilisel tasandil. Selline kattuv ala märgitseb teatud 
heterogeensust. Heterogeensus on inimteadvuse igipõline omadus ja  selle tead­
vuse mehhanismile on tingimata vajalik vähemalt kahe süsteemi kohalolek, mis 
poleks lõpuni teineteiseks tõlgitavad.
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KEELE ŽESTILISE PÄRITOLU HÜPOTEES1
SILVI TENJES
1. Sissejuhatus
Uurides käežeste ja  inimeste suhtlemist, võib küsida, miks me žestikuleerime, 
kui me kõneleme? Me teeme kindlasti žeste, kuigi me enamasti ise seda terava 
teadlikkusega ei taju. Seega, suhtluses kasutame me kõik ka žeste, mitte ainult 
itaallased! Millisel hetkel ilmub žest meie lausungi kaaslaseks? Kas on mõned 
olulisemad kategooriad, mida väljendades kaasame žesti? Kas žest on ka 
metafooriline? Kuidas on žestid ajaloos muutunud? Nendele ja  paljudele teistele 
küsimustele vastuste otsimisega tegelevadki žestiuurijad nii meil kui mujal 
maailmas. Antud artiklis püüame ühelt poolt minna ajas tagasi ning võtame 
vaatluse alla hüpoteesi, et enne kõne tekkimist suhtles meie eellane hoopis käte 
vahendusel, teiselt poolt vaatame, kuhu on jäänud sellest suhtlusest jälgi tänasel 
päeval. Seejuures võime ka küsida, miks inimene üldse kõnelema hakkas? 
Michael Corballis (1999), Aucklandi ülikooli psühholoogiaprofessor Uus-Mere- 
maalt väljendub poeetiliselt, et inimkeel võib olla tekkinud käežestidest, mis on 
tänaseks jäänud püsima kui kõnega paaris olev käitumuslik fossiil.
Siinkohal tahaksin teha ühe olulise kitsenduse käesoleva artikli jaoks. Nimelt 
on olemas ja  aktiivselt käibiv teooria kõnest kui žestist ja  keelest kui žestist. 
Neid ideid on viljelenud juba Wilhelm Wundt (1921), öeldes, et hääl on žest 
(sks Der Laut is ein Gebärde), ning arendanud edasi paljud uurijad, sealhulgas 
nt U. Neisser (1976), J. Kelso, E. Saltzman ja  B. Tuller (1986), M. Studdert- 
Kennedy (1987), D. Armstrong, W. Stokoe ja  S. Wilcox (1995) jt. Nende seisu­
kohtade järgi käsitletakse kõneüksusi žestilise fonoloogia terminites, sõnu 
žestide koordineeritud mustritena jms, et mõista ja  selgitada keelt ning kogni- 
tiivsust. See muidu igati huvitav muskulaarne teooria ei leia antud artiklis 
käsitlemist. Kuigi ei saa ka väita, et sel teoorial ja  artiklis käsitletavatel seisu­
kohtadel pole puutepunkte. Antud kiijutises vaatame inimkeele tekkimist käe­
žestidest ning seda hüpoteesi toetavaid kaasaegseid žestiuuringuid.
Inimkeel on bioloogilise evolutsiooni üks kauneimaid ja  keerulisemaid 
tulemusi. Inimese võime sekkuda ümbritsevasse maailma ja  olla edukas on 
sõltuv tema keelevõimest luua uusi ideid, mis lubavad tal muuhulgas põgeneda 
vahetust reaalsusest või kirjeldada sündmusi ja  nähtusi, mis pole kunagi 
eksisteerinud. Kuidas selline nähtus alguse sai? Tänapäeval on keele tekkimise 
võimalike teede kohta palju rohkem faktilist materjali (tänu eriti neuroloogia, 
antropoloogia, paleontoloogia jm  teadusharude viimase sajakonna aasta 
saavutustele), kui näiteks keelte hilisema lahknemise, üksikkeelte, keelkondade
1 Tahaksin tänada oma abikaasat viljakate vestluste eest, mis on aidanud kaasa 
käesoleva artikli valmimisele.
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jne tekkimise kohta. Ja arutelud keele tekkimise üle on asjalikud. Eestikeelses 
kirjanduses seda probleemi peaaegu valgustatud pole. Varem on hüpoteese 
inimkeele tekkimise kohta vaadelnud prof H. Õim (1976), kes artiklis Kas 
inimkeel on päritav? käsitleb E. Lennebergi ideed keele võimalikust bioloo­
gilisest alusest. Uuemaid artikleid on M. Ehala kirjutis, milles ta muuhulgas 
refereerib vokaalse hoolitsuse hüpoteesi kui olulist nähtust keele tekkimisel 
(Ehala 2000).
Keele žestilise päritolu teooria esitajate ajalugu läheb tagasi juba vähemalt 
18. sajandisse (Condillac 1746/1947). Hiljem on seda teemat käsitlenud 
E. Tylor (1868; 1871), L. Morgan (1877), A. Wallace (1881; 1895), G. Roma­
nes (1888), W. Wundt (1900), R. Paget (1930; 1944) ja  A. Johanneson (1949; 
1950). 20. sajandi teisel poolel on hüpoteesi üleval hoidnud G. Hewes (1973a; 
1973b; 1976), A. Kendon (1991), U. Place (1998) ja  M. Corbaliis (1999). Keele 
žestilise lähte ideid toetavad uuringud erinevatest valdkondadest: neuroloo- 
gilised, viipekeelte teoreetilised ja  eri kultuuride lõikes uuringud ning ahvide 
võime suhelda viibete abil. Mõned kõnekeelele iseloomulikud jooned polegi 
žestidest nii radikaalselt erinevad, nagu üldiselt arvatakse. Võime kõnelda võib 
olla tekkinud eraldi keelevõimest ja  kõne kasutamine kui vahend keele jaoks 
võib olla suhteliselt hilja arenenud. Žestide ja  viipekeelte uuringud on samuti 
oluliselt toetanud ideed, et kõne ei ole keele olemuslik koostisosa (Kendon 
1991). Keel on n-ö suurem, sügavam ja  võib olla tõesti kehastunud, kõne on 
keele üks väljundeid. Žestiuuringud on näidanud, kuidas kõnelejad kasutavad 
žesti kui väljendusvahendit, mis on partneriks kõnele lausungi mõistelise 
tähenduse edastamisel.
Artiklis vaadeldakse, milliseid printsiipe saab rakendada keele evolutsiooni­
lise arengu rekonstrueerimisel, arvestades keeletekke hüpoteesi käežestidest. 
Edasi arutletakse mõnede nimetatud printsiipide laiendatud ja  süvendatud 
seisukohtade ning uurimuste üle seoses: 1) inimese evolutsioonilise arenguga; 
2) aju-uuringutega; 3) viipekeeltega; 4) žestide ja  kõne koostööga; 5) keele 
ikoonilisusega; 6) metafoorsusega žestides.
2. Printsiibid keelelise evolutsiooni rekonstrueerimiseks
Kuni kirja tekkimiseni pole keel jätnud otsest, arheoloogiliselt dateeritavat 
jälge. Seepärast on keele järkjärguline evolutsiooniline rekonstrueerimine alati 
spekulatiivne. On siiski kindlaid printsiipe, mida võime rakendada, kui tahame 
otsustada, milline võimalikest rekonstruktsioonidest on ilmsem. Mõned print­
siibid on esitanud Ullin Place oma 1998. aastal taas läbi vaadatud artiklis Käe 
rollist keele evolutsioonis (Place 1998). Ta ütleb, et osa neist printsiipidest 
rakenduvad igasuguse evolutsioonilise rekonstruktsiooni puhul, aga mitmed on 
eriomased keele evolutsioonile. U. Place’i järgi on üldprintsiibid (Place 1998: 
2):
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/. Valikulisuse e selektiivsuse printsiip. Igasuguse keerulise bioloogilise karak­
teristiku areng kulgeb väikeste astmeliste järgnevustena. Iga aste moodustub 
valiku tagajärjel juhusliku muutuse populatsioonist nii, et see muutus, milles 
ta avaldub, annab valikulise paremuse kogu grupile, ning see muutus pole 
esile tulnud üksikus muidu sobivas kohas liikide poolt hõivatud astmel 
evolutsiooniprotsessis.
2. Printsiip, kuidas ontogenees asendab fiilogeneesi. Kuigi fülogeneetiline 
areng ei saa olla ontogeneetilise arenguprotsessi lihtne äralugemine (ingl 
read off), võime siiski eeldada, et need astmed, mis on äratuntavad onto­
geneetilise arengu protsessis, vastavad astmetele, mis puudutavad karakteris­
tikut fülogeneetilises arengus.
3. Printsiip taandarengust varasematele kohastumistele. Kui ühe adaptatsiooni 
ilming oma täiesti küpses vormis blokeeritakse, siis hakkavad organismid 
tagasi pöörduma evolutsiooniprotsessis eelnenud kohanemisvormi juurde.
Printsiibid, mis on eriomased keelelise evolutsiooni rekonstrueerimisele:
1. Lause kui lingvistilise kommunikatsiooni üksus. Keel on primaarselt kom­
munikatsioonivahend. Vastupidiselt J. Fodori (1975) arvamusele on keel ainult 
sekundaarselt ja  derivatiivselt mõtte vahend. Nagu teisedki interpersonaalsed 
kommunikatsioonisüsteemid, koosneb keel inimese, märgi-tekitaja või kõneleja 
poolt esile kutsutud vastustest, millel on sisu ja  prognoositav käitumisele- 
orienteeritud mõju teisele inimesele, märgi-saajale või kuulajale, kellele kõne­
leja lausung on suunatud. B. Skinner (1938) on nimetanud märgi-tekitajaks või 
kõnelejaks seda, kes teeb märke või eraldavaid stiimuleid.
2. Printsiip “mand’i ” ontogeneetilisest primaarsusest. Lause kõige varaja­
sem vorm keelelises evolutsioonis —  nagu see avaldub laste keelelises aren­
g u s— , mida kõnelejad produtseerivad, oli tüüp, mida B. Skinner (1957) 
nimetab mand'iks (< ingl command, request or question — ‘käsk’, ‘palve’ või 
‘küsimus’). Tuues esile mand’i, määratleb kõneleja täpsemalt tegevuse, mis 
kuulajale esitatakse. Toetudes siinjuures taas Skinneri seisukohtadele, väidab 
Place, et kõik esimesed laused pidid olema imperatiivid.
3. Argumendistruktuur. Lause esitab oma tegevuse funktsioonid kui eral­
davad stiimulid teate vastuvõtjale või kuulajale, kujutades seda, mida J. Barwise 
ja  J. Perry (1983) nimetavad situatsiooniks. Situatsioon on olukord, mille puhul 
entiteedi omadused või suhted muutuvad kas ajamomendil (hetkeline sündmus) 
või ajaperioodi jooksul (protsess). M and’i puhul on lause poolt kujutatud 
situatsioon kas sündmus, muutus, mille peab kuulaja sisse tooma, või olukord, 
mida kuulaja peab säilitama. Lause koosneb mitmekohalisest (ingl multi-place) 
predikaadist või verbifraasist ja  nii paljudest argumentidest või noomenifraa­
sidest, kui on vaja situatsiooni kujutamiseks. Argumendid representeerivad eri­
nevaid objekte, mis on kujutatud situatsioonides, millest üks on agent (mand’i 
puhul kuulaja).
4. Lause interpretatsiooni ja  lause konstruktsiooni juhtumid inimliinist 
allpool. Siin on mõeldud katsete tulemusi pudelnina-delfiinidega {Zalophus
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califomiamis), Aafrika halli papagoiga (Psittachus erithacus) või šimpansitega 
1980. aastatel. Uurimustest selgub, et nende liikide esindajatel on võime nii 
vastata stiimulitele kui ka tekitada selliseid stiimuleid, mis kohanduvad lause 
argumendistruktuuri karakteristikuga. Sellised loomade-maailmas produtsee­
ritud laused koosnevad kahest elemendist — predikaadist ja  argumendist. 
Tahtmata laskuda pikemasse arutellu eelnevate näidete ja  väidete üle, kuna see 
viiks kõrvale artikli otsesest sisust, võib ainult mainida, et vastuväiteid nendele 
on sama palju kui pooldavaid seisukohti.
5. Lingvistiliste funktsioonide valik läbi oma tehnoloogilise kasulikkuse. 
Kõige varasemad mutatsioonid e muutused, mis valiti kõigepealt, tegid keele 
arengu võimalikuks. Valikul lähtuti mitte niivõrd nende kasulikkusest seoses 
interpersonaalse kommunikatsiooni protsessiga, kuivõrd kasulikkusest seoses 
küttimise ja  koriluse tehnoloogiaga. Kaks mutatsiooni, mida võidi sel ajal 
valida, olid: 1) need, mis tegid võimalikuks referentsiaalse e viitava osutamise 
ning 2) need, mis tekitasid muutusi suus ja  kõris, tehes võimalikuks häälelise 
kõne tekkimise.
6. Paabeli torni printsiip. Nagu Paabeli torni lugu Piiblis osutab, on sisemine 
seos inimkeele evolutsiooni lähte ja  vastastikku mõistetamatute loomulike 
keelte pärastise arengu vahel, ning inimese usaldus pigem tehnoloogia kui 
füüsiliste karakteristikute arengu vastu uue keskkonnaga kohanemisel. Paabeli 
torni lugu viitab, et sellisele selektsioonile viis kasulikkus, mis oli ilmselt seotud 
tehnoloogiliste projektidega nagu küttimine, püüniste ehitamine suurtele looma­
dele või varjualuse rajamine sinna, kus looduslikke koopaid polnud. Kõik need 
tegevused nõudsid paljude inimeste koordineeritud tegevust.
7. Biheivioristlik ehk keeleõppimise printsiip. Erinevalt keele-eelsetest kom­
munikatsioonisüsteemidest on keel õpitud käitumise vorm. Arbitraarsed stii­
mulid keeles saavad oma funktsioonid sotsiaalsete konventsioonide läbi, mis 
varieeruvad ühest keelest teise.
8. Loomulike märkide ja  keele-eelsete mõistete printsiip. Selleks, et kesk­
konnaga edukalt kohaneda, peab iga vabalt (s.t käte abita) liikuv elav organism 
koos oma keerulise käitumusliku repertuaariga olema võimeline ära tundma 
erinevat liiki objekte ja  situatsioone, mida ta regulaarselt kohtab oma ümbrus­
konnas. Valikud tehakse erinevatest käitumuslikest strateegiatest selliselt, mis 
sobib konkreetsel ajal konkreetses kontekstis. Organism, mis omab korraldust 
käitumuslike paigutuste heraldikas, sobitub erinevate asjaolude mitmekesisu­
sega, mille tõttu satub kokku konkreetse objekti või situatsiooniga. Kohatud 
objektil või situatsioonil on sama liigi asjade keele-eelne kontsept e mõiste.
9. Mõistete ette kindlaksmääramine keskkonnast tingitud juhuslike asjaolude 
poolt. Kõik elusorganismid, kes sõltuvad ellujäämiseks võimest kontseptua- 
liseerida igasuguseid problemaatilisi stiimuleid, mida indiviid kohtab, jagavad 
sellist kontseptuali seerimise skeemi vaatamata erinevustele liikide poolt hõi­
vatud ökoloogilises nišis. Lingvistiline kommunikatsioon, milles sama arbitraar- 
ne sümbol muutub kinnistunuks samale mõistele keelekollektiivi kõikide liik-
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mete jaoks, poleks saanud kunagi areneda ilma sellise ühiselt kasutatud mõiste­
lise skeemita oma baastasandil.
10. Ikoonilisest sümboliliseks arenemise printsiip. Uuringud sünnilt kurtide 
lastega, kel polnud mingeid kokkupuuteid olnud viipekeelega, kuid kes viiplesid 
omatehtud märke (Tervoort 1961; Morford 1996); ameerika viipekeele uurin­
gud, ja  Hiina piktogrammide arengu ajalugu näitavad, et häälelisest kõnest 
sõltumatu lingvistilise kommunikatsioonisüsteemi arengus on kõige varasemad 
märgid reeglipäraselt ikoonilised. Nad imiteerivad selle objekti visuaalset 
välimust, mida nad kujutavad. Kõikidel juhtudel oli näha märgisüsteemi arengu­
tendentsi liikuda eemale ikoonilisusest ja  suunduda arbitraarsete sümbolite 
poole, millel pole samasust sellega, mida nad esindavad.
11. Stiimuli ekvivalentsuse printsiip. Uuriti lapsi käitumuslik-analüütilise 
traditsiooni raames seoses stiimuli võrdväärsuse määramisega. Ilmselt on 
evolutsiooni käigus valitud muutus, mis annab inimestele erinevalt teistest 
olenditest võime antud tähendusse sisestatud assotsiatsioonid vormida arbitraar- 
setesse sümbolitesse.
12. Bickertoni proto-keel. Stiimulite ekvivalentsuse klasside moodustamine 
on suunatud staatilistele visuaalsetele stiimulitele, mis on otseselt relevantsed 
objekti-nimede tekkimisel. (Tegevus-nimede tekkimist siinjuures ei käsitleta.) 
Kui objekti-nimed ja  tegevus-nimed on kord tekkinud, on võimalik konstruee­
rida lauseid proto-keeles (Bickerton 1990). Proto-keeles koosnevad laused 
objekti-nimest või noomenist, mis täpsustab agenti, tegevus-nimest ehk verbist, 
mis täpsustab tegevust, mida esitatakse, ja  teisest objekti-nimest või noomenist, 
mis täpsustab agenti või lõppsihti.
13. Viitava tegevusulatuse progressiivse avardumise printsiip. Nii nagu keel 
areneb lapsel, nii arenes ta eeldatavasti ka inimliigil evolutsiooni käigus. 
Vastavalt ka eelpool nimetatud esimestele printsiipidele oli viitamine esmane 
ning see oli piiritletud objektidega märgi-produtseerija ja  märgi-saaja üldises 
käibivas stiimulite keskkonnas. Märgi-tegija viitas objektidele, osutades neile. 
Koos ikoonilise representatsiooni kasutuselevõtmisega laiendati viitamist 
objektidele, mis puudusid üldises kõneleja ja  kuulaja stiimulite keskkonnas, 
kuid ainult niikaua, kui nende kuju võis maalida miimiliste liigutustega või 
nende heli võis hääleliselt imiteerida. Koos ikoonilise representatsiooni kasutu­
selevõtmisega laiendati viitamist nii individuaalsetele kui liigilistele puuduva­
tele objektidele, mille nimi loovutati keele konventsioonidele. Koos süntaksi 
kasutuselevõtmisega, eelkõige kinnistunud lausetega (Place 1998: 8) muutus 
võimalikuks viidata puuduvatele objektidele kirjelduses.
Sellised printsiibid kirjeldavad ära peamise joone, kuidas keel võis areneda 
käežestidest hääleliseks kõneks. Võib olla ei saa kõikide U. Place printsiipide 
arendustega nõus olla, aga olulisi seisukohti pole võimalik ka ümber lükata, 
vähemalt mitte üheselt ja  veenvalt. Järgnevalt vaatame lähemalt peamisi vald­
kondi, tõestamaks hüpoteesi keele tekkimisest käežestidest.
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3. Keel kui hiline “avastus”
On teada, et inimese ja  šimpansi ühised eellased elasid umbes 5-6 miljonit 
aastat tagasi. Seega on mõistlik järeldada, et grammatiline keel pidi tekkima 
(esile kerkima) hominiidide liinis mingil hetkel, kui nood lahknesid sellest 
liinist, mis viis tänapäeva šimpansite juurde. Vt ka tabelit 1 Ülevaade ajalistest 
andmetest tekstis artikli lõpus. Keele tekkimise alguse üle on palju vaidlusi 
seoses lahendamata küsimusega, mis seal siis ikkagi juhtus. Mõned lingvistid, 
nt Derek Bickerton Hawaii ülikoolist jt  arvavad, et on võimatu luua (välja 
mõelda) grammatika kui miski, mis on vormunud evolutsioonilise arengu 
käigus. See pidi olema ühekordne n-ö katastroofiline sündmus, mis leidis aset 
ilmselt hominiidide arengu hilisperioodil (Bickerton 1995).
Bickerton jt on väitnud, et see sündmus võis kokku langeda Homo sapiensi 
väljumisega Aafrikast umbes 150 000 aastat tagasi. See võiks ka seletada, miks 
Homo sapiens sai domineerivaks ja  asendas peagi täielikult teised hominiidid 
—  neandertallased Euroopas ja  Homo erectuse Kagu-Aasias. P. Lieberman ja  
E. Crelin (1971) on neandertallaste kohta arvanud, et kuigi nood polnud võime­
lised artikuleeritud kõneks, võib arheoloogiliste leidude põhjal arvata, et nad 
valmistasid tööriistu, matsid surnuid ja  et neil võis esineda midagi keele-samast. 
G. Hewes järeldab eelöeldust, et neandertallaste keel pidi olema mitte kõnekeel, 
vaid žestiline keel (Hewes 1973b). Philip Lieberman on fossiilsete leidude 
põhjal väitnud, et hääleaparaat, mis peab kindlasti toetama artikulatoorset kõnet, 
ei tekkinud enne kui hominiidide evolutsiooni hilisperioodil. Ka ütleb ta, et 
neandertallased, kes pidasid vastu veel ajani umbes 30 000 aastat tagasi, said 
häälduslikkuselt tõsise väljakutse. Ta väidab samuti (Lieberman 1998), et see
oli keel, mis eristas meie eellased teistest hominiididest. Katsed viia tänapäeva 
keeled tagasi originaal-emakeelele (nimetatakse ka proto-maailmakeel, ingl 
Proto-World) viitavad samuti keele tekkimise hilisele päritolule, mitte Homo 
sapiensi eelsele ajale.
Seisukoht, et keel on üsna hiljutine avastus, tekitab küsimuse, kas teiste 
elusolendite-primaatide häälitsused — nt ahvide hoiatushüüded ja  tuututa­
mine — on kuidagi seotud inimese kõnekeelega. Eeldatavasti olid meie eellased 
võimelised selliseid häälitsusi tegema. Miks need hüüded siis ei võinud 
muutuda keeleks, mida me tunneme? Kõige tugevam argument sellise stsenaa­
riumi vastu on see, et inimkeel ja  primaatide häälitsused on fundamentaalselt 
väga erinevad nähtused. N. Chomsky on oma raamatus Cartesian Linguistics 
1966 ( ‘Karteesiuslik keeleteadus’) täheldanud, et inimkeel on sidumata oma 
võimes väljendada mõtteid ja  selles vabaduses on ta vaba ka stiimulite kontrol­
list, aga loomade kommunikatsioonisüsteemid koosnevad kindlast arvust 
signaalidest või kindlast arvust lingvistilistest dimensioonidest, millest igaüks 
on seotud mittelingvistilise (ingl nonlinguistic) dimensiooniga. Peter MacNeila- 
ge Texase ülikoolist Austinist on märkinud, et primaatide häälitsemine on 
holistiline, sisaldades teadet häälitsuses eneses, s.t häälitsus ise ongi teade, aga 
inimese hääldamised võib kombineerida uuel viisil ja  luua sõnumi. M. Corballis
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ütleb, et meie eellaste hüüde-samased häälitsused on püsima jäänud kaasaegse 
inimese emotsionaalsetes häälitsustes: nutmises, naermises, kiljatustes, aga 
mitte kõnes.
Siiski on raske aktsepteerida seisukohta, et nii keeruline saavutus nagu inim­
keel võis tekkida viisil kõik või mitte midagi —  Suure Paugu teooria järgi — 
inimliigi evolutsiooni hilises staadiumis. Kui me vaatame semantikat kui 
pragmaatika ümmardajat ja  süntaksit kui semantika ümmardajat, tekivad rasku­
sed N. Chomsky seisukohtadega. Selleks et seletada inimese keelevõimet moo­
dustada keerulisi liitlauseid, peame postuleerima keelemeele kui kaasasündinud 
omaduse. See miski on ilmunud kui deus ex machina üksikust gigantsest 
mutatsioonist inimliigi eelajaloos. Muutused muidugi olema pidid. Kuidas me 
muidu seletame fakti, et meie kõneleme, aga loomad isegi parima tahtmise 
juures seda ei suuda? Võib olla ei peaks me otsima mutatsiooni, vaid paljusid 
muutusi, mis on miljonite aastate jooksul laiali levinud. Neist igaüks on ehitatud 
millestki, mis oli enne; igaüks kannab edasi selektiivset paremust kogu sellele 
grupile, milles ta ilmnes ning võimaldas oma liikmetel ellu jääda ja  edasi kanda 
geene, ning need, kellel seda mutatsiooni polnud, sõitsid vastu seina (Place 
1998: 4). Steven Pinker ja  Paul Bloom Arizona ülikoolist väidavad, et keel on 
välja võlvunud järk-järgult loomuliku valiku teel (Pinker and Bloom 1990). 
Mõned primatoloogid nagu Richard Byrne St. Andrewsi ülikoolist ütlevad, et 
keele tekkimiseks vajalikud kognitiivsed eeltingimused (nt võime kohaneda 
teise inimese mentaalse perspektiiviga) on olemas suurtel ahvidel, inimahvidel, 
ja  seepärast eelnesid just nemad meie hominiididest eellaste lahknemisele 
šimpansite liinist, ilmselt mitmete miljonite aastate jooksul.
Kuidas me sobitume eelnevate võimalustega? Vähemalt osaline vastus on, et 
keel võlvus välja mitte häälduslikkusest, vaid käežestidest ja  lülitus ümber 
häälelisele suhteliselt hiljuti hominiidide evolutsioonis, võib olla isegi koos 
Homo sapiensi ilmumisega. Umbes sellise idee esitas 18. sajandil prantsuse 
filosoof Etienne Condillac2 ning selle noppis üles ja  taasesitas ameerika 
antropoloog Gordon W. Hewes (1973b). Siinkohal võib meenutada, et peale 
esmaste viipekeelte on kõik keeled kõnekeeled. Veelgi enam, nagu teame 
vähemalt alates E. Lennebergi (1967) klassikalisest kokkuvõttest, on tohutu 
palju seisukohti, et inimolendid on neuro-anatoomiliselt adapteerunud kõne­
keele jaoks. Hewes oma artiklis on sellega kursis, kuid ütleb veel, et keele-žesti 
hüpoteesi püstitasid teineteisest sõltumatult sir Richard Paget (1944) ja 
A. Johanneson (1950) kui mudeli, kuidas keel võis üle minna hääleliseks. See 
idee pole ei lingvistide ega antropoloogide seas leidnud entusiastlikku vastu­
kaja, sest nende endi vahel puudub üksmeel ja  pole ka kindlaid otseseid
2 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780), prantsuse filosoof, sündis Grenoble’is. 
Tal oli seisukoht, et kogu teadmise aluseks on meeled. Tema töödest on tuntumad nt 
Essai sur Vorigine des connaisances humaines (1746, ‘Essee inimteadmiste päritolust’) 
ja Traite des sensations (1754, ‘Traktaat aistingutest’).
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tõendeid, et keegi meie hominiididest eellastest pigem žestikuleeris kui kõneles. 
See ei takista väite üle edasi diskuteerimast.
4. Primaatide preadaptatsioon e eelkohastumine
Meenutame mõnesid fakte primaatide evolutsioonist. Primaadid on suurel 
määral nägemismeelega loomad. Nii inimestel kui ahvidel on nägemine oluliselt 
rohkem arenenud kui mõni muu meele võime (ingl modality), kuulmine kaasa 
arvatud. Primaatidel on ajukoore kontroll parem käeliigutuste kui häälitsuste 
üle. Häälitsused on oluliselt kitsendatud emotsioonidel baseeruvate häälitsuste­
ga, mis on ajukoore-aluste struktuuride kontrollida. See tähendab, et varastel 
hominiididel pidi olema palju parem võimalus kohaneda ekspressiivse, tahtele 
alluva kommunikatsiooniga, kasutades selleks käsi. Võib olla seletab see ka, 
miks katsed šimpansitele viipekeelt õpetada on märksa edukamad kui õpetada 
häälduslikku inimkeelt.
Žestide retsiprooksus kui eelsuunaja keele poole võib tagasi minna veelgi 
kaugemale meie ühiste eellaste juurde ahvidega, aega umbes 25 või 30 miljonit 
aastat tagasi. Giacomo Rizzolatti ja  tema kolleegid Parma ülikoolist Itaaliast on 
kindlaks teinud üksikud neuronid (ahvide pretsentraalkääru motoorses piirkon­
nas), mis on aktiivsed, kui ahvid teevad konkreetset haaramise või küünitamise 
žesti. Mõned neist neuronitest, mida Rizzolatti ja  tema kolleegid on nimetanud 
peegelneuroniteks, on aktiivsed ka siis, kui ahvid jälgivad isikut (või ka teist 
ahvi), kes teeb sama (haaramise) žesti. Need rakud on ahvidel ajukoore selles 
piirkonnas, mis on homoloogne Broca piirkonnaga inimese ajus. Broca keskus 
inimesel on oluline keele programmeerimise keskus. Võib olla on peegelneuro- 
nitel siiski rohkem seost toidu hankimisega — andmise ja  saamise üksustega — 
kui keelega, aga G. Rizzolatti ja  Michael Arbib Lõuna-Califomia ülikoolist on 
arvamusel, et neil neuronitel on siiski oma roll keele järk-järgulisel väljatööta­
misel (Arbib and Rizzolatti 1996). Need neuronid võivad olla ka selle omaduse 
eelkäijad, mis võttis üle mentaalse perspektiivi võime teistelt (neuronitelt), mis 
omakorda osutus oluliseks keele tekkimisel —  nagu arvavad R. Byrne ja  teised.
Joonisel 1 on kujutatud peaaju vasaku poolkera külgpind. Motoorne piirkond 
asub pretsentraalkäärus ning üldise tundlikkuse piirkond posttsentraalkäärus. 
Motoorset kõnekeskust nimetatakse ka Broca keskuseks.
motoorne üldise tundlikkuse
Joonis 1. Peaaju vasaku poolkera külgpind (modifitseeritud Aul 1976: 176).
5. Žest ja aju
On mitmeid anatoomiliste seoste tõlgendusi käežestide ja  keele vahekorrast 
ajus. Elizabeth Bates California ülikoolist San Diegost väidab, et keel on 
parasiitsüsteem, mis katab neid aju piirkondi, mis algselt arendati välja palju 
põhilisemat laadi sensomotoorseks tegevuseks. Ja on isegi nii, et piirkonnad, 
mis teenivad keelt, jätkavad samamoodi ka mitte-lingvistilise töö tegemist. Nad 
pole loobunud oma igapäevasest tööst, ütleb E. Bates (Bates, et al. 1979). Siia 
kuuluksid ajukoore otsmiku sagara (ingl frontal cortex) motoorsed piirkonnad 
koos sensoorsete piirkondadega, mis vahendavad nii hääle tajumist kui ka 
paljude selliste ülesannete lahendamist, mis koonduvad mõiste alla tähendus. 
Sellisest sensomotoorsest seisukohast vaadatuna kavandatakse žest ja  keel koos 
ning vormitakse koos kogu aeg, sest nad jooksevad välja mööda samu juhteteid. 
Nii imbub keele planeerimine paratamatult läbi žestisse, mis on kaasprodukt. 
On võimalik, et fülogeneesis võis see imbumine toimuda vastassuunas.
Nagu kõnekeel, sõltub ka viipekeel kurtidel olulisel määral vasakust ajupool­
kerast. Näiteks vasaku ajupoolkera kahjustuse korral võib tekkida puudujääk 
viiplemises, mis on paralleelne kõnekeele puudujäägiga. Broca keskuse lähe­
duses olev eelnev kahjustus tekitab puudujäägi väljendusrikkas viiplemises.
Mitmed žestiuuringud on näidanud (McNeill 1987; 1992; 1999; Calbris 
1990), et visuaalsed ja  tajumuslik-motoorsed kujundid on pidevalt liikumises 
kui integraalne ja  lahutamatu osa selles protsessis, mille läbi me organiseerime
9
oma tähendusi. D. McNeill (1979) on väitnud, et tähendus esitatakse kõigepealt 
sensomotoorse skeemi (ingl schemata) vormis. Niipea, kui indiviid on võime­
line taas-esilekutsuma sensoorset kogemust mälus ja  niipea, kui ta võib tegevus­
plaani ellu viia, ilma seda tegelikult tegematagi, võib ta öelda, et on opereerinud 
sensomotoorse skeemi terminites. Tegelike kogemuste ja  tegevuse järgnevuste 
tõttu on selline skeem representatsiooni vorm. Indiviidi võime rakendada liigu­
tuse mustrites seda, mida esitavad tema lausungite tähenduste aspektid — nagu 
see tipneb žestides —  on tõend, et tähendused, mis on kodeeritud ja  represen­
teeritud lausungites, eksisteerivad tegelike kogemuste ja  tegevuse mustrite 
vormis.
6. Käe vabanemine, ka suhtluseks
Mitteinimliigi primaatidel on käte kasutamine suhtluseks piiratud, kuna nende 
käed ja  käsivarred on olulised kehatüve toetamiseks ning liikumiseks. Enamus 
primaate on kohanenud eluga puude otsas ja  kasutavad käsi okstest kinnihoid­
miseks ja  oksalt oksale hüppamiseks. Suurekerelised ahvid on rohkem maa­
pinnal toimetavad, aga liiguvad neljal jalal üle territooriumi. Simpansid ja  
gorillad, meie lähimad sugulased primaatide hulgas, on kohandanud endale 
liikumis-viisi, kus ülemine kehapool toetub sõrmenukkidele. Vastupidiselt 
sellele on hominiidide liini (vähemalt 4 miljonit aastat tagasi) esmaseks iseloo­
mustavaks jooneks püstiasend, mille puhul käed ja  käsivarred on vabad 
igasugusest kehaasendi või liikumisega seotud toetavast tegevusest. Kahtlemata 
on see andnud olulise tõuke nende kasutamiseks muudeks tegevusteks, seal­
hulgas ekspressiivseks kommunikatsiooniks e väljendusrikkaks suhtlemiseks. 
Just kahele jalale tõusmine on olnud paljude spekulatsioonide alus. Nende hul­
gas on siis seisukohad, et käte vabanemine andis võimaluse kasutada tööriistu, 
aga väljendusrikas kommunikatsioon võis samuti saada siin oluliseks.
Lõhe hominiidide ja  inimahvide vahel võis suuremaks paisutada veel Ida- 
Aafrika alangu (ingl Rift Valley) formatsioon. Ahve, kes muutusid hominii- 
dideks, ahistati oluliselt alangu idaküljelt. Hiljuti Tšaadist avastatud 3,5 miljoni 
aasta vanuse australopiteekuse säilmed, mis leiti Ida-Aafrika alangu lääneosast, 
on tekitanud mõnesid kahtlusi idapoolsete (ingl East-Side Story) kohta. Seni 
olid kõik teised hominiidide fossiilsed leiud — dateeritud üle 4 miljoni aasta 
kuni 2 miljonit aastat tagasi — leitud ida poolt, kus metsane ala läheb üle puis- 
rohtlaks. Sellises ümbruskonnas pidid varased hominiidid olema eriti kaitsetud 
palju rohkem tapmisele spetsialiseerunud ja  efektiivsemate jahimeeste rünna­
kute vastu, kelleks olid kaasaegsete tiigrite, lõvide ja  hüäänide eellased. Need 
siis olidki ahistajad. Selline situatsioon võis viia valikuni, mis suurendas koos­
tööd ja  kokkukuuluvust. Nende mõlema mõju suhtluses peaks olema eriti 
oluline.
Sellises keskkonnas pidi žestiline kommunikatsioon olema palju efektiivsem 
kui hääleline suhtlus. Esiteks, žestiline suhtlus on vaikne ja  nii on väiksem risk,
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et keegi kuuleb. Žestid võimaldasid hiilida. Teiseks, žestiline suhtlus on 
fundamentaalselt ruumiline, ja  enamus infot, mida edastati, oligi ruumiline, nt 
kus umbes oht võis asuda, kuidas oleks kergem saaki püüda või isegi kuidas 
oma väljanägemist korrastada. Ilmselt oli osutamine kõige esmane kommunika­
tiivne žest rohtlas. Nagu tänapäeval on teada, õpivad väikesed lapsed osutama 
väga varajases eas, kusjuures primaadid ei osuta kunagi. Merlin Donald 
Queen’si ülikoolist Kingstonist, Ontario piirkonnast, väitis, et esmane kommu­
nikatsioon baseerus miimikal, kaasates kogu keha, mitte ainult käsi ja  käsivarsi. 
See suhtlusviis elab täna edasi tantsus ja  kehakeeles. M. Donaldi seisukoha järgi 
on selline suhtlusvorm keelest eraldiseisev (Donald 1998), aga M. Corballise 
seisukoha järgi oli see suhtlusvorm hoopis eelkäijaks. Nii ehk teisiti, aga seda 
võib küll öelda, et žestiline keel on ikoonilisem kui hääleline keel. See 
tähendab, et žestiline keel on palju otsesemalt tabanud asjade kujud ja  nende 
paigutuse (ka: ‘loomuse’ —  ingl disposition) ruumis. Andes preadaptatsioonile 
e eelkohastumisele vaba kontrolli ülemise kehapoole jäsemete üle ja  kandes 
manuaalset tegevust üle tegevuse tajumiseks, võisid meie varased eellased 
endastmõistetavalt arendada intentsioonilise kommunikatsiooni eesmärkidel 
pigem žesti kui häält.
7. Peost suhu
Kui keel pärineb käežestidest, miks siis tänapäeva inimene üldse rääkima 
hakkas? Kuigi varastel hominiididel võis olla palju parem eelkohastumus 
käeliseks kommunikatsiooniks ja  puisrohtlas eelistati vaikselt viiplemist, olid 
kindlasti olemas ka võimalikud eelised häälduslikkusele ümberlülitumiseks: 1) 
kõne eelistuseks oli teate pimedas edastamise võimalus, 2) kõne oli 
eelisolukorras, kui suhtluse osapooled teineteist ei näinud või 3) kui suheldi 
suhteliselt pika maa tagant. S. Goldin-Meadow kolleegidega on teinud järgmise 
järelduse: kui kätel ja  häälel on ühine jagatud suhtlustuum, siis on see eriti 
efektiivne süntaksi jaoks. Süntaks saab võimaluse edastada grammatilisi kom­
ponente, jättes ikoonilise komponendi kätele, selle asemel et lasta kätel kanda 
nii süntaksit kui tähendust. Võib olla veel olulisem on see, et kõne on vabas­
tanud käed n-ö veel kord, lubades meie eellastel verbaalselt instrueerida teisi 
käelisest kunstist. Siin on mõeldud, et samal ajal tööriistade kasutamise või 
valmistamisega saab neid ka demonstreerida.
Pole usutav, et ümberlülitumine žestiliselt suhtluselt kõnekeelele toimus 
äkki. Häälelised ühmatused ja  kiunatused võisid üsna ilmselt hakata vahe- 
märgistama varast žestilist suhtlemist —  üsna samamoodi, nagu žestid illustree­
rivad häälelist kõnet praegu. Hääleline suhtlus nõudis olulisi muutusi 
kõnetraktis, nagu ta nõudis olulisi ümberlülitusi seoses kontrolliga häälduslik- 
kuse üle, kus kontroll läks predominantsetelt ajukoore-alustelt struktuuridelt 
ajukoore kontrolli alla. Philip Lieberman on väitnud, et need muutused polnud
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ilmselt lõppenud veel suhteliselt hilises hominiidide arengufaasis. Võib olla nad 
lõppesid alles Homo sapiensi ilmumisega umbes 100 000 kuni 150 000 aastat 
tagasi. Enamgi veel, kõnekeel nõuab motoorse järjestatuse palju täpsemat 
programmeerimist, kuna teade nõuab tähelepanuväärset ajalist järjestatust. 
Viipekeeles, vastupidi, antakse grammatiline informatsioon tihti edasi paral­
leelselt teiste teate aspektidega. Näiteks samal ajal, kui lauset viibeldakse, võib 
lause üle kanda väitest küsimuseks kulmukergitusega või muuta see eituseks 
pearaputusega. Surve korrektseks ajaliseks jaotuseks kõnesignaalis võis samuti 
soodustada selektiivset suundumust unilateraalseks kontrolliks, samas kui 
igasugune neuraalse (e närvi-) info väljavahetamine kahe ajupoolkera vahel võis 
anda tulemuseks mõningase ajalise täpsuse kao. Vastavalt sellele stsenaariumile 
polnud see keel, mis unikaalsena iseloomustab Homo sapiensi, vaid pigem nihe 
väljendusvormis, mille tulemusel häälduslikkus hakkas kandma esmast kommu­
nikatiivset koormat, sealhulgas kõige tähtsamat —  grammatilist komponenti. 
See võis tõepoolest olla Eva, kes rääkis, kuid ta eellane suhtles ilmselt 
efektiivselt žestide ja  häälduslikkuse kombinatsiooni vahendusel.
Keel võib olla alanud kui generatiivne, grammatiline süsteem alates 
inimlaste-liigi (ingl + Id species o f Homo) tekkimisega üle 2 miljoni aasta 
tagasi. Varastel inimlastel näeme kõigepealt selget märki aju suurenemisest ja  
esimesi üritamisi kivist tööriistu teha. Kuigi kivist tööriistad muutusid 
keerulisemaks inimlaste-liigi arenedes, on tehnoloogia olnud tähelepanuväärselt 
staatiline peaaegu 2 miljonit aastat —  mis ilmselt on ka periood käte 
kasutamiseks kommunikatsioonis. Ilmselt alles 40 000 aastat tagasi hakkasid 
tööriistad muutuma suurema variatiivsuse ja  keerukuse suunas. Siiski, keerulise 
tehnoloogia esiletõus Euroopas näib olevat kokku sattunud Homo sapiensi 
Euroopasse saabumisega, kes omakorda järk-järgult asendas seal laiutanud 
neandertallased. Hiljutised avastused, sealhulgas nt 90 000 aasta vanused luust 
artefaktid Zairest (end. Kongo DV) lubavad arvata, et tehnoloogiline revolut­
sioon algas palju varem ja  võis oma lähte saada Homo sapiensist Aafrikas. 
Siinkohal võiks meenutada katket antropoloogiateaduste doktori Edouard Bone 
1994. aastal peetud ettekandest Inimese päritolu ja  inimese evolutsiooni 
tähendus:
“Hiljuti oli mul võimalus külastada tähelepanuväärset näitust Viis miljonit 
aastat inimese olemasolu. Kohe alguses võis näha Tansaanias asuva Laetolil’i 
vulkaani tuhka ja  mudasse jäänud jälgi, mis kuulusid kahele kõrvuti kõndinud 
kahejalgsele olendile / . . . /  Samuti on leitud matmispaiku: näiteks avastati 
Skandinaavias Bögebakkenis3 koos oma luigetiivale asetatud lapsega maetud 
noor ema. Iraagis Shanidaris, Iraagi ja  Türgi piiril asetati üks surnukeha 80 000 
aastat tagasi lilledest voodisse. Lilled olid närtsinud, kuid seemned olid muu­
tunud fossiilideks. Tänapäeval saab taastada lillede liike. Botaanikutel õnnestus 
kindlaks määrata erinevad liilialised ja  tulikalised; võis taastada värvide 
harmoonia. Saab täpsustada, millisel aastaajal matmine toimus: see oli maikuus,
3 Taanis
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mil Iraagi kiltmaal õitsesid oranžide õielehtedega tulikad . . .” (Bone 1996: 34) 
Nagu näeme, olid meie eellastel kujunenud mitmed suhtluseks ja  ühiseluks 
olulised omadused.
Praegu arvatakse, et Homo sapiens sai alguse Aafrikast ja  levis sealt laiali 
vahemikus umbes 60 000 kuni 100 000 aastat tagasi, asendades teised hominiid- 
sed liigid, kes olid migreerinud varem, sealhulgas neandertallased Euroopas ja  
Homo erectuse, kes võis jääda püsima Jaaval veel hilise ajani —  umbes 27 000 
aastat tagasi. Mis oli see, mis võimaldas meie liigi olenditel võitu saada nendest 
suure ajuga hominiididest, kelle eellased olid migreerinud palju varem? Kõige 
tõenäolisem vastus on, et nad said võitu tänu paremale tehnoloogiale. Aga 
tehnoloogia paremus võis tuleneda mitte aju suurusest, vaid üleminekust ma­
nuaalselt keelelt häälelisele keelele, mis lubas neil kasutada käsi tööriistade ja  
relvade tegemiseks ning häält juhtnööride jagamiseks. Hääle kasutamine õpeta­
miseks tagas oskuste ja  teadmiste edasikandmise, milles on ka kultuuri läte.
8. Autonoomsed žestid ja žestilised keeled
Kuigi žestid on sümbolilised ja  kuigi nad on olulised kommunikatsioonis, on 
nad siiski väga erinevad suulisest kõnest. Kõnega kaasnevate žestide tähendusi 
esitatakse globaalses, kujundilises vormis, aga tähenduse lingvistilise interpre­
tatsiooni leksikaalsed vormid töötatakse läbi süntaktilistes struktuurides. Siiski 
saab žeste kasutada samal viisil nagu sõnu. Mitmesugustes kogukondades 
leidub žestilisi vorme, mis on veidi vähem variaablid vormis, kuid mida võib 
käsitleda kui keelt. Selliseid žeste nimetatakse embleemideks ja  mõnedel neist 
on funktsiooniks asendada kõneakt täielikult. Näiteks asetades vertikaalses 
asendis nimetissõrme vastu huuli, edastame kellelegi palve olla tasa. Itaalias on 
žest, milles kahe käe nimetissõrmed on algul laiali ning siis külgepidi puutes 
(lateraalne kontakt). See žest tähendab võrdselt, aga nagu sõnagi, sõltub tema 
tähendus kasutusest koos lingvistilise konstruktsiooniga.
Žestilist keelt on jälgitud religioossetes kommuunides, kus on vaikimisnõue 
(vt ka ‘trapistid’ —  Kimmel-Tenjes 1993: 554) või ka olukordades, kus kõnelda 
on raske või kõne on keelatud. Ühed kõige keerulisemad aktiivselt kasutata­
vatest viipekeeltest on Austraalia aborigeenidel. Nende keelte näited iseenesest 
pole veel otsene tõend, et žestiline keel eelnes häälelisele keelele, kuna need 
viipekeeled baseeruvad tegelikult häälelisel keelel, kuid nad võivad funktsio­
neerida ka iseseisvalt ja  on täisgrammatilised. Arvatavalt pärinevad nad Aust­
raalia kesk-põhja kõrbealalt ja  on levinud sealt laiali. Neid kasutatakse osaliselt 
kõnelemiskeelu ületamiseks, mida peavad järgima kesk-põhja kõrbeala naised 
peale lähedase sugulase surma ja  osaliselt kasutavad neid noviitsidest noor­
mehed initsiatsiooni ajal. Viipekeeled on laialt kasutusel veel Põhja-Ameerika 
tasandikuala indiaanlaste juures. Ilmselt teenisid viipekeeled seal peamiselt 
üksteisest arusaamise hõlbustamise rolli erinevaid keeli kõnelenud omavahel 
suhelnud hõimude vahel.
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Kõige külluslikumate võimalustega ja  kõige rohkem uuritud käelised keeled 
on kurtide viipekeeled. Kurtide viipekeelte kohta on kaks mõnevõrra erinevat 
seisukohta: 1) viipekeeled on silmapaistvad loomupärased iseseisvad keeled 
oma arenenud grammatikaga (Corballis 1999) ning 2) viipekeeled on süsteemid, 
mis on ellu kutsutud välistest, sotsiaalsetest vajadustest tingituna ning nad pole 
sõna otseses mõttes keeled (Kendon 1991). Vaatamata eriarvamustele viipe­
keelte olemuse suhtes, ei sega see mõlema seisukoha esindajaid ühtmoodi arva­
mast, et viipekeeled aitavad kinnitada keele žestilise päritolu hüpoteesi.
8.1. Viipekeeled kui loomupärased iseseisvad keeled
Viipekeeled polnud ametlikud, seadustatud keeled kuni 18. sajandi lõpuni. Esi­
mesed seadustajad olid prantslased. 1864 andis Ameerika Ühendriikide 
Kongress välja seadusandluse rahvusliku kurttummade kolledži rajamise kohta. 
Kolledžit hakati nimetama Gallaudet’ kolledžiks (praegune Gallaudet’ ülikool) 
tema esimese juhataja järgi. Veel 19. sajandi lõpus oli tugev vastuseis viipe­
keele kasutamise ja  kurtidele kõnelemise õpetamise suhtes. Kurtide Hariduse 
Rahvusvaheline Kongress Milanos 1880 hääletas oralismi4 poolt, ja  see oligi 
ametlikult tunnustatud viipekeel. Selline olukord andvat kurtidele lastele väide­
tavalt kooli lõpetades kesised lugemise-kirjutamise oskused.
Muutus algas 1950ndatel tänu William Stokoe’i, tollase Gallaudet’ ülikooli 
professori jõupingutustele. Kuigi viipekeel polnud täielikult tunnustatud veel 
isegi siis, näitas W. Stokoe, et tudengid kasutasid seda rohkesti ja  et viipekeelel 
olid tõelise keele tunnused. Selles on Stokoe ja  teised rohkesti kinnitust saanud 
oma uuringutes, ja  ameerika viipekeel (ingl American Sign Language, ASL) on 
nüüd tunnustatud Gallaudet’ ülikoolis. Üliõpilastele õpetatakse kõiki vajalikke 
aineid —  matemaatikat, keemiat, filosoofiat ja  isegi poeesiat —  ilma et sõnagi 
kõneldakse. Viipekeeltes on samuti lõputu erinevus, mida viljelevad kurdid üle 
maailma, ja  pole kahtlust, et need on loomupärased (genuiinsed) keeled täieli­
kult arenenud grammatikaga. Viipekeelte spontaanne esilekerkimine kõikjal 
kurtide kogukondades kinnitab, et žestiline kommunikatsioon on sama loomulik 
inimese omadus kui kõneldav keel (Corballis 1999). Tõepoolest, lapsed, kes 
teevad väga varajasest east peale ainult viipeid, teevad järk-järgult läbi ka 
samasugused keele tekkimise ja  arengu staadiumid kui lapsed, kes õpivad 
kõnelema, sealhulgas muuseas staadiumi, mida me nimetame lalisemiseks. Nad 
viiplevad vaikselt!
Kui osutub tõeks N. Chomsky universaalgrammatika mõiste, siis rakendub 
see viipekeelele samavõrra kui kõnekeelele. Susan Goldin-Meadow ja  Carolyn 
Mylander Chicago ülikoolist uurisid 8 kurti last, kelle vanemad olid kuuljad. 
Uurijad leidsid, et lapsed olid loonud viipekeeled, mis olid palju keerulisemad,
4 Oralism — kurtidele huulte pealt lugema õpetamine või õpetamine, kasutades ära 
nende ükskõik kui vähest kuulmisjääki.
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kui need lihtsad žestid, mida kasutasid nende vanemad neid õpetades. Kuigi neli 
last kasvasid üles Ameerika Ühendriikides ja  neli Hiinas, oli nende laste 
viipekeeltes rohkem ühist kui laste ja  nende vanemate viipežestides. Lapsed 
mõlemalt maalt viiplesid spontaanselt liitlauseid, väljendades rohkem kui üht 
propositsiooni (väidet) ja  nad järjestasid oma žeste samaselt. Lapsed kohandasid 
spontaanselt ergatiivi5 stmktuuri oma viibetesse, milledes intransitiivsed tegijad 
(ingl actor) on eraldi transitiivsetest. Näiteks sõna hiir on intransitiivne tegija 
lauses Hiir läheb urgu, samas kui see on transitiivne tegija lauses Hiir sööb 
juustu. Keeltes, kus on ergatiiv, peaks viibe hiire jaoks olema kummaski 
kontekstis erinev. Hiina ja  inglise keeled ei tee sellist eristust. Sellised uuringud 
toetavad ideed, et lastel on nii kõnekeele kui viipekeele arengus kaasasündinud 
komponent.
8.2. Viipekeeled kui süsteemid, mitte keeled
Kus suulisi väljendeid pole võimalik kasutada — kas rituaalsetel, keskkondlikel 
või füsioloogilistel põhjustel, võib žest mobiliseerida end kõne komplemen- 
taarse asendajana. Kurtide viipekeelte uuringud näitavad, et need süsteemid 
võivad olla nii täielikult läbi töötatud nagu kõnekeeledki. Tänaseks on viipe­
keelte näol olemas võimalus, kuidas žestilist vahendajat saab kasutada keelesüs­
teemi loomiseks, nii et iseloomulikud jooned on analoogsed kõnekeele omadele, 
aga süsteem on kõnest sõltumatu.
See, mis teeb viipekeelte uurimise atraktiivseks, ongi keele päritolu prob­
leem —  nad võimaldavad meil jälgida keele formeerimise (e moodustamise) 
protsesse. Näiteks on mitmed autorid kirjeldanud uute leksikaalsete vormide 
loomist nii juba välja kujunenud viipekeelte kasutajate poolt —  nagu nt 
ameerika viipekeel —  kui ka lokaalsete viipekeelte puhul. Selles loomis­
protsessis teevad konkreetsete objektide või tegevuste pantomiimilised repre­
sentatsioonid läbi muutused stilisatsiooni, reduktsiooni ja  assimilatsiooni kaudu, 
et moodustada viipekeele struktuur (Tervoort 1961; Kiima and Bellugi 1979; 
Scroggs 1981). Ilmneb, et väga suur osa küpse viipekeele silmnähtavalt suvalisi 
viipeid, mida saab analüüsida, nagu nad oleksid loodud moodustavate elemen­
tide süsteemist analoogselt kõnekeele fonoloogilistele elementidele, tuletatakse 
tegelikult konkreetsete objektide pantomiimi-samastest representatsioonidest 
reduktsiooni ja  stilisatsiooni regulaarsete protsesside kaudu.
Ergatiiv (< kr ergates ‘tegija’), mõnes keeles, nt baski keeles ja kaukaasia keeltes 
tegevuse subjekti kääne e lõpuga alusekääne, mida kasutatakse, kui öeldis on sihiline 
pöördsõna. Sihitis on siis nimetavas käändes. Alus on neis keeltes lõputa nimetavas 
käändes ainult siis, kui öeldis on sihitu pöördsõna. Ergatiivseks on peetud ka mõnd 
läänemeresoome keelte tarindit, nt eesti poja tehtud töö, soome isän ostama ‘isa 
ostetud’.
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Keelemoodustamise protsessidele heidavad rohkem valgust uuringud, mis 
võrdlevad viipekeelte kasutust stabiilsetes kurtide kogukondades nagu ameerika 
või briti kurtide kogukonnad ja  kurtidel, kes pole väljakujunenud kogukondade 
liikmed. Uuringud on näidanud, et peab esinema variatsioone süsteemis nimega 
keel. Variatsioon on seotud erinevustega nendes interaktsioonilistes asjaoludes, 
mis panevad viibet kasutama. Seda on leidnud nii W. Washabaugh (1986), 
uurides viipekeelt Providence Islandi kurtide hulgas, kus ei olnud kurtide 
kogukonda, ja  J. Jepson (1991), kes uuris Indias kurtide viipeid tavalises ühis­
konnas võrrelduna nendega, mida kasutasid kurdid linnas oma kogukondades. 
Mõlemad uurijad tegid spetsiifilised järeldused, et välised tingimused on need, 
mis kutsuvad ellu süsteemi tekkimise, mida saab nimetada keeleks. See kinnitab 
seisukohta, et erinevad strukturaalsed jooned käituvad keele diagnostikana. 
Sellisteks joonteks on paarid nagu musterdamine ja  süntaktilisus, ning need 
jooned on süsteemi sotsiaalsete vajaduste tagajärg. Keelt ellukutsuvad jooned 
pole seega mitte autonoomsed, või isegi kaasasündinud ega ka mitte mingid 
sisemised protsessid (Kendon 1991).
Kurtide viipesüsteemide analüüsid, nagu ka kurtide laste uurimised ei 
paljastanud mingit viipekeelt, märkide keelt (Feldman, Goldin-Meadow and 
Gleitman 1978; Goldin-Meadow 1990). See näitab, et kui inimesed on jäetud 
ilma igasugusest otsesest sidemest olemasoleva keelega, siis nad võivad 
kujustada omaenese süsteemi, mis täidab keskseid keele funktsioone, kasutades 
selleks ainult žeste. Siit saab teha olulise järelduse, mis toetab keele žestilise 
päritolu positsiooni.
Kas käežestid on viies ratas keelelise evolutsiooni vankri all, kuigi ka 
sõitmiseks? M. Corballis väidab, et inimeste viipekeelte ja  käežestide rikka­
likkus tõestab evolutsioonilise lättena just vastupidist. Žestid pole kõnega 
juhuslikult seotud; nad võivad edasi anda informatsiooni süstemaatilisel viisil. 
Näiteks žestid viipekeeltes kannavad infot täiesti vabalt, eraldi kõneldud sõnast. 
Nii et žest pole mitte viies ratas, vaid võib olla universaalratas ehk ainuline 
ratas, millest esmalt lähtus keel.
9. Žestide ja kõne koostöö mõningaid iseloomulikke jooni
Žestid pole mitte kujud kujuteldavast minevikust. David McNeill (1992; 1999) 
Chicago ülikoolist on näidanud, et käežestid on keerulisel viisil põimunud meie 
igapäevase kõne mustritega. Kõne kannab grammatika koormat ja  enamust 
sümbolilise representatsiooni kandamist. Kui kuuleme lindistatud loenguid või 
kuulame raadiot, siis läheb väga vähe infot kaduma. Sellegipoolest lisavad 
žestid visuaalse, ikoonilise komponendi, mis võib nt kanda lisainformatsiooni 
või lõpetada venima kippuva seletuse. Paluge kedagi seletada, mis on spiraal, 
või kalameest jutustada, kui suure kala ta on püüdnud! Eriti ilmekalt on näha, 
kuidas inimesed võtavad väga loomulikult abiks käežestid siis, kui nad püüavad 
suhelda inimesega, kes räägib mingit võõrkeelt. Susan Goldin-Meadow kollee-
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gidega Chicago ülikoolist on näidanud, kuidas žest võtab kiiresti üle gramma­
tilise rolli, kui inimesed väldivad kõnelemist.
Kõnega kaasnevate žestide liigutusfraaside analüüs näitab, kuidas nad on 
koordineeritud kaasnema kõnefraasidega. Kui kõnelemise ajal žestikuleeritakse, 
siis iga tähenduslikult olulise grupi e tähendusgrupi (ingl sense-group) jaoks 
kõnes on vastav žestifraas. Enamgi veel —  on leitud, et kui žestifraas väljendab 
lausungi sisu, siis karakteristikud, mis kujutavad seda arengut —  esinedes kas 
enne tähendusgrupi tuumsilpi või samaaegselt tuumsilbiga —  vastavad kõige 
olulisemale informatiivsele punktile kõnefraasis (Kendon 1991: 2, Tenjes 2000). 
Žestifraas võib sageli leida otsetee enne kõnefraasi, millega nad assotsiatiivse 
seose läbi koos alustasid. See annab kindla aluse väita, et žestifraas on täielikult 
valmis organiseeritud kas enne kõnefraasi või kõnefraasiga samaaegselt.
Erinevate näidete võrdlusest on selgunud, et kõnefraasi ja  žestifraasi koordi­
natsioon pole automaatne. Ühelt poolt on näiteid, kus žestifraasi kõige 
ekspressiivsemate aspektide esitamine lükatakse edasi nii, et see toimub koordi­
neeritult kõnefraasi kesksete silpidega, teiselt poolt on näiteid, kus kõne 
hoitakse õhus nii, et käed jõuavad tagasiasendisse, et esitada järgmisena tulev 
žestifraas. Seega, kõne ja  žest õigustavad teineteise olemasolu (Kendon 1990). 
Ei ole ka nii, et ühte liiki väljendused oleksid alati seotud teistega samal viisil. 
Žest ei jälita  kõnet automaatselt, samuti ei tee seda kõne žesti suhtes. Selles, 
mida võib väljendada žestiga, valitseb tõeline mitmekesisus. Kõnega kaasneval 
žestil on oma osa väljenduse sisu esitamisel, suulise diskursuse struktuuri 
nähtavaks tegemisel. Žestid võivad märkida diskursuse üksuste retoorilist 
staatust; nad võivad mängida olulist rolli vooruvahetuse reguleerimisel ja  end 
maksma panna kuulajaskonnas, kellele lausung adresseeritakse. Kus iganes žest 
kannab sisu, võib see olla antud paljudel erinevatel viisidel. Väljendatav sisu 
võib olla nii abstraktne kui konkreetne. Näiteks deiktilised žestid osutavad 
kohtadele virtuaalses ruumis viidatavate objektide kaudu nii, et kujutletakse, 
kus nad võivad seal asuda. On žeste, mis joonistavad jälje läbi ruumi või läbi 
aja, luues ruumi. Žestid, mis tähistavad millegi visuaalset ilmumist, esitavad 
suurusi või kujusid. Osad žestid esitavad mingit liiki tegevusmustreid. Nii 
võime jälgida haaramisliigutusi, millegi lahtipakkimise või lahtiharutamise 
sugestiivseid liigutusi, kinni- või lahtikeeramise liigutusi jne. Taolised žestid 
edastavad liigutusmustreid, mida võib kasutada selleks, et osutada konkreet­
setele tegevustele, kuid kasutada ka metafooridena mõtlemisprotsessis (McNeill 
1987; 1992; Calbris 1990).
Žestid, mis kaasnevad kõnega, võivad edastada konkreetset ja  äärmiselt 
täpset infot,, mida ei saa üldse esitada kaasneva kõnefraasiga. Näiteks vestluses 
kahe inglase vahel, mis leidis aset Ameerika Ühendriikide idarannikul, ütles üks 
teisele: Kas sa oled “Sunday New York Times’i ” näinud?, tehes kahe käega 
žesti, mis kujutas midagi paksu ja  piklikku. Ta tegi viite New York Times'i 
pühapäevalehe suurusele ja  paksusele (suur võrreldes Briti lehega). Kõneleja 
küsimuse kõige olulisem osa oli tähelepanu juhtimine ajalehe füüsilistele
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karakteristikutele, mida kandis edasi žest, mitte kõnevorm (Kendon 19866). 
Näiteks vestluses suitsetamisest loobumise kohta (Kendon 1990) kirjeldab 
kõneleja, kuidas tal ei õnnestunud lahti saada automaatsest harjumusest 
sigarettide järele haarata. Žestiga, mis kaasneb just kirjeldusega samal ajal, 
liigutab kõneleja oma kätt nii, et ülespoole avatud pihuga vasak käsi liigub särgi 
rinnataskusse, ning seda liigutust tehakse üksikasjalikul moel, edastades 
spetsiifilist infot nii koha kohta, kus ta tavatses sigarette hoida kui ka tegevuse 
automaatse iseloomu kohta, millest ta parajasti rääkis. On teisigi 
eksperimentaalseid uuringuid, mis näitavad, et kõnega kaasnevad (ingl co- 
speech) žestid võivad olla olulised retsipiendile lausungite mõistmisel (Graham, 
Argyle 1975; Riseborough 1985; McNeill 1992).
Inimolendite keelevõime võis alata suhtlusega žestide abil, nagu oleme juba 
näidanud. Selle tõenduseks on ka sünnilt pimedate inimestega tehtud uurin­
gud —  inimesed, kel polnud võimalik teist inimest näha. S. Goldin-Meadow ja 
tema toonane kolleeg Jana Iverson Indiana ülikoolist uurisid 12 pimeda žeste, 
kui nood vestlesid (Iverson, Goldin-Meadow 1998). Pimedad kasutasid žeste 
samal määral, kui nägijad. Nende žestid kandsid samamoodi infot edasi ja  
nende žestid olid vormilt sama ulatuslikud! (Näiteks kasutati kaldu C-kuju 
joonistamist käega õhus, et juhtida tähelepanu anumast välja valatud vedeli­
kule.) J. Iverson ja  S. Goldin-Meadow ütlevad (1998; 228), et võib olla žestiku- 
leerivad kõnelejad, kuna nad mõistavad, et žestid võivad kanda kasulikku 
informatsiooni kuulajani. Tähelepanuväärne oligi see, et pimedad žestiku- 
leerisid, kui nad kõnelesid, vaatamata sellele, kas kuulaja oli nägija või mitte. 
See on kinnitanud ideed, et žestid on tihedalt paaris kõneaktiga. Sellistel 
paaridel on oma lätted ajus.
A. Kendon esitab kaks kõne ja  žesti suhet pehmendavat asjaolu. 1. Kõnekeelel 
on neid aspekte, mis näitavad, et ta on vähem erinev žestilisest väljendist, kui ta 
võiks esmapilgul olla. Kõnekeele väljendusviisides võib leida žestile iseloo­
mulikke jooni. See tähendab, et kasutades kõnet keele jaoks või kasutades žesti 
keele jaoks, pole neis nii radikaalset erinevust, nagu võiks eeldada. 2. Kõnel on 
neid funktsioone, mida tavaliselt ei peeta lingvistiliseks selle sõna otseses mõttes, 
kuid mis on sellegipoolest väga olulised ja  mis järelduvad tema oraal-auditiivsest 
olemusest. A. Kendon nimetab neid faatilisteks (ingl phatic)1 funktsioonideks. 
Nende kaudu töötati kõnevõime rohkem läbi, enne kui ta võeti üle kui vahend 
sümboliliseks kommunikatsiooniks, mis on lingvistiline kommunikatsioon.
6 D etailsem alt sellest näitest eesti keeles vt ka S. Tenjes, Žestid eestikeelses dialoogis. 
M agistritöö. Tartu: Tartu Ü likool (käsikiri), 1995, lk 59.
7 M õiste pärineb B ronislaw  Kasper M alinowskilt, kes tuletas selle  ingliskeelsest 
sõnast emphatic —  ‘em faatiline, (tunde)rõhuline’. Ta on öelnud näiteks, et “tervitused 
on faatilise suhtlemise osa, m illega inim esed loovad liidusidem eid ja  hoiduvad vaiku­
sest, mis on alati hoiatav ja  kardetav” (lk 314) —  B. M alinowski, The Problem o f  
M eaning in Primitive Languages. С. К. O gden and I. A. Richards (eds), The M eaning  
o f  M eaning. N ew  York: Harcourt, Brace and W orld, 1923, lk 2 9 6 -3 3 6 .
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9.1. Kõne faatiline funktsioon
Kõnekeeles on palju paralleele žestiliste väljenditega. Ühisosa nende vahel 
ainult tundub väiksem, kui see tegelikult on. Kahe väljendusviisi integratsioon 
on vähem müstiline, kui see arvatakse olevat. Kõneldes me sageli osutame ja  
viitame, nii on keele referentsiaalne funktsioon üks olulisemaid. Kuid keelel on 
teisigi funktsioone. Kuigi neid funktsioone tuuakse vähem esile keele üle 
peetavates diskussioonides, on nad samavõrd olulised, sest nad arvestavad meie 
võimete läbitöötamisega kõnelemiseks, enne kui me kasutame keelt. A. Kendon 
peab siin silmas kõnelise kommunikatsiooni fa a tilis t  funktsiooni (Kendon 1991: 
8) —  viis, kuidas häälduslikkust muudetakse, kui me arvestame üksteisega. 
Küllap on kõigil mõnikord ette tulnud vajadus teha pööre vestluse käigus — 
mitte seoses sellega, millest parajasti räägiti, vaid koosolu  pärast, ja ga tu se  
pärast. A. Kendon väidab, et keele päritolu küsimuses tuleb sellele probleemile 
rohkem tähelepanu pöörata. K õne  kui selline võib olla läbi töötatud häälelisuse 
kasutamise arendamise käigus fa a tilis te  funktsioonide jaoks. Kui sotsiaalne elu 
hominiididel oli keeruline ja  muutuv, küllap siis pidi olema väga oluline 
ühenduse p idam ine, pidev üksteise hoiatamine või muidu teada andmine selle 
kohta, mis kellelgi kavas oli või kuidas üksteisesse suhtutakse.8 See pidi olema 
kergelt ja  efektiivselt tehtav häälelisuse painduvate, õrnade vahenditega. Paljud 
uurijad on kirjeldanud, kuidas erinevad mitte-inimliigi primaadid kasutavad 
enam-vähem läbitöötatud häälduslikkust, millel on olnud sotsiaal-koordinatiiv- 
sed ehk faatilised funktsioonid. R. Andrew (1976) on kirjeldanud keerulisi 
kruntivaid  mustreid ahvide liigutustes üksteise suhtes, B. Richman (1980) on 
arutanud keeruliste rütmiliste laulu-samaste häälitsuslike muutuste üle samuti 
teatud liiki ahvidel. C. Snowden (1990) on oma uuringute põhjal järeldanud, et 
paljudel primaatidel on häälitsustes dialoogilised muutused —  teatud võime­
lisus dialoogiks. Eelnev lubab kujutada, et kui sotsiaalsed suhted arenesid 
keerulisemaks, pidi toimuma vastav areng keerulisuse suunas ka hääldus- 
likkuses. A . Kendon arvab, et seesugusel viisil võis jõuda olemuslike tingimus­
teni, mis viisid kõnevõime arengu suunas.
Kui kõne oli läbi töötatud, siis oli ta pigem esmaseks vahendiks sotsiaalsete 
suhete koordineerimisel kui sümbolilise referentsi süsteemiks. Kuidas selline 
koordinatsioon sai sümbolilise funktsiooni, nagu ta on? Kendon arvab, et see 
toimus läbi teatud assotsiatiivsete protsesside. Kui proto-referentsiaalse kom­
munikatsiooni pantomiimilised dialoogid olid talletatud, pidid osapooled sageli 
olema võimelised orienteeruma üksteise tegevustes. Igaüks pidi olema kindel, et 
tema kavatsust teise tegevuse suhtes —  nagu ta oli selle d ia loog ilise lt esita­
nud —  mõisteti. Häälitsused võisid teenida seda funktsiooni hästi. Näiteks võib 
tuua inimestele omast soovi hüüda üksteist tähelepanu äratamiseks. Võib
K eele tekkim isest, kollektiivsest petm isest ja  hoolitsevast sugem isest vt ka M. 
Ehala, Uued tuuled ajaloolises keeleteaduses. —  J. Engelbrecht, E. Ergma (vastut. 
toim), N oored teaduses. Tallinn: Eesti Teaduste Akadeem ia, 2000 , lk 11 -16 .
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kujutada, et niisuguseid keerulisi häälikute järgnevusi nagu sädistamine 
tähelepanu köitmiseks häälduslikkuse kaudu — signaliseerides nii teateid Vaata 
mind! ja  samuti vastu võttes teateid Ma mõistan — pidi säilitatama kui 
pantomiimilise dialoogi integraalseid osi. Kui sellised situatsioonid olid 
küllaldaselt korduvad, tekkis hääldusele sümboliline funktsioon ning hääldus 
assotsieerus representatsioonilise tegevusega näiteks nii, et konkreetne hääldus­
likkuse muster võis siis tulla kasutusele tegevuste eneste asemel.
10. Ikoonilisus kõnekeeltes ja žestides
10.1. Keele arbitraarsus
Kui varaseim keel oli tõepoolest žestiline, siis aitab see ehk seletada üht kõne 
evolutsiooni müsteeriumi: kuidas sõnad hakkasid tähistama objekte ja  sündmusi 
arbitraarsel viisil. Ka siin on kaks esmapilgul erinevat seisukohta: üks rõhutab 
sõnade arbitraarsust, teine ikoonilisust. Usutavasti on sõnal mõlemad omadused, 
ikoonilisust pole me lihtsalt viimased 100 aastat rõhutanud ja  seepärast tundub 
selline vaateviis pisut dissidentlik.
Esimese üldlevinud seisukoha järgi on sõnad pigem abstraktsed kui 
ikoonilised. On väike hulk erandeid nagu näiteks onomatopoeetilised sõnad (nt 
‘bzz’, arvukate mesilaste sumisemise hääl, aga ka ‘kolisema’, ‘susisema’, 
‘mürts’ jne). Pole midagi sõna häälduses, mis annaks alust arvata, et see peaks 
olema tema tähendus. On väidetud, et kõige varasemad sõnad olid tegelikult 
oma referentside, viidatavate, järeleaimamine. Idee, millele andis hüüdnime 
auh-auh teooria 19. sajandi filoloog Max Müller. Seda ideed keele tekkimise 
teooriana peetakse siiski üsna võimatuks; eelkõige sellepärast, et kõnekeel on 
ühedimensiooniline, struktureeritud ajas ja  mitte ruumis, samas kui olulised 
sündmused meie maailmas on neljadimensioonilised, struktureeritud ajas ja  
ruumis. Selline piirang ei rakendu käežestidele, mis võisid esile kerkida 
varasematest katsetest füüsiliselt jäljendada füüsikalist maailma. Kuid see, mis 
võis alata kui ikooniline süsteem, võis tõenäoliselt areneda abstraktsemateks 
omadusteks aja jooksul, ja  mõnes suhtes arbitraarsed häälemustrid võisid 
seostuda žestidega nii, et muutusid ise pigem abstraktseteks sümboliteks kui 
ikoonideks. Tundub, et siin ei ole asi kaugeltki nii ühene ja  selge, nagu M. 
Corballis (1999) on arvanud.
10.2. Keele ikoonilisus
Kui vaatame žesti, nagu seda kasutatakse kõnes ja  nagu seda kasutavad viip- 
lejad, saame küllusliku hulga kujutavaid ja  pantomiimilisi väljendeid. Kui žesti 
kasutatakse tema enda pärast (viipekeeled jmt), muutub ta palju modifitseeri- 
tumaks ja  me võime näha süsteemide esilekerkimist. Need on tõeliselt
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süsteemsed, aga ka suvalisuse karakteristikuga —  kõigega, mida me kujutame 
ette keelel olevat. Me võime näha juba väljaarendatud viipekeeltes ekspres­
siivsete leiutiste esitamist, mis tuletatakse ilmselt väljendi vormist, mis 
omakorda sõltub visuaalsest, ikoonilisest representatsioonist. Siinjuures on 
ahvatlev näha seda kui väljendi fundamentaalset viisi, midagi, mis on täiesti 
aluseks igat liiki referentsiaalsele väljendile.
Kui see nii on, võime loota, et kaasaegne kõnekeel peaks samuti neid jooni 
näitama. Seda, et keel just ei o le  kujutav, on enamasti esitatud kui keele 
tähtsaimat printsiipi. Väljendi pildilisi, ikoonilisi esitusviise, mida leiame 
žestidel, nimetatakse üldiselt m ittelingvistilisteks. Paljud viipekeele uurijad on 
eitanud selliste joonte olemasolu. Nad on teinud jõupingutusi, et tõestada 
viipekeelte staatust iseseisvate keeltena (Herbert and Waltensperger 1979). 
Keelemärgi arbitraarsus, nagu selle on välja hõiganud F. de Saussure, on K eele  
P rin tsiip idest esimene ja  paljud lingvistid on võtnud seda nii südamesse, et nad 
pole tähelepanu pööranud inimesele tervikuna, tema kehalisusele  ning on 
seetõttu jätnud kõrvale olulisi fakte, mis näitavad, et arbitraarsus —  või pigem 
keele m itte ikoonilisus  —  on parimal juhul suhteline (Kendon 1991)! Samal 
seisukohal on ka mitmed teised uurijad. Stan Voronin (1991) ütleb, et F. 
Saussure’i keelemärgi arbitraarsuse printsiibi ületähtsustamisega ignoreeritakse 
hääle-süm bolism i ja  onomatopoeetilisi elemente maailma keeltes. Luues ja  
kasutades keelt me kõnelejatena tõepoolest kasutame seda piltide loomiseks 
sellest, mida me räägime ja  see pildiloome või ikoonilisuse võime teavitab meid 
olulisel määral isegi näivalt täiesti formaalsest lingvistilisest struktuurist.
See näib töötavat igal keeleanalüüsi tasandil. R. Wescott (1971) ning R. 
Jakobson ja  L. Waugh (1979) näitasid häälelise sümbolismi nähtuse allesjäämist 
keeles ja  seda, kuidas sõnad kõlavad ning kuidas nad on rütmiliselt 
m usterdatud. Siinjuures oli oluline, kuidas kõnelejad näitasid ja  järkjärgult 
organiseerisid kõnet. Seega näib (kui keel on inimeste looming), nagu oleks 
musterdamine mänginud olulist rolli keele moodustamisel. On palju uuringuid 
spontaanse kõne kohta, mis näitasid, et me võime mõnikord osaleda protsessis, 
mille läbi sõnad saavad vormid väljaspool hääle kujutamist. D. Tannen (1983) 
uuris Kreeka naisi vestluses ja  P. Nordberg (1986) uuris vestlusi Rootsi 
täiskasvanute hulgas. Nad juhivad tähelepanu häälesõnade  laialdasele kasu­
tusele —  need on mitteleksikaalsed vokaalsed üksused, mis on äärmiselt 
onomatopoeetilise iseloomuga. Inglise keeles nt vroom  viitab kihutava auto 
mürale, brr!  tehakse külma puhul, whoosh  väljatulistatava raketi kirjelduseks. 
Nordberg näitab, kuidas selliseid häälesõnu kasutati erinevatel eesmärkidel 
Rootsi täiskasvanute kõnes, sageli süntaktiliselt täielikult integreeritud lause 
sees, milles nad ilmnesid, ja  tihti olid nad lokaalselt konventsionaliseeritud. On 
ilmne, et sellised häälesõnad või vokaa lsed  že s tid  muutuvad konventsio­
naalseteks ja  saavad sõnavara osaks. Mõnedes keeltes on häälesõnu leksikonis 
rohkem ja  neid nimetatakse ideofoonideks. Neid on palju Aafrika keeltes, aga ka 
mujal. Need on leksikaalsed üksused hälbiva fonoloogiaga, tüüpiliselt onomato­
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poeetilised ning neid võib kasutada adjektiividena ja  verbina. Ideofoon sageli 
kas intensiivistab või täpsustab.
Ikoonilisus morfoloogias on samuti laialt levinud. R. Wescott (1971) mee­
nutab, et pluurali vormid on sageli üldiselt pikemad kui singulari vormid ja  
komparatiivides on tavaline, et võrdluse kangem  osa on pikem kui lähe: 
‘pikk’ —  ‘p ikem '. G. Lakoff ja  M. Johnson (1980) meenutavad reduplikat- 
siooni9 kui intensiivistavat või m itm ustavat (e p lu ra liseeriva t) nähtust paljudes 
keeltes, mis on ilmselt ikoonilise alusega.
Ka süntaksis võib ikoonilisust demonstreerida. J. Haiman (1985) räägib 
kausaalsete suhete väljenditest mittesugulaskeeltes, kus on rohkem otseseid 
seoseid enamate morfeemide vahel pigem siis, kui neid rakendatakse agendi ja  
kogeja vahelistes  suhetes. J. Haiman ütleb, et süntaks organiseeritakse sageli kui 
semantiliste seoste lineaarne diagramm. Ta ütleb ka, et on veel palju süntaktilisi 
jooni, mida tuleks ikoonilisusena arvesse võtta.
Ikoonilisusest keeles on huvitavaid tähelepanekuid teinud Bret Battey oma 
artiklis, mis käsitleb keelt, žesti ja  muusikat (Battey 1998). Ta väidab, et keel 
peegeldab meie kogemuse struktuuri. Kuigi lingvistid rõhutavad sõnade ja  
keeleliste konstruktsioonide arbitraarsust ja  konventsionaalsust, on keeles neid 
aspekte, mis kindlalt näitavad ikoonilisust —  strukturaalset sarnasust — 
viidatava suhtes. Kõige käepärasem näide siinjuures oleks subjekti, objekti ja 
verbi kategoriseerimine. SOV-konstruktsioon määratleb suhet: on mingi ele­
ment, mis teeb midagi; on miski, mida tehakse; tehakse midagi millegi suhtes.
B. Battey möönab, et riskides ülelihtsustada G. Fauconnier’ ideid mentaalsetest 
ruumidest (vt ka Fauconnier 1985: 1) võib öelda, et objekt ja  subjekt reastatakse 
mentaalses ruumis ning verb määratletakse suhtena nende vahel. Võrdlevaks 
näiteks on siin ameerika viipekeel, mis paneb paika subjekti ja  objekti füüsilises 
ruumis ning siis modelleerib verbi suhtena nende vahel. Muidugi kerkib 
siinjuures küsimusi. Kas kolmnurk subjekt-objekt-verb  implitseerib (~ sisaldub 
järeldatavana) meie maailmakogemuses ja  seepärast peegeldub see ikooniliselt 
meie keeles? Või on need kolm kategooriat arbitraarsed märgisüsteemid? Või 
midagi vahepealset?
Üks huvitav valdkond on keele lised  külmikud  (ingl linguistic freeze). Termin 
viitab seotud lausungitele, mis on muutunud külmunuiks keele sees, kuigi nad 
on teoreetiliselt arbitraarsed. Neid me kutsume ka idiomaatilisteks väljenditeks. 
Nii eesti kui inglise keeles võiks sellisteks olla väljendid nagu nt ‘üles ja  alla’ 
(ingl up an d  dow n), ‘siin ja  seal’ (ingl here and there), ‘pead ja  jalad’ (ingl head  
o ver heels, eesti keeles ka ‘uperpalli’; ‘ülepeakaela’). Mõnede selliste külmikute 
seletamiseks on pakutud erinevaid teooriaid. Nende seletuste juures on üks 
huvitav joon: külmikute läbi usk ideesse, et meie eksistentsiaalne positsioon, 
meie maailmavaade võib mõjutada keelevorme. Marge Landsberg (1995) on
9 Reduplikatsioonist eesti keeles vt ka M. Erelt, Reduplication in Estonian. —  
M. Erelt (ed.), Estoninan: T ypological Studies II. Tartu: U niversity o f  Tartu, 1997, 2 -  
41.
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uurinud, kuidas inimese enesetajumine peegeldatakse külmikutes, tuues seeläbi 
esile meie egotsentrilise perspektiivi ja  kultuurilised normid. Meie enesetaju kui 
kõikide asjade kese peegeldab tendentsi näha osutuste nullpunkti lausungis seal, 
kus meie ise oleme —  nii ajas kui ruumis. Me ütlemegi pigem ‘sees ja  väljas’ 
(ingl in and out) kui ‘väljas ja  sees’, ‘siin ja  seal, mitte ‘seal ja  siin’. Selline 
mina kõ igepea lt-printsiip kombineerub maskuliinsuse domineerimisega maa­
ilmapildis (Battey 1998: 9), andes selliseid külmikuid nagu ‘isa ja  ema’ (ingl 
fa th er  and m other), ‘mees ja  naine’ (ingl husband and w ife), ‘poisid ja  tüdru­
kud’ (ingl boys and g irls). Et asi oleks vähegi õiglane, tuleks nimetada ka 
vastupidist külmikut: ‘pruut ja  peigmees’ (ingl bride  and groom ). Kirjeldatud 
keelenähtuse juures võib veel nimetada kalduvust osutada enne elusale kui 
elutule, vanemale enne kui nooremale, tugevamale enne kui nõrgemale ( ‘džinn 
ja  toonik’, ingl gin an d  tonic). Palju külmikuid võib seletada hääleliste eelis­
tustega, kuid antud näidete puhul jääb jõusse ka midagi enamat kui lihtsalt arbit- 
raame sotsiaalne konventsioon. B. Battey väidab, et verbaalsel vormil on 
isomorfism millelegi veel sügavamal, mis on sisestatud meie isiku kogemusse 
(Battey 1998: 9).
Nagu võtab kokku R. Wescott (1971): K õik keeled  on küllastatud ikooniliste  
elem entidega  ja  lisab, et K eelte  võrd lem isel n äivad  pa lju d  süm bolid  (s.t 
arb itra a rsed  m ärgid) o leva t olnud kord  ikoonid. Eelnevatest töödest selgub, et 
kui inimesed seisavad vajaduse ees luua midagi uut väljendi esitamisel, siis tihti 
nad ei leia keelevaramust olemasolevate terminite hulgast seda õiget. Siis nad 
improviseerivad visuaalsusega, kujutamisega, kuuldelisusega või nende 
kombinatsiooniga. Oletame, et see kujutamine on teistele mõistetav. Seejärel 
võib see muutuda vormiks ja  lõpuks arbitraarseks vormiks. Seega, ikoonilisus 
siseneb keelde pidevalt ning transformeerub pidevalt mitteikooniliseks.
11. Metafoorsus kõnes ja žestilistes väljendites
Kõnel ja  žestil on palju ühist. Kõnega kaasnevad žestid edastavad visuaalse 
kujutamise kaudu konkreetseid tegevusi, kujundeid, ruumisuhteid või liikumisi 
läbi ruumi, mis on metafoorid abstraktsete mõistete jaoks (McNeill 1987, 
Calbris 1990). On tähelepanuväärne, et metafoorid töötavad žestides nii, nagu 
metafoore võib leida verbaalsetes väljendites.
Ka verbaalne metafoor elab  läb i, kogeb žestilist väljendit. Näiteks loos 5 
psühhiaatri ja  1 sotsiaaltöötajaga (Kendon 1991: 7) küsib üks arst sotsiaal­
töötajalt, mis kasu ta sai intervjuust patsiendiga. Vastus: Nägin teda ühe korra, 
ei saanud palju , aga ma “korjasin  selle  ü le s” vestluse käigus tem aga. Samal 
ajal teeb ta avatud peoga 3 korda ülespidi liigutuse, nagu korjaks maast midagi. 
Ning teine vastus sama situatsiooni kirjeldusest: Ta rääkis väga kiiresti ja  “see  
kõik tuli v ä lja ” väga spontaanselt. Siin kasutab sotsiaaltöötaja isikumetafoori 
nagu konteinerit, kus tulevad välja ideed või tundmused. Lausungit öeldes 
väljendas ta sisu ka metafoorselt žestiga, tehes laia pühkiva liigutuse.
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Järgmine laialt kasutatav metafoor on rääkida ajast ruumi terminites. G. 
Calbris (1990) on uurinud ruumi kujutamise žeste prantslastel, ja  võrdlevalt 
prantslastel, ungarlastel ning jaapanlastel (Calbris 1987). Ka eestlased teevad 
osutavat žesti minevikus toimunu puhul pigem üle õla selja taha ja  tuleviku 
puhul on liigutus ettepoole, kuid möödaniku puhul kasutatakse ka täiesti 
teistsuguseid žeste. Ettepoole või tahapoole viidatakse seoses ruumiga või 
objektiga (Tenjes 1996: 187-189). Kui samu metafoore võib leida nii žestidest 
kui kõnest, kas siis pole mitte mõlemad omadused paigutatud samale 
substraadile? Selleks võiks olla võime, mis pärineb meie sensoorsete tajude 
sisemiseks muutumisest, eelkõige nägemistajust, ja  füüsilise maailma käsita­
misest. Metafoorid, mis on predominantsed diskursuses, ja  sensoorne kogemus, 
eriti visuaalne kogemus, töötavad vahenditena ruumi ja  objektide motoorseks 
käsitamiseks diskursuse sees. Intellektuaalne tegevus esitatakse kõnekeeles 
suures osas läbi metafooride, mis on üles ehitatud meie visuaalsel maailma­
kogemusel (Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987, Danesi 1990, Sweester 1990). Kui 
mõtlemine on välismaailma üle kandmine sisemiseks, siis pole juhus, et keel — 
kui teda võetakse selle protsessi esitusvahendina teiste jaoks sotsiaalselt jagatud 
sümbolite kaudu —  peaks andma väljapoole metafoorse kasutuse visuaalsele 
kogemusele ja  tajumuslik-motoorsetele protsessidele. Vähemalt ei peaks olema 
üllatav, kui žest töötab selle heaks, et väljendada abstraktset sisu.
12. Kokkuvõtteks
Inimese käelise suhtluse hüpotees ei saa olla halvem mistahes muust hüpoteesist 
seoses hääldusliku keele tekkimisega. Kui meenutada, et praeguste teadmiste 
kohaselt tekkis elu Maal 4 550 000 000 aastat tagasi, siis on hominiidide 5 
miljoniline iga suhteliselt lühiajaline ja  eriti lühiajaline on Homo sapiensi, 
‘aruka inimese’ eluiga —  vaid 60 000 kuni 100 000 aastat. Kui võtta maakera 
iga võrdseks 12 tunniga, pole inimene maakeral olnud veel ühte minutitki. Siis­
ki on ta palju jõudnud —  näiteks on ta õppinud kasutama nii käsi kui häält.
Artiklis vaadeldi erinevaid printsiipe ja  arvamusi seoses kõne arenguga 
käežestidest. Käsitleti seisukohti seoses inimese evolutsiooniga, aju-uuringu- 
tega, viipekeeltega, žestide ja  kõne koostööga, keele ikoonilisusega ja  metafoor­
susega žestides. Keel, nagu me teda täna mõistame, on keeruline kombinatsioon 
paljudest erinevatest võimetest. See kombinatsioon pole tulnud mitte kohe ja  
korraga, vaid järk-järgult koos erinevate võimete tulemisega kokku erineval 
ajal. Häälelisus alustas tegevust kui kommunikatiivne süsteem, milles sotsiaalne 
süsteem funktsioneeris kesksena. See tuli läbi assotsiatsiooni, mida kasutati 
vahendina sümboliliseks representatsiooniks. Selektiivsus, mida on eriti palju 
rõhutatud, võis viia selle funktsiooni suhteliselt kiirema kasutamise juurde. 
Žestiline võime on modaalsus, milles referentsiaalne funktsioon arenes esmalt, 
ja  see näib praegu olevat paljuski asendunud.
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Kokkuvõtteks meenutame, et kuigi meil pole otseseid tõendeid, et meie 
kauged eellased suhtlesid käte abil enne hääldusliku kõne esiletõusmist, pole 
see väide siiski rajatud tühjale kohale. On selge, et käsi ja  kõne käivad käsikäes. 
Žesti suurimaks vooruseks on tema kolmedimensioonilisus: meil on omast käest 
võtta ruumiline kunstnik. Žesti abil saame oluliselt hõlbustada teate edastamist. 
Me võime kõnelemise ajal kogu vajaliku kirjelduse usaldada käežestide hoolde. 
Žesti puuduseks ainulise suhtlusvahendina on tema vähene nüansseerimisvõime 
ja  ilmselt piiratum sõnavara. Meie liigutused ei ole piisavalt täpsed, nagu seda 
on keel. Kõne oluliseks eeliseks žesti ees ongi tema nüansirikkus ja  täpsus; 
puuduseks on kõne lineaarsus: häälikute ajaline järgnevus, mis aeglustab teate 
edastamist. Lõpetuseks võite kujutleda, kuidas te peaksite seletama kellelegi, 
kes pole kunagi tooli näinud, mis on tool\ aga seletama peaksite nii, et te käsi 
üldse ei kasuta!
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Tabel 1. Ülevaade ajalistest andmetest tekstis. (Loe ‘...aastat tagasi’ suunaga 
alt üles.)
27 000 viim ased Homo erectused Jaaval
30 000 viim ased neandertallased Euroopas
80  000 Iraagis Shanidaris asetati surnukeha lilledest voodisse
90  000 luust artefaktid Zairest
100 000 Homo sapiens lülitus ümber kõnele kui esm asele kom ­
m unikatsioonivahendile, žestidele jäi sekundaarne roll
60  0 0 0 -1 5 0  00 0 Homo sapiensi ilmumine ja  Aafrikast välja rändamine
2 miljonit suureajuliste in im laste-liigi tekkimine; käežestid olid  muu­
tunud täielikult süntaktiliseks, kuid ka häälelisus oli saa­
nud oluliseks
4 m iljonit -  2 m iljonit hom iniidide fossiilsed  leiud
3,5 m iljonit australopiteekuse säilm ed Ida-Aafrika alangult
4  m iljonit -  5 m iljonit püstiasend hom iniididel; žestid on muutunud keerulise­
maks, hõlm ates ka viipeid, mida kasutasid varased homi- 
niidid nagu nt australopiteekused
5 m iljonit -  7 m iljonit hom iniidide lahknem ine inim ahvidest, inim ese ja  šimpansi 
ühistest eellastest; lihtsad žestid muutuvad keerulisem aks, 
häälega edastatakse ainult em otsionaalseid karjeid ja  hoia- 
tushüüdeid.
2 5 -3 0  m iljonit viiped ahvide suhtluses
4 550  m iljonit e ~ 
4, 5 miljardit elu  tekkimine Maal
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SILVI TENJES. The Hypothesis of the Gestural Origins of Language.
This study attempts to clarify the relationship between hand gestures and speech 
in the context of language acquisition. Our pre-ancestors communicated with 
manual gestures before switched to vocal mode. Language emerged not from 
vocalization, but from manual gestures. This hypothesis is supported by 1) 
human evolution; 2) brain-researches; 3) sign languages; 4) cooperation 
between gestures and speech; 5) iconicity in language; 6) metaphors in gestures. 
Iconicity seems to be present at every level at which language is analyzed. The 
20th century linguistics has put arbitrariness at the center of the stage, dis­
placing iconicity. The theory of gestural origin may help to explain the transi­
tion from a non-symbolic use of behaviour to its symbolic use if this is regarded 
as occurring in the gestural medium.
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ŽESTID KESKAJAL
Silvi Tenjes
KESKAEG KUI ŽESTILINE KULTUUR
Euroopa keskaegset kultuuri on mõnikord nimetatud žestide kultuuriks või 
“žestiliseks kultuuriks” (Schmitt 1992: 77). Olgu kohe märgitud, et mõistel žest 
oli siis laiem tähendus kui käeliigutus, nagu seda eelkõige kasutatakse tänapäe­
val. Žest oli keha liigutus, oli tegu. Sõna žest (lad gesta — 1) ‘teod’, 2) ‘nota­
riaalsed lepingud’ —  tuleneb väljendist res gesta —  ‘tehtud teod’) on multi- 
valentne. Mõiste hõlmab nii eeposte kangelasi kui ka narratiive (erinevad kroo­
nikaid, lugulaule või legende), mis on nende kangelaste tegudega seotud, hiljem 
aga nii kangelase põlvnemist kui tsükleid, millesse need põlvnemislood on 
põimitud (DMA 1983: 257). Žestikultuuril oli kahesugune tähendus: 1) inimese 
keha liigutustel ja  -hoiakutel oli tollal oluline osa sotsiaalsetes suhetes; 2) kesk­
aegne kultuur ise lõi oma žestid, mis koos moodustasid keskaegse žestiteooria.
Mitmeski suhtes on meie praegused arusaamad žestidest pärit nendest 
tähendustest, mida nad kandsid antiigis. Näiteks idee, et žest võib väljendada 
meie tundeid, emotsioone või ideid, või et žestid võivad moodustada keha 
keele. Läbi keskaja olid nii tekstid kui kujutised (ikonograafia) mõlemad loodud 
kiriku poolt ja  kiriku jaoks. Tekstid ja  kujutised —  s.h. žestide tähendused ja  
funktsioonid, keha väärtus ja  inimese elu eesmärk —  väljendasid igasuguste 
ideede ja  seisukohtade puhul kiriklikku vaatepunkti. See tõik iseloomustab 
lääne ajalugu väga pika perioodi jooksul. Keskaeg oli “feodaaltsivilisatsioon, 
mille ideoloogia aluseks oli ristiusu õpetus ja  mida hoidsid koos maaomandil 
põhinevad alluvussuhted” (Aleksejev 1996: 759).
Žestid, nagu sõnad, kuuluvad efemeersesse maailma. Tavaliselt ei jäta nad 
endast mingit jälge, mida uurijad saaksid hiljem kasutada. Siin on vähe eran­
deid. Üks neist on kirja kuju (Id ductus), mille järgi paleograafid rekonstruee­
rivad käeliigutusi, mis vedasid jooni sajandeid varem. Mõnedelt skulptuuridelt 
või maalidelt saab leida kunstniku käeliigutuse või -surve. Kontide ja  luude 
deformatsioon lubab arheoloogidel oletada muistseid kükitamise ja  küürutamise 
viise. Kuid tavaliselt pole uurijatel haarata mitte millestki muust kui žestide 
tekstilisest või ikonograafilisest “kujutamisest”. Siinjuures on palju erinevusi. 
Mõned tekstid lihtsalt mainivad eraldi žeste, aga ei kirjelda neid. Lood kuningas 
Arthurist ja  tema rüütlitest kirjeldavad, mida nad tegid, aga ei anna teavet, 
kuidas nad seda tegid. Selles suhtes paremaid kirjeldusi on Karl Suure kurbuse 
väljendamisest: ta sakutanud habet ja  nutnud ohjeldamatult (Schmitt 1992: 82). 
On leitud isegi moraalseid ja  eetilisi otsuseid või abstraktset mõtlemist väljen­
davate žestide kirjeldusi. Kuid sellegipoolest ei jõua me kunagi žestide enesteni.
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See tähendab, et me peame arvestama igasuguseid mõjutusi: ulatuslikku sõna­
vara ja  ideoloogiaid, mis astuvad žestide, tekstide ja  meie vahele.
Vastavalt mõnede uurijate seisukohtadele oli žestide tähtsuse üheks oluliseks 
põhjuseks keskajal madal kirjaoskus. Feodaalühiskonnas olid kombed ja  tavad, 
mida väljendati pigem žestide ja  sõnadega kui kirjalikult. Tänapäeval on vaevalt 
võimalik kujutada, et lihtsal žestil võis olla seaduse jõud või et inimesed 
usaldasid žesti rohkem kui notari juures allkirjastatud formulari. Ja ometi olid 
žestid palju mõjuvamad igasugustest dokumentidest vähemalt kuni 13. sajan­
dini, kui hakkasid arenema linnad ja  kaubanduslik tegevus ning kasvav riigi- 
bürokraatia aitas kirjaoskust arendada.
Täielikult ei saa siiski vastandada žestiline kultuur versus kirjaoskus. Esi­
teks, keskaeg on alati tundnud nii žeste kui kirja, kuigi tasakaal nende vahel 
muutus ühest sajandist teise ja  ühelt sotsiaalselt grupilt teisele. Keskaegne 
kultuur pani kirjutamisele ja  lugemisele suurt rõhku, kuid neid viljeleti vähe ja  
kasutati peamiselt jumalasõna e pühakirja levitamiseks. Kuid siin oli ka põhjus, 
miks kirjaoskuse monopoliseerisid sajanditeks kirik ja  vaimulikud, kes 
kirjutasid ladina keeles. Teiseks, kirjutamine ise oli teatud žesti liik ajal, mil 
kirjutati käsitsi —  see oli käejoone isikupärane jälg. Kuid inimesi, kes oskasid 
kirjutada, oli väga vähe ja  seepärast tuli üksteisega suhelda läbi rituaalsete 
žestide, sõnade ja  sümboliliste objektide (reliikviate hoiulaegas, hostia, mõõk 
jne). Žestid kandsid endaga ja  andsid edasi poliitilist ja  religioosset võimu, tegid 
selle avalikuks, kõikidele mõistetavaks ja  andsid seaduslikule tegevusele elava 
kujutise. Žestid sidusid inimlikke soove ja  inimeste kehi.
Ühiskond oli metafoorne kujutlus “kehast”, kelle “liikmed” — pea, käsi­
varred, küljed, kõht, sääred ja  pöiad —  peegeldasid erinevaid sotsiaalseid 
gruppe oma erinevate funktsioonide ja  väärtustega, keelega, märkidega, vappi­
dega, ja  ka oma individuaalsete žestidega. Dmikud, mungad, kanoonikud, rüüt­
lid, kaupmehed ja  õpetlased moodustasid erinevaid “žestilisi ühendusi”. Sellises 
ühiskonnas oli vähe ruumi individuaalsusel, kõik kuulusid ordosse. Ordo — 
sõna, mis mitte juhuslikult ei pärine rituaalsest liturgiakorrast, ordinesist (lad 
ordo —  ‘kord’; ‘ordu’). Selline ühiskond oli tugevasti ritualiseeritud ja  žestid 
kindlustasid igaühe kuulumise ühte kindlasse gruppi.
Žestid väljendasid ka hierarhiat sotsiaalsete gruppide vahel, igaühe sees ja  
erinevate ühiskonnaklasside ning ametite vahel. Nii oli kõikidel žestidel oma 
tähendus —  mitte ainult kõige pühalikumates rituaalides, vaid ka igapäevaelu 
žestidel, näiteks ristimärgi tegemisel kirikusse sisenemisel, enne sööki, või 
ohuga silmitsi seistes. Inimene polnud kunagi üksi, kui ta oma žesti tegi. Isegi 
eremiit kõrbes (s.t Euroopas keskajal metsas) või munk oma kongis tegid oma 
žesti Jumala “kõikenägeva silma” all. Žeste esitati alati veel kellegi suunas, 
kellegi poole, rääkides või võideldes, tervitades või vaieldes. Suhtluses inimeste 
vahel või inimese ja  Jumala vahel või palvetades ei jäetud kunagi tegemata 
žeste, milles väljendusid nii keha kui hing. Inimesed andsid žestidele oma usu 
kõik väärtused, oma sotsiaalse klassi kõik sümbolilised väärtused ja  kogu oma 
elu lootused kuni surmani ja  pärast surma.
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ŽESTID MUUTUVAS AJAS
Me teeme rohkem žeste kui neid tähele paneme. Žestid muutuvad ühest kohast 
teise või ühest ajast teise. Ajaloos mõned žestid kaovad, teised tekkivad. Mõned 
kujundlikud väljendid nagu “vaenukinnast heitma” või “kaabut kergitama” 
meenutavad žeste minevikust, kuid esimene neist pole enam liigutusena 
aktuaalne ja  kauaks teistki?
Sageli kasutatakse väljendit “valitsus tegi lesti ” kas teise maa suhtes või 
streikivate tööliste suhtes vms. Väljend on üsna mitmetähenduslik. See näitab, 
et reaalsed žestid ei lahenda enam sotsiaalseid või diplomaatilisi konflikte, kuid 
osutab ka, et me ei identifitseeri “žesti” peaaegu mitte millegi materiaalsega, 
vaid sellega, mida me nimetame “sümboolseks” tegevuseks. Me märkame, et 
sellele vaatamata tekitavad sellised sümboolsed aktid midagi, mis on reaalselt 
mõjus. Just seda tõdes keskaegne kultuur: žestidel ja  rituaalidel on sümboolne 
jõud. Samuti ei tohi unustada, et kaua aega ei tehtud vahet väljamõeldise ja  
tõeluse vahel. Käe sümbolilise kasutamise esmaseks näiteks oli Jumala käsi (lad 
dextera domini), mis nii Vanas kui Uues Testamendis tegi igasuguseid tegusid: lõi 
universumi ja  inimese, Õnnistas, tervendas jne. Nii said need tegevused preestri ja 
kuninga käe žestilise tegevuse mudeliteks. Inimese käel oli oluline osa erine­
vates rituaalsetes žestides läbi keskaja: vaimuliku käte peale panemine, õnnis­
tamine, ristimärgi tegemine, kätega tervendamine (vastavalt Kristuse eeskujule 
järgisid seda pühakud ja  piiskopid), vandetõotuse žestid (tõstetud käsi, habet 
hoidev käsi, reliikviat puudutavad sõrmed jms), lausumise “maagilised” žestid, 
sõrmede heasoovlikkuse või pahatahtlikkuse asendid jne.
Käsitledes kirjanduslikke või juriidilisi tekste, on mõned uurijad üritanud 
koostada keskaegsete žestide tüpoloogiaid kas vastavalt kehaosadele, millega 
žestid olid seotud: pea-, käežestid, käsivarte žestid jne, või vastavalt žestide 
võimalikule tähendusele: kurbuse, rõõmu, tervituse, kohtumise, lahkumise, 
austuse, vasallitõotuse (ustavusvande), õnnistamise žestid, palvežestid vms. 
Paljud uurijad on piirdunud ka üksikute käsikirjade kaunistuste refereerimisega 
(eelkõige Sachsenspiegel —  Saksi peeget)\ ühte liiki žestide käsitlemisega (nt 
palvežestid) või ühe konkreetse kunstniku tööde üksikasjaliku uurimisega (nt 
Giotto)2. Et: üldse oleks võimalik üldistada, tuleks küsida, mis oli žesti tegemine 
keskajal, kuidas ja  kes tegid žeste ning mida seejuures mõeldi, kujutati või püüti 
klassifitseerida? Millised kultuurilised jooned, millised hoiakud olid inimeste ja 
keha suhtes või inimeste ja  ümbritseva suhtes? Milliseid sotsiaalseid suhteid 
väljendati? Et täpselt vastata, tuleks uurida teoloogilisi, ilmalikke, kirjandus­
likke, pedagoogilisi ja  meditsiinilisi tekste, kloostrireeglistikke ja  -tavasid, 
liturgia korda, lugusid nägemustest, traktaate palvetajatest ja  jutlustajatest, tolle­
aegseid näidendeid, võimalikult tõetruid pilte vürstide elust jne.
Saksi õiguseraam at aastatest 1 2 2 0 -1 2 3 5 . K õlblusega seotud temaatikat selles jm  vt 
Sootak 1991: 456 , 458.
2 Giotto di B ondone, elas 1266 või 1 2 7 6 -1 3 3 7 .
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ŽESTID ÕIGUSEMÕISTMISES JA KUNSTIS
Üks valdkond, kust me leiame keskaegseid žeste, on kohus, eelkõige juriidilised 
protseduurid. Õigusküsimuste taaselustamine 12. ja  13. sajandil oli üks tähele­
panuväärsemaid intellektuaalseid liikumisi. Taasvirgumise allikad pärinesid nii 
antiigi tekstidest kui ka kohalikest ja  regionaalsetest tavadest. Ilmselt üks kõige 
detailsem ja  kõige kuulsam õigusalane tekst 13. sajandi algusest on Sachsen­
spiegel. See raamat on üsna detailne ja  küllaltki usaldusväärne kohtupraktika 
ülestähendus ühest konkreetsest Saksamaa piirkonnast. Sachsenspiegel, nagu 
teisedki tolle perioodi õigustekstid, ei hiilga analüütiliste käsitlustega; reegliks 
oli kombineerida erinevaid aspekte ja  jutustada lugejatele lisaks õigusteooriale 
sobivatest juriidilistest protseduuridest. Samas pandi tollal alus ja  korraldati 
seaduseks nii mõnigi juriidiline protseduur. Mõned käsikirjad sisaldasid peale 
vormelite ka kaunistusi. Kunstiajaloolastele on sellised protseduuride koodek­
siks ühendamised ikka huvi pakkunud, sest juriidiliste protsesside juures oli 
kujutatud palju visuaalset, nt värve, mis olid kindlalt kodifitseeritud. Mitte 
kõige vähem tähtsad selliste joonte hulgas polnud sümboolsed žestid.
Õiguslike žestide kodifikatsiooni võime tundma õppida erinevatest allika­
test, eelkõige juriidiliste käsikirjade kaunistustest. Esmane allikas Sachsen­
spiegel on jõudnud meieni neljas kaunistustega käsikirjas, mis kõik pärinevad 
samast (hävinud) eeskujust. Nii mõnigi kord on uurijad pisut ennatlikult arva­
nud, et kõigel käsikirjas kujutatul on täpne vaste reaalsusega, et žestid kujuta­
vad piltlikult usaldusväärset peegeldust tegelikult esitatud žestidest. Aga siis on 
nad varsti pidanud endalt küsima, kui palju sellest, mis on kujutatud, on 
kunstniku “väljamõeldis” või mis pärineb kunstnike varasematest väljakuju­
nenud tavadest, mis pole tingimata kattuvad juurapraksisega. Sellistele küsi­
mustele vastuseid otsides tuleb tõdeda, et Sachsenspiegeli miniatuuridel on 
mõnevõrra piiratud väärtus (Barasch 1987).
Antud juhul on olulisem õigusliku žesti kujutamine — olgu nad usaldus­
väärses vastavuses reaalsusega või mitte — , mis kinnitab täielikult tollast 
teadmist žestist kui sümboolsest vormist. Lahutuse puhul kohtus kujutatakse 
kohtunikku lükkamas kätega teine teisele poole lahutatud abikaasasid. Kas ta ka 
tegelikult tõukas meest ja  naist teineteisest eemale või mitte, see polnud pea­
mine. 13. sajandil uskus rahvas ilmselt, et midagi niisugust võis kohtus sündida 
ja  selline žest oli õigusprotseduuri lahutamatu osa.
Käsikiri, millele Moshe Barasch oma raamatus viitab seoses Sachsen- 
spiegeliga, Codex Palatinus Germanicus 164, asub Heidelbergi ülikooli raa­
matukogus ning arvatakse olevat kõige sarnasem Sachsenspiegeli käsikirjade 
(hävinud) originaalile. M. Barasch ütleb samas, et kahjuks on selles käsikirjas 
vähem kaunistusi kui teistes käsikirjades, mis on hilisemad, aga vähem usaldus­
väärsed originaali suhtes.
Kas keegi, kes väidab kohtus, et ta keeldub midagi tegemast, hoides vasema 
käega kinni oma paremat kätt, muutes tööd tegeva käe liikumatuks, annab nii­
viisi teada oma teovõimetusest? Kaasaegne inimene võib selles kahelda. Kuid
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k esk aja l kujutati sed a  akti ilm se lt  ju s t n ii. S e ll is e id  ž e s t il is i  li ig u tu si kujutati 
sü m b o o lse te  te g e v u ste n a , n en d e  kuju ja  k o n fig u ra ts io o n  o li tä ie lik u lt d e term i­
neeritu d , n en d e  täh en d u s o li n äh tavasti ü h e m õ tte lin e . K as s e ll is te l  k o d if its e e r i­
tud ž e s t id e l o li a in u lt sü m b o o ln e  väärtus v õ i o li  n e il ka m in g i p rak tilin e  e e s ­
m ärk ig a p ä e v a e lu s?  S e l le  k oh ta  p o le  tõ s ik in d la id  an d m eid . Ü h isk o n n a s , kus 
lu g e m iso sk u s  ei o ln u d  en d a stm õ is te ta v , tä itis  p a lju sid  “a rh iiv i” fu n k ts io o n e  e la v  
m älu .
V e e l saab  õ ig u s lik e  ž e s t id e  k o d if its e e r im ise  p ro tsessi u u r im istest tu letad a  
in d iv id u a a lse te  sü m b o o lse te  že s t id e  k o n k reetset “ sõn avara” . S e lg e lt  jo o n is tu s id  
vä lja  ž e s t id e  s p e ts iif il is e d  vorm id , sam uti tä h en d u sed , m is o lid  n en d eg a  su h e s ­
tatud ja  ü h etä h en d u slik u d . S e l l is e  “sõn avara” u la tu s p iird u s m õ ista g i se lle g a ,  
m is ju h tu s k oh tu s. K o n k reetsete  sü m b o o lse te  ž e s t id e  “sõ n a s tik ” lõ i e e ld u se  
p ild il is e le  tra d its io o n ile , kuhu k u u lu s ka struktuur, m id a  iga  k u n stn ik  v õ is  
ju lg e lt  kasu tad a. K a su ta m isek s laen ati ž est s e l l i s e s t  ž e s t ik o g u m ist.
Sachsenspiegeli k äsik irjad e k a u n is tu ste s  on näha ju r iid ilise  ž e s t ik u la ts io o n i  
s e lg e s t i  v ä lja jo o n is tu n u d  tüübid  ( jo o n ise d  1 ja  2 ). Ü k s k äsi, kas parem  või 
v a sem , haarab te ist, m ille  k ä e se lg  on  v ä lja p o o le , r a n d m e liig e se st  v õ i k ä siv a r ­
rest, su lg e d e s  liig e se k o h a . M õ lem a d  käed  on  kas rippu, tõ ste tu d  rinna k õ rg u se le  
võ i kord is e g i p ea  k o h a le . O m a e sm a se s  tä h en d u ses nä ib  ž e s t ilm u tava t v õ i­
m etu st koh ut m õ ista  (B arasch  1987: 9 1 , 9 2 ) . S am a  ž e st ilm u b  Sachsenspiegel is 
m itm el korral, küll v ä ik es te  v a r ia ts io o n id eg a , k u id  sä ilita d es  om a is e lo o m u lik u d  
jo o n ed .
Joon is 1. Saksi peegel, M S, fol. 37. D resden (B arasch  1987: 92)
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Joonis 2. Saksi peegel, MS, fol. 11. Dresden (Barasch 1987: 92).
S ach sen sp iegel  il lu s tra ts io o n id  e i m õ tle  sed a  že st i välja . V ara sem a te  sajandik- 
ku nst tu n n eb  že st i k an n atu se  ja  su u tm atu se  vä ljen d ajan a , m ille g a  p iiü tak se  ara 
h o id a  v iim sep äevak oh tu l (h u k k am õistu , k o h tu o tsu se ) saab u m ist. 12. sajandi 
lõ p u st on  tead a tek st, kus k im b atu se  ja  v õ im e tu se  v ä ljen d a m isek s  haarab  
kujutatud figu u r  o m a  vasaku  k äega  p arem ast k äest randm e kohalt (G arnu"  
1 9 82 ). S e e  ž e s t on vä g a  sarnane tu n n ista ja  ž e s t ile  G io tto  fresk o m a a lil S ü ü ta  
laste tapm ine  ( jo o n is  3 , fragm en t) P ad ovas A ren a  k a b elis  (it C apella den 
A ren a ; B arasch  1987: 3 1 ) . G io tto  fresk od  Capella d e ll’ A rena's  P a d o \a >  
p ärin evad  u m b es aastast 1305 .
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Joonis 3. G iotto , Siiiitalaste tapm ine  (fragm ent). 
Padova, A rena kabel (B arasch 1987: 31).
K esk a eg n e  p ild ilo o m e  p a istab  s ilm a  Siiiitalaste tapm ise  teem a  d e ta ilid e  ilm ek a  
k u ju tam ise  p o o le s t . T ä n a p ä ev a  tea d la sed  on  eristan ud  m itm eid  k u ju ta m isv iise , 
k asu tad es n ä ite id  n ii v isu a a lse s t r ep resen ta ts io o n ist kui k irjan d u sest. L o o m u ­
liku lt on k e sk se l k oh a l m e e le h e ite s  em a d e  k u ju tam in e. O lu lise d  on  žestid :  
em a sid  on  k irjeldatud  ja  kujutatud v õ it lem a s  ju lm a d e  sõd u ritega , rünnates n e id  
lausa p a lja ste  kätega . On sü m b o o lse id  ja  p a tee t ilis i ž e s te  nagu  nt vastu  rinda  
tagu m in e . V ä h em  k esk se l kohal o lev a n a , kuid s iisk i saged asti on kujutatud  
H ero d est, eriti tem a nägu ja  käsk ivat ž e s t i. Tapatalgute  tõ lg en d u ste s  k esk aja l ei 
asetu n u d  s tseen i tu nn istajad  era ld i, va id  o lid  sea lsa m a s . S e lg e s t i v ä lja jo o n is tu ­
nud p ea ltvaa ta ja te  grupp o li sam u ti haaratud h irm ust ja  kurb usest. N ii k a u g e le , 
kui on  v õ im a lik  le id a  n ä ite id , on näha, et se l lin e  k u ju ta m isv iis  k r is ta lliseeru s  
1 3 .-1 4 . sa jan d il. S a g e li o li tun n ista ja ten a  kujutatud sõd u reid , en am asti keisri 
ih u k a itsja id , k es ise  e i võtn u d  la ste  ta p m isest o sa .
G io tto  fresk o l Siiiitalaste tapm ine  on  käed näha ü h el tu n n ista ja l k o lm est. K ui 
ü h e figu u ri ž e s t il on  m in g i täh en d u s, s i is  on  s e e  e s in d a tu d  k ogu  gru p il. M e  
n ä em e, k u id as m ees  on haaranud om a  v a sem a  k ä eg a  k inn i parem ast k äest 
randm e k oh a lt n ii, e t te in e  käsi on  p eaaegu  p e id u s . S e lle  k u m m a lise  ž e s t i tä h en ­
dus p o le  in tu itiiv se lt  tõ lg en d a ta v . V a e v a lt  o le k s  G io tto  kujutanud sed a  ž e st i, kui 
se l poleks; m õn d  fu n k ts io o n i k o m p o s its io o n i terv ik lik u k s m õ is tm isek s .
7
H ilisk e sk a ja  ik o n o g r a a f ilis t  tra d its io o n i u u rid es v õ im e  s e l le le  k ä e liig u tu se le  
le id a  s e le tu se . K un i 12. sa jan d in i o li sam a, G io tto  fre sk o l kujutatud že st i tä h e n ­
du s p e a m ise lt  seo tu d  v õ im e tu se g a  m uuta  saatu st v õ i tuua p äästet ehk  
v a b a n em ist.
S a m a  ž e s t i n ä em e  ka 13. sa jand i sa rk o fa a g il kujutatud fig u u r id e l (jo o n is  4 , 
fragm en t, B arasch  1987: 9 4 ) . K u id as k u n stn ik  kujutab n a istera h v a  arm etut 
se isu k o rd a ?  T a  n äitab , k u id as n a in e  haarab ü h e k ä eg a  te ise s t , h o id es  n e id  o m a  
rinna a ll. K a  G am ier' u u r im u ses (1 9 8 2 )  Keskaja kujutamise keelest on n ä ite id  
sam ast ž e s t is t . M õ n ed  n e is t  p ärin evad  11. sajan d ist.
Joon is 4. F ragm ent G au tier de S u lly ’i sarkofaag ilt 
S u lly ’i lossis (B arasch 1987: 94).
G io tto  p id i s e l l i s e  ž e s t itõ lg e n d u se g a  tuttav o lem a: jõ e tu s , v õ im etu s  m uuta  
k oh u tava t saatu st. K a su ta d es sam a tõ lg en d u st, teeb  G io tto  jä r g m ise  o tsu stu se:  
tu n n ista ja  p o le  v a a d e ld a v a s  k u riteos sü ü d i, ta p o le  v õ im e lin e  a sjad e  käiku  
m u utm a. S e ll in e  o tsu stu s  e i kuulu  Süütalaste  lo o  o r ig in aa li ju u rd e , k u id  s e lle l  
fresk o l on  m u id k i lisa n d u si. T a g a p o o l a su v  kuusnu rk ne e h it is  p a istab  o le v a t  
tü ü p ilin e  b a p tisteer iu m , m ille g a  k aasn eb  täh en d u s, et “ süütu te ta p m in e” on  
“ v ereg a  r is tim in e ” . V e r e  täh en d u s r e lig io o s s e te s  s tse e n id e s  h ilisk esk a ja l o li ü ld ­
tead a  ja  sed a  on e r in ev a te s  k o n tek s tid e s  ka an a lü ü situ d . S iin ju u res  tava tsetak se  
n ä itek s m a in id a , e t A ren a  k a b e lis  on  Kristuse piitsutam ine  m aa litu d  k ohe  
Süütalaste tapm ise  fresk o  a lla  (B a ra sch  1987: 9 4 ) . K ü llap  p o ln u d  ju h u s , et 
G io tto  n eed  fresk o d  läh estik k u  ü k ste ise  a lla  a seta s. Iga tah es Süütalaste  lo o s  
näitavad  m õ lem a d  —  eh itu se  kuju ja  tu n n istaja  —  p ea ltn ä g ija  v õ im etu st m uuta
seda, mida ta näeb. Ning seda ongi kunstnik muuhulgas tahtnud öelda, tehes 
seda konventsionaalsete vormelite abil.
On öeldud, et keskajal tunti ainult rakenduskunsti, mis teenis enamasti 
ülemaist, transtsendentaalset inspiratsiooni ad maiorem gloriam Dei ( ‘kõik 
Jumala suuremaks kiituseks’) (von Wright 1996). Keskaegne kunst oli põhi­
olemuselt antropomorfne. Inimfiguuri kujutati kõikjal ja  nähtamatud olendid 
(kuri, inglid, ka Jumal) olid antud inimfiguuridena. Seepärast oli piltidel žeste 
arvutu hulk. Kuid žestide sellised kujutamised sõltusid lõpuks ikkagi teatud 
reeglitest, mis domineerisid keskaegses kunstis ja  millest kunstnikud hoolega 
kinni pidasid. Seepärast on fikseeritud žestide uurimine piltidel suur probleem. 
Ka lihtsad liigutused, nt õnnistamine ristimärki tehes, olid kunstniku poolt 
fikseeritud. Kuid millisel hetkel? Kunstnik valis, kas rõhutada üleval või all 
hoitavat kätt, kuid ta ei saanud suunata liigutust ennast, selle suunda või kiirust.
Üks valdkond, kus žeste edukalt kasutati, oli teater. Teatrietendusi ja 
müsteeriume peeti mitmetes Euroopa maades. Itaalia oli ses suhtes tuntud alates
13. sajandist, ka prantslased olid aktiivsed. Sellest perioodist on säilinud 
mitmeid vastavateemalisi ikonograafialisi kujutisi ja  freskosid. Teatris arenesid 
ka nn individuaalsed žestid. Need olid tähelepanuväärsed sõnumiga žestid. 
Freskodel ja  teatril oli ühiseid jooni: teatris polnud lava ja  seepärast ei paistnud 
kogu tegevus hästi —  tuli valida žeste, mis olid antud etenduse puhul kõige 
i sel oomu sta varnad.
KEHA JA HING KESKAEGSETES ŽESTIDES
Inimese kehal oli suurim tähtsus keskaegses ühiskonnas ja  kultuuris. Inimolend 
oli mõeldud kahesugusena: ta koosnes hingest ja  kehast, nähtamatust “sise­
misest” ja  nähtavast “välimisest”, mis olid omavahel dünaamilises seoses. Sel­
line metafoorne ruumikasutus ja  kategoriseerimine aitasid klassifitseerida ini­
mesi ja  ideid ning olid kasutusel žestide puhul iseäranis kahes valdkonnas —  
eetikas ja  meditsiinis. Meditsiini mõiste tähendust keskajal võiks iseloomustada 
järgnevaga: see oli “arstide-nõidade aeg, piinatud ja  põlatud keha aeg, kus 
puuduvad staadionid ning ei tegelda spordiga” (Le Goff 1998: 103). Keha oli 
ambivalentne. Ühelt poolt oli see “hinge vangla”, patu teener ja  takistus teel 
lunastusele. Selline arvamus ei säästnud žeste, eriti siis, kui tundus, et nad 
astuvad üle eetika ja  sotsiaalse tava poolt kehtestatud õigetest piiridest. Nii 
keskaegne kui antiikeetika mõlemad rõhutasid modestia ( ‘mõõt’, ‘määr’) 
mõistet, pidades silmas mõõdukust, mis oli õige viis vooruslike žestide (lad 
gestus) tegemiseks. Sellisele ideaalsele liigutusele vastandati žestikuleerimine 
(lad gesticulatio), voorusliku liigutuse patune vastandpoolus.
Ideaalne žest oli oma liigutuse kaudu seotud mõistliku ja  vastutustundliku 
individuaalse mõttega. See ideaal taandus varakeskaegsetes kloostrites askee­
tliku žesti ees. Pääsemine jõudis kohale läbi keha ja  eriti läbi halastuse, patu­
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kahetsuse ja  vagaduse rituaalsete žestide. Kristlastele (erinevalt dualistidest- 
hereetikutest) oli keha teatud mõttes paratamatu kurja paik, mida pidi kasutama 
positiivselt. Piibel illustreeris ja  õpetas alates Aadamast Vanas Testamendis 
Kristuseni Uues Testamendis kõiksuguseid žeste: nii patuseid, mis kandsid 
languse märki, kui vooruslikke, mis võimaldasid kogu inimkonna lunastust. 
Veel üks tähelepanek keskajast: igasuguse, isegi lubatud individuaalsust 
väljendava žesti kadumine. Kõik žestid olid kaasatud suuremasse kogukonna/ 
ühiskonna liturgilistesse liigutustesse. Kogudus ise oli osa kosmilisest liiku­
misest, kuhu kuulusid inimesed, laulvad inglikoorid ja  Jumala tahe.
Oraator polnud enam reetor, vaid usklike palvetav kaaslane või preester. 
Tolle aja kristlikule eetikale oli tüüpiline patu mõiste interiorisatsioon3, mille 
tulemusena keha ja  temaga koos ka žeste umbusaldati. Žeste peeti selliste 
pahede väljendajaiks nagu kõrkus (lad superbia) ja  himu (lad luxuria), mida 
pidi ohjeldama ja  nuhtlema. Munklus arendas välja täiesti uued žestilised tavad 
koos range askeetluse ja  patukahetsuse žestidega ning kollektiivse palve ja  
liturgia uute vormidega. Oraatori võimeid vajati nüüd kirikus. Oli ka “püha 
žestikulatsioon”, inspireeritud Jumalast. Selle illustratsiooniks tavatseti tuua 
Piiblist (2. Sa 6, 14) Taaveti püha tants, kus ta hüples paljalt seaduselaeka ees. 
See kandus üle kirikusse ja  muutus liturgiliseks protsessiooniks. Keskajast on 
teada ka žeste käsitlev teoreetiline töö. Pariisi õpetlane Saint-Victori Hugo 
(1096-1141) kirjutas De institutione novitiorurm (Õpetus noviitsidele), kõige 
enam läbitöötatud žestiteooria tol perioodil (Schmitt 1992). Mõeldud oli see 
eelkõige noviitside abistamiseks. Žestide õpetamine muutus hädavajalikuks 
kõikides kloostrites, sest noviitsid pidid mungaks saades unustama kõige 
ilmalikumad žestid. Hugo võrdles žestide korraldust kuningriigi valitsusega ja  
inimkeha poliitilise kehaga. Hugo žestiteooria oli osa laiemast eetilisest, polii­
tilisest ja  esteetilisest ideoloogiast, mis sai tuntuks 12. sajandi Pariisi koolides. 
Keskajal õpetati ka elukutseid, mis vajasid intellektuaalset koolitust. Õpeta­
miseks olid ühendatud asutused (Id collegiate units), millest aegamööda tekkis 
kombineeritud uurimistöö ja  õpetamise institutsioon —  ülikool. Siin valitses 
teadmiste andmist ja  hankimist rangelt see, mida von Wright nimetab Sõna 
autoriteediks: Pühakiri ja  “kanoniseeritud” antiikautorid (von Wright 1996: 65).
11.-13. sajandi vahemikus proovis kirik saavutada kontrolli igapäevaelu 
oluliste valdkondade üle ja  preestri käe sakraliseerimine oli üks sellistest 
kontrollimehhanismidest. Kõrgkeskajal hakkasid Prantsusmaa ja  Inglismaa 
kuningad puudutama skrofuloosi (kaelalümfisõlmede paistetus, “näärmeti- 
isikus”) kohe peale kroonimist ja  “pühaks saamist” ning ka kirik soosis usku 
kuninga käe imelisse väesse. Sellele on viidanud ka paljud teised keskaja 
uurijad (vt Le Goff 1998: 99-100).
3 Interiorisatsioon —  välise, esem elise tegevuse muundumine seesm iseks, psüühiliste 
protsesside või omaduste kujunemine välise tegevuse tagajärjel.
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KÕNELEV KÄSI
Euroopa kultuuris oli ka kõne kesksel kohal. Nii judaism kui selle edasiarendus 
kristlusena on sõna, kõne ja  kirja religioonid. Klassikalisel antiigiperioodil oli 
kõne hariduse osa. Ka keskajal, kui aeg kosus, muutus kõne osa olulisemaks. 
Seda, kuidas see toimus, saab jälgida eelkõige piltidelt ja  skulptuuridelt. Mis on 
kõne visuaalne ekvivalent? Kuidas saab näidata, et keegi kõneleb? On võib olla 
üllatav, et kõne näitamiseks, visualiseerimiseks, on parim kehaosa käsi. Käsi 
võib näidata seda väga erineval moel: osutades, nipsutades, ringitades jms. Käsi 
kui “kõneorgan” on võimeline edastama tähenduste ja  emotsioonide erinevaid 
varjundeid. Sedagi teati juba antiigis. Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, kõnekunsti 
“isa” ja  õpetaja, ütleb Institutio oratorias (Kõnekunsti õpetus) (XI. 3.85-87, vt 
Barasch 1987: 16): “Oma kätega me küsime, lubame, hüüame teisi enda juurde 
ja saadame nad ära, ähvardame, anume, vihjame vastumeelsusele või hirmule; 
oma kätega me tähistame rõõmu, kurbust, kahtlust, tunnustust, patukahetsust 
ning näitame mõõtu, hulka, arvu ja  aega. /.../ Keelte tohutu mitmekesisuse 
hulgas, läbi kõikide rahvuste ja  rahvaste, on käte keel, mis näib olevat ühine 
kõikidele inimestele.” Quintilianus rõhutab käe võimet mõistetavalt edastada 
erinevaid emotsioone. Mida ta ei ütle, on see, kuidas käsi peaks edastama 
konkreetset fakti, millest kuju (nt pildil) kõneleb. Siiski on püütud mõnesid 
käežeste kui kõnetegevuse tähistajaid esile tuua.
1. Adlocutio ( ‘kõnetus’, ‘kõne’) —  žest, mis näitab kõneakti. Žest on pärit 
juba etruskide kujukestelt (Riis 1953: 109 jj), hiljem levis see eriti Roomas 
ja  jõudis sealtkaudu Euroopasse. Adlocutio oli keisri oma armee kõnetus. 
Keiser seisis platvormil armee keskel. Adlocutiot alustas ta käe tõstmisega, 
nõudes vaikust ja  tähelepanu.
2. Acclamatio ( ‘hüüatus’) oli samuti kõnesituatsiooni žest, eelnevast võib olla 
väiksema kaaluga. Acclamatio oli vähem individualiseeritud kui adlocutio, 
samuti ka vähem formaliseeritud. Tavaliselt žestikuleeris seda rahvahulk. 
Žesti võis esitada erineval viisil, hüüdes või karjudes. Hilisantiigi ja  
keskaegne kunst, eriti bütsantsi kunst idas leiutas acclamatio variante. Kuid 
ka nende variantide puhul on kõnelev käsi acclamatio tuumaks ja  
südameks. Üks paremaid näiteid on 5. sajandi algusest eKr pärinev elevan­
diluust plaadike, kus kujutatakse Probianust troonile asumas ning kaht 
figuuri teda hüüdmas. Hüüdjad tõstavad oma paremad käsivarred ja  hoiavad 
neid selles konkreetses asendis, mida me tunneme ühest muust kontekstist: 
pöial ja  kaks esimest sõrme tõstetud, kaks järgmist sõrme painutatud nii, et 
pöial puudutab neid. See žest, mida me praegu tunneme õnnistamise 
žestina, annab tunnistust kõnežestist.
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Keskaegses kunstikeeles, mis avaldus nii kunstis kui äärmiselt formaliseeritud 
sotsiaalsetes tegevustes, olid kõnele osutavad liigutused kesksel kohal. Isegi 
niivõrd, et nad võisid varjutada kõik teised žestid. Seega pole imestada, et neid 
leidub kõige sagedamini tolle aja sakraalkunsti motiivide hulgas. Näiteks oli 
Kristust kujutavas ikonograafias (L’Orange 1953: 171) ülim kõikvõimsuse žest 
(ülestõstetud käed avatud pihkudega, mis on pööratud pealtvaataja poole) — 
pärit idamaistelt jumalatelt ja  valitsejatelt — muutunud nüüd kõnežestiks. 
Spetsiifilisi kõnežeste, mis kristalliseerusid keskajal võib tänapäeval näha veel 
kristlikul missal, eelkõige rituaalset õnnistamise žesti: benedictio latinat rooma­
katoliku kirikus ja  benedictio graecat (kreeka) ortodoksi kirikus, või mõnedel 
protestantlikel jumalateenistusel. Benedictio latina puhul on kolm sõrme (pöial, 
nimetissõrm ja  keskmine sõrm) välja sirutatud, kaks ülejäänud sõrme (“sõrmu- 
sesõrm” ja  väike sõrm) aga painutatud peopessa. Benedictio graeca on võrrel­
dav benedictio latinaga., ainus erinevus on selles, et väike sõrm on ka tõstetud. 
Mõlema žest päritolu on sama. Codex Rossanensises, tuntud 6. sajandi käsi­
kirjas selgitavad Vana Testamendi prohvetid ja  kuningad üksikasjalikult oma 
sõnu kas “ladina” või “kreeka” kõnežestiga (Zamecki 1975). Nii prohvetid kui 
kuningad esitavad mõlemaid žeste. Hilisem areng, nagu me teame, põhjustas ka 
kahe žesti lahknemise nii, et kreeka vormi võis leida ainult bütsantsi riituses, 
ladina žesti aga ainult lääne kirikus. Tänapäeval on siiski nn ladina žest leitav 
ka mõnedelt õigeusu kirku ikoonidelt. Kõige tuntum kõnežest oli see, “mille 
puhul keskmine sõrm liikus pöidla poole ja  ülejäänud kolm sõrme olid 
“avatult”” (Quintilianus Institutio oratoria XI. 3.92; jooniseid selle kohta vt 
Tenjes 1996: 165).
Jumala käsi piltidel ei näita mitte Jumala kohalolu, vaid on visualiseeritud 
Jumala sõna, Tema kõneakt. Seda sai väljendada nt inglite-sõnumitoojate kaudu. 
See, mida ingel ütleb maa peal, ongi Jumala nähtav sõna. Giotto on kuulutavat 
kätt kasutanud oma loomingus nt freskol Sakarias4 templis1 (joonis 5, Barasch
1987:25).
4 Sakarias —  kr Zacharias, hbr > ‘Jahve m äletab’.
5 Asub Firenzes, Santa Croce kiriku Peruzzi kabeli vasakul seinal.
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Joonis 5. G iotto , Sakarias tem plis  (fragm ent). H ren/.e, 
Santa C roce kirik, Peruzzi kabel (B arasch 1987: 25).
P A L V E Ž E S T ID
L itu rg ilisi žeste  ise lo o m u sta b  kõrge form aliseeritu se  aste. Iseg i kui on võ im a lik  
näidata, et en am u s litu rg ilisi že ste  arenes “lo o m u lik est” k õ n ežestid est ja  k om m u ­
n ik atsioon i m uud est tüüpidest, on tõ s i, et kord ju b a  korrapärase liigu tu sen a  
liturgia  o sak s saanud, o li n e il peaaegu  p laan ipäraselt k u n stlikk e, sih ilik u lt  
kavandatud jo o n i. K od ifitseeritu d  p a lv ežeste  v õ ib  le id a  igast in im ü h isk on n ast. 
N ad on tead ao leva lt ühed  k õ ig e  u n iversaa lsem ad  žestid  (O h m  1948; H e iler  1923; 
Sittl 1890 ). R istatud käsi v õ ib  k õ ig e  varasem ate tead ao leva te  p a lv eže stid e  hu lgast  
väga  harva le id a . K aks p a lv ežesti, m is d om in eerivad  eu roop a ku ltuuritrad itsioon is  
ja  m ida v õ ib  le id a  paljud est kultuuridest vä lja sp oo l E uroopat, on:
1) ü le s p o o le  tõ ste tu d  käed ,
2 ) avatud  p ih k u d eg a  la ia li käed .
Ü le stõ ste tu d  käed  tunduvad  o le v a t van im ad , k õ ig e  u n iv ersa a lsem a d  p a lv e ž e s t id .  
N e id  v õ ib  le id a  van ad es ku ltu u rid es n in g  nad on  in tu itiiv se lt  m õ iste ta v a d  
k aasaja l. A va tu d  p ih k u d eg a  la ia li käed , p ih u d  p ööratud  p ea ltvaa ta ja  p o o le , on  
sam uti tuntud ju b a  iid se te s t  a eg a d est. “ K ui te käsi laotate, p e id an  m a om a  
silm ad  te ie  ee s t , ku i te ka palju  p a lv e ta te , e i k u u le  m a m itte  —  ... “ (Jesa ja  1: 
15). N e id  Jesa ja  sõn u  ts iteer iti ka k esk a ja l. K e sk a e g se id  p a lv e ž e s te  p o le
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süstemaatiliselt uuritud, seepärast ei saa me kindlad olla iga üksiku liigutuse 
päritolus ja  tuletuses. Kuid seda võib küll öelda, et isegi ilmalikus kirjanduses 
enne 13, sajandit moodustasid palvežesti laialisirutatud käsivarred (Barasch 
1987), Tolleaegse ilmaliku kirjanduse näiteks võib nimetada Tegude laule (pr 
Chansons de geste), vanaprantsuse eepilisi lugulaule, mis pärinevad 11»— 
14, sajandi vahemikust. Nad koosnevad 10= või 12=silbilistest stroofidest, mida 
lauldi või deklameeriti. Peaaegu kõik laulud on anonüümset päritolu (DMA 
1983:257).
Alates 12. sajandist hakkas kristlikus liturgias kiiresti arenema uus palve- 
žest: ristatud käed. Žest on välja kasvanud keskaegsest rituaalist, kus vasall 
suhtleb oma isandaga, nt vasallitõotuse andmisel. Sellegi žesti läte on aga vähe­
malt antiigis, kui vallutatutel seoti käed randmest kinni. Ka eesti keeles on selle 
teema kohta huvitavat lugemist, kuigi antud käsitlus kannab paratamatult oma 
aja pitserit. “Tavaliselt seisab palvežest selles, et pannakse käed kokku, 
peopesad vastamisi, vahel ka sõrmed risti. Kuidas seletada seda žesti? Looduse- 
uurija Darvin, tuginedes kellegi tähtsusetu inglise kirjaniku väitele, kirjutab, et 
palvežest on sama liigutus, mida sooritab põgenemiselt tabatud ori, ulatades 
käed ahelatele. Lugeda võime veel ühest vanast ning haruldasest itaalia raama­
tust (autor Giovanni Bonifaccio — a. 1616): “Kes hoiab käed ees ühendatud 
peopesadega, tunnistab end otsekohe süüdlaseks, kelle käed on seotud ja  kes 
kannab teenitud karistust.” /.../ Loomulikult ei motiveeri Darvin ja  teised palve- 
žesti dogmaatiliselt, vaid nad juhivad meie tähelepanu ainult välisele asjaolule, 
kuidas omaaegsest orjaliigutusest olevat kujunenud palvetaja žest. Aga just 
sellane jäljendav, pantomiimiline teke ei taha olla kuigi mõeldav intiimseima, 
psühholoogilisema žesti juures, nagu seda on palvežest.” (Kuljus 1939)
Joonis 6. M onfaucon, Prantsuse monarhia mälestusmärgid. 
Joonistatud kadunud sarkofaagi järgi (Barasch 1987: 60).
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Näib, et Bütsantsi etikett pole sellest žestist teadlik olnud. Ristatud käed jõudsid 
Lääne-Euroopasse 9. sajandil. Üks varasematest sellekohastest näidetest on 
Reimsi peapiiskopi Hinemari sarkofaag. Hincmar suri aastal 882. Sarkofaag on 
kaotsi läinud, kuid me teame sellest joonise järgi Montfauconi raamatus 
Monuments de la Monarchie frangaise (Prantsuse Monarhia Mälestusmärgid) 
1729-1733. Sarkofaagi keskpaneelist vasakul on kujutatud peapüskoppi rista­
tud kätega, ilmselt palvetamas. Montfaucon interpreteeris žesti kui ustavusvan- 
net kuningale, kes istub paneeli keskel (joonis 6, Barasch 1987: 60). E. Pa- 
nofsky (1964: 48) arvab, et peapiiskop võib paluda Kristuse eeskostet. Mis iga­
nes võib olla selle žesti täpne tähendus, on tema esinemine tollal ikkagi haru­
kordne. See muutus feodalismi kõrgajal. Ristatud käed said feodaalse soovitus- 
rituaali kohustuslikuks osaks, mis omakorda oli osa feodaalsest ustavusvandest. 
Rituaal jõudis haripunkti, kui vasall pani oma ristatud käed isanda kätesse. See 
oli alistumise märk, aga tähendas ka sõltuvuslikkust, samuti usaldust ja 
truudust. Sachsenspiegeii 14. sajandi käsikirjast leiame põlvitava läänimehe, 
kes tõstab oma ristatud käed. Tema ees istub krooniga isand, kes võtab lääni­
mehe ristatud käed enda omadesse (joonis 7, Barasch 1987: 61). Selline 
feodaalõukonna tseremoniaalžest on otseses suguluses palvežestiga ikono­
graafias. Žest tungis kiriklikku rituaali ja  muutus seal domineerivaks palve- 
žestiks. See protsess võttis aega mitmeid sajandeid, kuid 13. sajandiks oli tema 
kulg juba kindlasti jõudnud haripunkti. Kuidas selline väljaspool kirikut, 
“sekulaarsfääris” arenenud žest sai liturgia osaks, seda on raske seletada. Oleta­
takse frantsiskaanlaste aktiivse liikumise mõju. Frantsiskaanluse algperioodi 
allikates, nt Thomas Celano Püha Franciscuse elus soovitatakse tõepoolest — 
kuigi mitte sõnaselgelt — palvetada ristatud kätega (Ladner 1961: 270).
Joonis 7. Saksi peege l, M S, tol. 8. D resden  (B arasch  1У87: 6 1 ).
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KOKKUVÕTTEKS
Mõtteid keskaegsetest žestidest, nende funktsioonidest ja  nende väärtustest võib 
kokku võtta kolme mõistega. Esiteks ekspressiivsus: žestid olid inimese moraal­
sete väärtuste, tundmuste, hinge sisemiste liigutuste väljendajad. Ekspres­
siivsuse mõistel on läänes väga vana traditsioon. Erinevatel aegadel on ta saa­
nud erinevaid konnotatsioone: eetilisi antiigis või kristlikus traditsioonis, psüh­
holoogilisi tänapäeval. Ilmselt polnud žestid keskajal “hingeliigutuste” väljen­
dajad tundmuste mõttes, nagu meie seda mõistet tänapäeval tunneme. Teiseks, 
mitteverbaalne kommunikatsioon tänapäeva terminina on välja kasvanud vanast 
retoorikatraditsioonist, mille lätted omakorda ulatuvad paganlikku elutarku­
sesse. Koos kristlusega muutis sõna sümboolset väärtust kõne ja  žestide vahel, 
samuti muutusid avaliku suhtluse sotsiaalsed tingimused. Ruum ja  aeg vahe­
tasid asukohta. Keskaegne pulpit ( ‘kantsel’; ‘jutlustamine’) asendas antiikteatri. 
Samuti muutusid antiikteatri näitlejate põhilised retoorilised žestid preestri, 
õpetaja või rändnäitlejate žestideks. Kolmandaks mõju, millel oli kahesugune 
tähendus: 1) tehniliste žestide (lausumise, liigutamise, kirjutamise) praktiline 
m õjuja 2) poliitiliste või sakraalsete rituaalide sümboolne mõju.
Keskaeg päris antiigist palju žeste, nt retoorilised žestid declamatio ( ‘kõne’; 
‘ilulugemine’) jaoks, dextrarum iunctio ( ‘seotud parem käsi’) õiguslikud žestid 
või palvetaja orans ( ‘kõne’; ‘kõnelemisviis’) žestid, aga ka intellektuaalsed 
vahendid, millega mõelda ja  rääkida žestidest. Antiigist jõudsid meieni sõnad ja  
mõisted nagu gestus; gesticulatio; motus ( ‘kehaliigutus’) koos oma intel­
lektuaalse, moraalse või teadusliku kontekstiga, milleks olid nt sotsiaalse käitu­
mise eetika, retoorikakunst, muusika, meditsiin. Kristlus valitseva ideoloogiana 
muutis keskajal neid mõisteid, ühendades neid joontega, mis pärinesid Piiblist. 
Nii pidid žestid täitma uusi sotsiaalseid ja  religioosseid mudeleid. Lõpetuseks 
on hea meeles pidada ka J. Le Goffi tabavat tähelepanekut, et “feodalism, see ei 
ole kirjutatud sõna, vaid žestide maailm” (Gurevitš 1992: 40). Keskaeg on vaid 
üks viiv žestide ja  inimkeha pikas ajaloos.
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It is clear that ancient men and women communicated —  that is, exchanged 
messages —  within and between their societies very much like all other species of 
animals do and have always done: by means of nonverbal signs. Each and every 
member of each and every species alive or existing has come into the world with 
its unique repertoire of nonverbal signs which decidedly promotes its survival. This 
holds for modems man no less than for his ancestors: that is, we ourselves 
communicate with other human beings, as well as with the other forms of animal 
life. We share an ecological niche and regularly interact with, most of the time by 
means of a large variety of nonverbal messages (Sebeok 1987). In their sense, it 
can be argued that while language was a primary evolutionary adaptation, 
speech —  which appeared, with Homo sapiens, not more than about 300,000 years 
ago — is but a recent secondary exaptation (Sebeok 1987). This means that this 
vocal-auditory, temporal (and hence linear) expression of language has acquired, in 
its manifestation as speech, an important incremental function: namely, to serve the 
current utility of a communicative function, thus supplementing, in a subtle and 
intricate fashion, the entire human repertoire of nonverbal devices inherited from 
our primate ancestry.
It is reasonable to suppose that the adjustment, or fine-tuning, of the encoding 
capacity required by speaking to the decoding capacity required to understand 
speech, and vice versa, took about two million years to achieve at least partially.
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Full understanding is a rare commodity; most of the time most of us do not quite 
grasps what another human being is trying to tell us.
Even today, humans have no special organ for speech, which is formed by a 
tract originally designed for two entirely different biological functions: the alimen­
tary and the respiratory. Speech is then received, like any other sound, by the ear, 
which has still another phylogenetic source, and is a rather newly acquired sensory 
receptor (Sebeok 1987). Without going further in this a bit “disrespectful” attitude 
towards such a substantial ability —  human ability to speak —  I would like to 
consider the communicative signs accompanying speech, i.e. gestures. One cannot 
but agree that the supposition about the importance of gestures in forming the 
verbal language holds to a great degree. A number of relationships hold between a 
gesture and a word, verbality and non-verbality.
The present paper provides a synopsis of the history of investigating gestures 
(Chapter 2. Investigation of gestures), an attempt at their classification (Chapter 3. 
Classification of gestures), a discussion about the complexity of defining a gesture 
and its “working definition” (Chapter 4. Defining gestures). A close consideration 
is given to dialogue (Chapter 5. Dialogue as a social system) and gestures 
occurring in it. The functions of topic and interactive gestures are supplemented on 
the basis of the analysis of specific Estonian material (Chapter 6. Interactive and 
topic gestures in dialogue). A table 1 summarizes the gestures treated.
2. Investigation of gestures
The question of the meaning and functions of gestures has arisen time and again 
over the long period of their investigation. Gestures have been treated together with 
language; have been used in providing explanation to the rise and origin of 
language.
The history of investigating gestures dates back to ancient times. Expressive 
behavior caught the attention of several Greek philosophers, the most influential 
being Aristotle whose analyses were recorded in “Physiognomia”, “De Anima”, 
“Parva Naturalia” .
Roman studies of gestures did not transcend delimiting certain types of gestures 
and notifying some of their specific features. Thus, Cicero differentiates between 
significative and demonstrative gestures and Quintilian makes a difference between 
gestures that naturally accompany words and gestures that signify something by 
imitating it (Payrato 1985).
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A. Kendon remarks that the earliest book devoted exclusively to gestures 
appeared at the beginning of the 17th century (Kendon 1986). He must have had in 
mind the work “Chirologia: Or the Natural Language of the Hand” (1644/1974) by 
J. Bui wer. John Bui wer was an English physician who invented the deaf-and-dumb 
language and who also dreamed of an international language of gestures. Man has 
two sources of discourse, “his mouth and his hand”, words and gestures; “ ... the 
Hand, that busie instrument, is most talkative, whose language is easily perceived 
and understood as if Man had another mouth or fountaine of course in his Hand” 
(Buiwer 1644, see Barasch 1987: 2).
“La mimica degli antichi investigata nel gestire napoletano” (“The Mimic Art of 
the Ancients Investigated in Neopolitan Gesture”) (1832), written by Andrea de 
Jorio is perhaps one of the most complex and systematic treatises of kinesics 
published in the 19th century. His work provides us with one of the most valuable 
traditional collection of gestures. But Jorio himself did not do anything with 
gestures besides grouping them into serious, indifferent or obscene (Payrato 1985). 
Typical de Jorio hand gestures have been presented by A. Kendon in his paper 
(Kendon 1993) (see Fig. la, lb).
Figure 1.a.
The “ring” from de Jorio (1832)
(Kendon 1993: 24).
Figure 1 .b.
Typical handshake of the mano a brosa 
(“purse hand”).
From de Jorio (1832)
(Kendon 1993: 25).
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A number of summarizing treatises about the social and psychological 
importance of understanding gestures were written before World War II. In 1941 
D. Efron published his by now classical work “Gesture and Environment” (Efron 
1941/1972). His extensively cited book belongs, among other things, to “cultural- 
difference-related” gesture investigations. D. Efron undertook an extensive study 
of the gesturing styles of Southern Italians and East European Jews and showed 
that there were marked differences. The most intriguing fact was probably that 
Southern Italians used in their conversations extensively illustrative gestures —  as 
if the speaker always used slides to accompany his talk, Efron has noted. Jews used 
comparatively abstract gestures compared to the content of their talk. In other 
words, Jewish immigrants used more batons and ideographs while the Italians 
employed more kinetographs. He further traced the attrition of these gestural 
patterns among offspring with looser ties to traditional custom (Efron 1941/1972).
Paradoxically, the growth of interest in what came to be known as “nonverbal 
communication” did not stimulate the study of gesture as one might have expected, 
especially during the triumph of behaviorism. Psychology, too, neglected gesture 
because it seemed too much connected with deliberate action and social convention 
to be of use for the understanding of the irrational or to be easily accommodated in 
terms of behaviorist doctrine. Linguists have neglected it because it has seemed too 
much a matter of individual expression. A revival of interest in speculation about 
the evolution of language, and in particular Gordon Hewes’ discussions of gestural 
origins theory, the discovery that chimpanzees can be taught sign language (Hewes 
1973), have all created a climate in which the study of gesture once again seems to 
be important. The last two decades have witnessed extensive study of gestures in 
speech and the investigation of both of them in connection with thinking.
3. Classification of gestures
Remarkable efforts have been made to classify gestures exhaustively. The overall 
impression is that are as many different classifications as there are investigators. 
But without conceptualization there would not be any later results. Interlocutors 
perceive different communicative signals and are fully aware of that: they use 
them, can identify them and group them into different chunks, classes or types de­
parting either from one's perceptual abilities, traditions or upbringing. The investiga­
tors have tried to classify these differences from their point of view (perspective).
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Below we present several classifications in order to demonstrate how difficult it is 
to delimit the part of nonverbal communication —  gestures.
The author of the first substantial and clarifying classification should, without 
doubt, be considered D. Efron (1941/1972). Although he limited himself only to 
head and hand movements, this is the first classification based on a comprehensive 
and strictly empirical study. He is the first to fix the classes and categories clearly 
and logically. In a nutshell, the analysis involves three strata and subdivisions.
A. Spatial-temporal. He first studies the spatial-temporal aspects of gestures. Here, 
a gesture is just a movement that portrays relationships in space:
(1) radius (span of movement);
(2) shape (straightforward, circular);
(3) direction (relationship between the speaker and the listener);
(4) parts of the body (head, fingers; unilateral or bilateral movement).
B. Interlocutive, i.e. involving interactive aspects of gestures:
(1) familiarity;
(2) performance of simultaneous gestures;
(3) use of space and distance;
(4) gestures towards objects.
C. Linguistic. Efron investigates the referential meaning of a gesture and provides 
the following classification:
(1) Logical-discursive: Gestures not related to an object or idea but to the 
process of expressing these ideas in action. They stress the verbal-vocal 
behavior or the content of the message, and are related to the presented ideas 
on the how-rather than on the what-level.
(a) batons, movements that accent a particular word or phrase. They denote 
the tempo of the mental activity accompanying speech.
(b) ideographs: movements that trace the flow of an idea;
(2) Objective: gestures possessing their own, speech-independent meaning 
which may or may not change the meaning of the message:
(a) deictic: gestures referring to an observable object, pointing to available 
referents
(b) pictographs: gestures conveying their meaning in an observable way:
(b .l) iconographs: gestures depicting the form of the observable object;
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(b.2) kinetographs: movements that depict a bodily action;
(c) emblems or symbols: gestures that replace words and are encoded 
arbitrarily and with intent (e.g., the hand signals of a baseball catcher or a 
coach). They have a standard meaning in a culture that is specifically 
attached to the meaning. If an emblem possesses a morphological 
similarity to the depicted object it is considered a hybrid emblem.
This classification as well as the terms used became truly valued only years 
later.
The development in the area of research into nonverbal behavior that started in 
the 50’s became clearly noticeable in the 60’s and 70’s. It helped to place 
gestures —  as a more or less defined concept —  into a wider context. The work of 
P. Ekman and W. Friesen “The Repertoire of Nonverbal Behavior: Categories, 
Origins, Usage, and Coding” published in the journal “Semiotica” in 1969 has 
greatly enhanced the "placing" of the phenomenon of gestures and shed light on the 
problems involved in their classification. This study has become the most in­
fluential work in the history of research in non-verbal behavior, especially 
concerning the categorization of gestures. It has a direct link to the study of Efron. 
The authors rely on Efron’s analysis and supply it with new factors. The work has 
become a cornerstone in gesture categorization that also introduced radical changes 
in the research perspectives and the orientation of analysis. The value of their 
classification lies in the fact that by examine the parameters of origin, usage, and 
coding of nonverbal behaviors, Ekman and Friesen distinguished five well-defined 
key categories. The work is also highly acclaimed from the point of view of 
empirical research and theoretical justification. Ekman and Friesen use this 
classification for all the body gestures, especially for the gestures of the head and 
hands (also arms). Departing from these three parameters they distinguish 
emblems, illustrators, affect displays, regulators, adaptors (self-directed, alter- 
directed, object-directed). Each of these categories is definable and distinguishable.
Emblems —  may substitute verbal behavior, for example a gesture to stop a car 
or a gesture to show being offended. Emblems are those nonverbal acts that have a 
direct verbal translation, or dictionary definition.
Illustrators —  complement speech, for example when describing a busy 
highway. They are movements that are directly tied to speech, serving to illustrate 
what is being said verbally. There are 6 types of illustrators:
(1) batons —  movements which time out, accent or emphasize a particular word 
or phrase;
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(2) ideographs —  movements which sketch a path or direction of thought;
(3) deictic movements —  pointing to a present object;
(4) spatial movements —  depicting a spatial relationship;
(5) kinetographs —  movements which depict a bodily action;
(6) pictog;raphs —  which draw a picture of their referent.
Illustrators can also include the use of an emblem to substitute for, repeat or 
contradict a word or phrase.
Affect Displays —  they convey what affects a person lives through. The face is 
primary site of affect displays. Primary affects include happiness, surprise, fear, 
sadness, anger, disgust and interest.
Regulators help to stress the character of the conversation and thus regulate 
communication. These are acts that maintain and regulate the back-and-forth nature 
of speaking and listening between two or more interactants. The regulators are 
related to the conversational flow, the pacing of the exchange.
Adaptors —  these movements imitate something, for example making a bed or 
grasping somebody from behind, or instrumental actions with an object, e.g. 
"playing" with a pencil or a cigarette. This category of nonverbal behavior is the 
most difficult to describe.
These movements were first learned as part of adaptive efforts to satisfy self or 
bodily needs, or to perform bodily actions, or to manage emotions, or to develop or 





Cf. also the table in Ekman and Friesen 1969: 94-95.
The typology of Ekman and Friesen has remained, despite possible interpretation 
and shade differences, the peak of achievement for epistemological research aimed 
at defining and classifying gestures.
Various typologies of gestures have been proposed later as well. They are more 
incomplete but still valuable from the point of view of different studies.
M. Wiener, S. Devoe, S. Rubinow and J. Geller (1972) distinguish the fol­
lowing gestures: pantomimic, semantic modifying and relational. The freedom of 





(3) beats (gestures, which seem to relate only to the rhythmic structure of
speech).
J.-L. Nespoulous and A.R. Lecours proposed three basic categories of gestures 
and theirs subcategories:
(a) arbitrary gestures:
-  quasilinguistic gestures, they can be used instead of speech;
-  referential or modalizing;
(b) mimetic gestures (characterized by their iconicity):
-  strictly mimetic gestures;
-  connotative gestures;
(c) deictic gestures:
-  specific deictic gestures;
-  generic deictic gestures;
-  deictic gestures referring to the function of the object (Nespoulous, Lecours 
1986).
Considering all the above-mentioned it is understandable that providing a single 
definition of what is called non-verbal behavior would be very complicated for two 
reasons. On the one hand, it is impossible to group different criteria of 
classification (which should be taken a priori as usable until proved the opposite by 
profound empirical studies); on the other hand —  non-verbal behavior as a starting 
point is convenient but too fuzzy. It entails heterogeneous aspects and signals with 
very different meaning (from syntactic, semantic and pragmatic point of view). It 
would be illusory to attempt to establish some kind of final classification.
4. Defining gestures
It is  r ea so n a b le  to  ad m it that on  ca n n o t p o s s ib ly  c la s s ify  p h en o m en a  that ca n n o t b e  
d e fin e d  p rior to  that c la s s if ic a t io n . W e  n e e d  a  w o rk in g  d e fin it io n  (P ayra to  1 9 8 5 )  
w h ic h  w o u ld  e n a b le  u s , p erta in in g  a  to p ic , to  m o v e  around  w ith in  certa in  lim its . 
W o u ld  it b e  p o s s ib le  to  d e f in e  g estu re  p er se  or n e c e ssa r ily  fo r  th e  c la s s if ic a t io n  at 
the m o m en t?  T h e  s itu a tio n  is  fu lly  co m p a ra b le  to  that w h ere  a lin g u is t  fin d s  o n e s e l f  
w h en  a ttem p tin g  to  d e f in e  th e  w ord . O n e w a y  or an oth er, the d e fin it io n  o f  g estu re  
u n a v o id a b ly  h a s to  b e  p ro v is io n a l and  o n e  sh o u ld  c o n s id e r  v a r io u s d e fin it io n s  put 
forw ard  o v e r  th e  p er io d  o f  stu d y in g  g estu res .
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A definition of gesture that has been fixed without taking into account the 
context or generality is inexact and historically very “unproductive”, considering 
the progress made in investigating that phenomenon in interpersonal 
communication. It is not possible to provide the exact definition of what is a 
gesture though it is possible to delimit it to a certain degree.
One could take, for example, a modem definition of gesture (as given in the 
Oxford English Dictionary): “A movement of the body, or any part of it that is 
considered as expressive of thought or feeling”. This is an extremely broad 
definition. At first sight it would seem to include practically everything that a 
person might do. However, a brief consideration of how the word is commonly 
used shows that the word gesture refers to only certain kinds of bodily movements 
that are considered expressive of thought or feeling.
Here’s a nice citation from G. Maranon (1937): “A gesture is an expression of 
any desire or emotion whether expressed by the face, hands or body.” Speaking of 
facial expressions he differentiates between different movements (using means of 
differentiation available in language) and finally point out that “by a gesture we 
mean ways of materializing the state of one’s soul through ways of expressing 
ordinary affects when we could see or imagine them through a certain social 
activity” (Payrato 1985).
Here’s my working definition of gesture: a gesture is a hand movement 
accompanying speech and acquiring its meaning in the context of conversation or 
possessing a language-independent meaning.
5. Conversation as a social system
The most common setting for discourse is face-to-face dialogue. Because it is face- 
to-face, it includes some nonverbal (e.g. facial displays and gestures) as well as 
verbal acts, and because it is dialogue, it has social as well as semantic and 
syntactic aspects. Linking these two, J.B. Bavelas, N. Chovil, D.A. Lawrie, A. 
Wade (1992) investigated a subclass of conversational hand gestures that they 
called interactive gestures and whose function is to aid the maintenance of 
conversation as a social system.
Conversation must be seen not as alternating monologues but as a social system. 
Many researchers have observed this. That is, dialogue makes significant social or 
interpersonal demands as well as semantic and syntactic ones. The interlocutors 
must, without any formal structure or rules, manage to organize their conversation,
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co-ordinate their contributions, and calibrate their meanings as they go along. The 
intrinsic problem in dialogue thus conceived is that, although both partners must 
remain involved, only one person can talk at once. Whenever a speaker has the 
floor, there exists the possibility that the conversation could veer off into 
monologue. One solution to the problem is for the speaker to involve the listener 
regularly. The speaker can do this by inserting phrases such as “You know?” or 
“As you just said”, or even “What do you think?” However, the frequent use of 
such verbal by-play would constantly interrupt the verbal narrative, so nonverbal 
means of seeking or maintaining listener involvement is well suited to this 
function. It is proposed that interactive gestures, for all of their many specific 
forms and meanings, constitute a class with the common function of including the 
listener and thereby counteracting the beginning of a drift toward monologue that is 
necessarily created every time one person has the floor. Such gestures, especially 
when delivered simultaneously with the verbal narrative, can efficiently exert 
countervailing force in the direction of dialogue.
The observations of J.B. Bavelas et al. and other researchers have identified 
several verbal and nonverbal “topic-free” acts that can serve the complex 
interactive demands of conversation.
Interactive gestures are uniquely affected by the requirements of dialogue. One 
of these several requirements implies including another person. Dialogue in 
conversation is collaborative. That is, dialogue requires social processes, such as 
co-ordination and calibration, in addition to the individual processes of language 
production and comprehension.
Most gestural research was based on monologue data (where, for example, an 
interviewer asks a subject to narrate specified material). The examination of 
dialogue data revealed an apparent subclass of illustrators that may be understood 
as making a reference to the interlocutor rather than to topic of the discourse.
5.1. Interactive and topic gestures
In 1989 J.B. Bavelas, D. Hagen, L. Lane and D.A. Lawrie proposed a new division 
of illustrators at the annual meeting of the International Communication 
Association. They proposed to divide conversational gestures into topic gestures 
and interactive gestures. Interactive gestures refer to the interlocutor rather than the 
topic of the conversation and help maintain conversation as a social system.
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There are hand gestures that have the previously unnoticed function of helping 
the interlocutors’co-ordinate their dialogue. J.B. Bavelas and her group have called 
them interactive gestures and assume that they address and maintain the interaction 
required by dialogue rather than convey meaning within the dialogue as other 
gestures do. J.B. Bavelas and others are developing a theory that emphasizes the 
social, dialogical aspects of conversation and in which nonverbal and verbal acts 
may serve specialized but always integrated functions (Bavelas, Chovil, Coates, 
Roe, in press).
What do these gestures look like and how can they be identified? As is true for 
all illustrators, no two interactive gestures are exactly alike, but they do have 
recognizable common features.
Most scholars divide hand gestures into two broad classes:
(1) stereotyped hand signals that people can and often do use in non-speaking 
contexts (e.g. the hitch-hiking or “OK” signals)
(2) gestures in conversation.
J.B. Bavelas, N. Chovil, L. Coate and L. Roe are interested in the other group, 
conversational gestures which occur only while people are talking and which do 
not have stereotypic forms.
Speakers spontaneously improvise them along with their words and phrases, to 
which the gestures are tightly synchronized. It was already found in the early 
investigations that conversational gestures are communicative because their 
frequency decreases when another person would not see them. P. Ekman and W.V. 
Friesen have called one group of gestures related to other person, a “hand shrug 
emblem” (1972). J.B. Bavelas and others have seen those as interactive gestures in 
dialogue. D. McNeill has a gesture named “a conduit of metaphors”. This gesture 
treats the words or information being conveyed as an object transmitted between 
the interlocutors. This gesture is usually performed with the open palm, fingers 
curling, meaning verbally “What did you mean/say/ think?” (McNeill 1986). Some 
conduit metaphors depict the delivery of information, being thus interactive 
gestures.
Previous investigations have also described gestures used in word searches, in 
finding the correct word: a hand opened as if to receive the word, and a vertical or 
waving palm that forestalls or rejects the possibility of help in word search. M. 
Wiener, S. Devoe, S. Rubinow, and J. Geller (1972) also noticed this gesture. They 
described this gesture that they paraphrased as meaning “Don’t interrupt” in the 
subclass “orientation of palms”.
J.B. Bavelas and others have suggested that interactive gestures supplant the 
subclass of illustrators previously called batons or beats. They also include
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interactive gestures such as conduit metaphors, which were not called beats. J.B. 
Bavelas and her colleagues have found that most of these “non-topical” gestures 
are in fact direct references to the other person in conversation. Using dialogue 
data, they found that on close examination these simple movements share two key 
characteristics of form and meaning:
(1) at some point, however briefly, the finger(s) or open palm(s) are oriented 
directly at the other person;
(2) the meaning of the gesture in the context in which it occurred includes a 
reference to “you”, the other person in the dialogue.
Thus, a new division of the illustrator class would be topic and interactive 
gestures. Topic gestures depict semantic information directly related to the topic of 
discourse, and interactive gestures (smaller group) refer instead to some aspect of 
the process of conversing with another person. J.B. Bavelas, N. Chovil, L. Coates 
and L. Roe (Cf. Bavelas et al 1992) identified four aspects that are often marked by 
interactive gestures:
(a) citing the other participant's previous contribution;
(b) seeking agreement, understanding, or help;
(c) the delivery of new versus shared information;
(d) events around the speaking turn (e.g. taking or forestalling the turn).
There are many specific functions that interactive gestures serve in dialogue.
J.B. Bavelas and her group suggest that there are four broad functions, subsuming a 
total of 12 specialized functions (Bavelas, Chovil, Coates, Roe, in press), 
summarized in Table 1 (see Table 1 “Proposed functions of hand movements”). I 
have added some more functions of interactive gestures to Table 1.
Table 1
Proposed functions of hand movements
CONVERSATIONAL GESTURES accompany and illustrate talk and are 
improvised with and synchronized to words. They are usually made by the person 
at the moment of speaking. Gestures are divided into two classes: (1) topic 
gestures and (2) interactive gestures.
(1) TOPIC GESTURES depict some aspect of the topical content of the 
conversation; e.g., the size of an object or (metaphorically) of a problem. The vast 
majority of conversational gestures are topic gestures.
(2) INTERACTIVE GESTURES are a much smaller group that refer to the 
addressee and provide no information about the topic-at-hand. They serve several 
necessary functions in dialogue:
(2.1.) Delivery gestures as a group refer to the delivery of information by the 
speaker to an addressee:
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(2.1.1.) General delivery gestures mark the standard relationship from the speaker 
to the addressee; the speaker “hands over” to the addressee relevant/important 
information. The corresponding verbal paraphrases would be “Here’s what I’m telling 
you”, “In my opinion”, ‘That’s what I’m saying”, ‘That’s what I’m saying”.
(2.1.2.) Shared information gestures mark material that the addressee probably 
already knows — information that is part of their common background. They essentially 
mean “As you know”.
(2.1.3.) Digression gestures mark information that should be treated by the 
addressee as being aside from the main point. Their verbal analogue could be “Follow 
me”.
(2.1.4.) iElliptical gestures mark information that the addressee should elaborate for 
himself or herself; the speaker will not provide further details. Analogous to “You know 
the rest (yourself)”.
(2.2.) Citing gestures refer to a previous contribution of the addressee:
(2.2.1.) General citing indicates that the point the speaker is making at the moment 
had already been contributed by the addressee. The verbal paraphrase would be “As 
you said earlier”.
(2.2.2.) Acknowledgement of the addressee's response indicates that the speaker 
saw or heard that the addressee had understood the speaker. It can be paraphrased as 
“I see that you have understood me”.
(2.3.) Seeking gestures aim at eliciting a specific response from the addressee:
(2.3.1.) Seeking help requests a word or phrase that the speaker is not able to find 
at the moment. The verbal paraphrase would be “Can you give me the word for...?”
(2.3.2.) Seeking agreement asks whether the addressee agrees or disagrees with 
the point being made. It is analogous to “Don’t you agree?”, “As you see yourself”.
(2.3.3.) Seeking understanding asks whether the addressee understood what was 
said. Its verbal equivalents include “You know?”, “Eh?”, “What else can I say?”, “What 
else could I do?” at the end of a phrase.
(2.4.) Turn change gestures refer to issues pertaining to the speaking turn:
(2.4.1.) Taking a turn accepts the turn from the other person. One paraphrase could 
be “OK, I’ll take over” .
(2.4.2.) Giving a turn hands it over to the other person. As if to say, “You turn now.”
(2.4.3.) Maintaining a turn is often a slightly bouncing or pushing movement towards 
the other person. The verbal paraphrase would be “Let me finish, don’t interrupt!”
(2.4.4.) Opening a turn indicates that it is anyone's turn, as if to say “Who’s going to 
talk next?”
(2.5.) Defence or surrendering gesture reveals that the speaker does not like the 
remark of the previous speaker or that he/she disagrees with it but admits the 
possibility of another point of view. It can be verbalized as “OK, it might as well be so”, 
“I surrender”, “I admit that it happened so”.
The primary characteristic that unites interactive gestures is that they refer 
directly to the interlocutor, they give no information about the topic. A second 
related characteristic is their physical form that always includes some kind of 
iconic reference to the interlocutor. Sometimes the reference is simply by deixis — 
pointing at the other person with fmger(s), thumb, or palm —  but in most
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instances it is more complex. J.B. Bavelas and her colleague can distinguish 
reliably between topic and interactive gestures using a decision procedure based on 
elimination. The scorer first considers whether it is a topic gesture, looking for 
some depiction of information related to the topic at hand (e.g. details of the story 
being told). Failing to find that, the scorer then looks for an interactive meaning. 
To be an interactive gesture, it must have a paraphrase that is both independent of 
the topic and addressed to the interlocutor. In addition, the form must be interactive 
that means that the finger(s), thumb, or open palm(s) are oriented directly toward 
the other person at some point, however briefly. The back of the palm, heel of the 
hand, or closed hand is not interactive in form.
J.B. Bavelas and her work-group thus propose a new distinction for conver­
sational gestures: most function as topic gestures that refer directly to the specific 
topic at the moment; some function as interactive gestures that refer instead to the 
addressee (Bavelas, Chovil, Coates, Roe, in press). Topic gestures (along with 
words, facial expressions, etc.) convey topic-specific content whereas interactive 
gestures are topic-independent. Regularly we could not infer the interactive 
gestures from the topic of conversation. Interactive gestures serve to facilitate and 
regulate the process of having a dialogue. Interactive gestures serve housekeeping 
functions that are required by dialogue but not by monologue. They enable a 
speaker to include the addressee, to solicit the addressee’s involvement in their 
dialogue, and to coordinate their contributions (Bavelas, Chovil, Coates, Roe, in 
press). The meaning of the interactive gesture cannot be determined from the 
words alone. That is, based on the words alone, one would in most cases expect a 
topic gesture.
J.B. Bavelas and her group assume that interactive gestures are a small and 
previously unnoticed group of conversational gestures that speakers can efficiently 
insert as a means of including their addressees, usually without yielding the turn or 
even making explicit verbal reference to the addressee. Unlike the gestures that 
depict some aspect of topical content, interactive gestures assist the dialogue itself 
rather than serving semantic or syntactic functions. Indeed, the existence of several 
different kinds of interactive gestures draws our attention to the many specific 
ways in which interlocutors must calibrate their contributions and mutual under­
standing. These gestures are strongly and uniquely affected by the requirement to 
have a dialogue, rather than by narrative content. Interactive gestures elicit micro-
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analytically predictable responses from recipients. These gestures confirm the 
value of looking more closely at the social process of conversation.
6. Interactive and topic gestures in dialogue
6.1. Presentation of the material
For about a year it was possible to observe in detail materials recorded in the 
Tartu TV studio. I reduced the choice to the dialogues occurring in the recordings. 
The studio had envisaged a series called “Men of stagnation” (it was aired later 
under a different name). The interviewer (marked by initials PU) talks to well- 
known people in the Estonian society during the Soviet period, the so-called 
stagnation period. The minimal length of one conversation is 60 minutes, 
maximum 90 minutes. Three different men were interviewed at different times in 
1994. The researcher could observe the whole unaided or raw material. The 
dialogue has been noted down in detail: a question, the answer and all 
accompanying hand movements, expressive facial movements and, when possible, 
also the movements of legs.
The preceding question or text is presented in brackets to enhance under­
standing of the following utterance. The dotted line between utterances indicates 
that there is a sentence (or more) between the preceding question and the following 
answer. The underlined part of the utterance indicates at what moment (parallel to) 
the words the gesture was performed. If there were more than one gesture during 
an utterance then each subpart of the utterance is followed by the number of the 
gesture. Description of the gesture and its possible verbal counterpart are between 
the slanted lines, just after the utterance. In case of multiple gestures the 
enumeration of description corresponds to the ordinal number of the gesture. The 
features of oral speech have been preserved maximally. Dots in the middle of an 
utterance denote pauses in the natural flow of speech.
The article makes use of part of the material from conversations with all the 
three men. The processed material contains interactive and topic gestures cor­
responding to the classification of J.B. Bavelas et al. The processed material 
generally confirms their theory but new possibilities and hypotheses have also been 
found. Although the material can be classified as interview it is dialogic in essence.
In one of the interviews the interviewer PU and the respondent KK are sitting in 
a backstage room, evidently on a bigger box-like thing/item. The camera is placed
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so that KK faces it directly; PU is to the right of KK and sidewise to the camera 
(from the viewer’s point of view) but to the left of KK (from his position). The 
right-left dichotomy has been considered in the analysis from the interlocutors' own 
point of view when describing the interactive gestures (when KK looks left then he 
looks towards the interviewer PU) but from the viewers' point of view when 
describing topic gestures. It has no impact on the analysis of content of topic 
gestures. The left-right dichotomy has been considered in a similar way in all the 
dialogues. KK uses a stationary microphone and PU a directed one. In all cases the 
question and answer contain more than one utterance.
In the second dialogue the interlocutors are sitting in the storeroom of the 
theatre on comfortable period-style chairs. The respondent JA has a table in front 
of him; thus we can speak about certain movements or leg positions in a minimal 
way.
The third interview has been recorded in different places, most of it in the 
respondent KR home where they sit on a sofa. But they also walk around, visit a 
church. Part of the interview takes place on a building site.
6.2. Interpretation of the material
The beginning of a conversation very often seems to be “groping” each other and 
only after such an introduction people get more relaxed and gestures appear in the 
conversation.
It is evident that gestures demonstrate something of a person's nature/character, 
certain aspects, moments, which would enable us to better understand him/her but 
also the other interlocutor.
Our material reveals that gestures are used as a “supporting stick” when a 
person says something directly related to him/her. There occur many more 
interactive gestures of a certain type and a lot of topic gestures.
6.2.1, Interactive gestures
Totally new to the category of interactive gestures are the so-called defensive or 
surrendering gestures (cf. Table 1, division 2.5.), verbally equivalent to something 
like “To tell the truth, it happened”; “I admit that it happened so”. These are not 
related to turn-taking though they are outwardly similar. The partner implies that 
the other has made an utterance to which he would rather not reply but admits the 
right of the other to have done so.
179
(1) [PU: But did it happen?]
KK: But how many times did it happen that the next morning already at 
nine there was a call from the KGB asking what did your guys do 
yesterday? See. That happened, very often.
/Raises hands up in front, palms outward; “I surrender” ; “Honestly, that 
did happen”/
In the following presentation of interactive gestures the number in bracket 
corresponds to the enumeration in Table 1. First, the delivery gestures and seeking 
gestures (cf. Table 1, subdivisions 2. 1. and 2. 3.) and their subdivisions have been 
presented: general delivery gestures (subdivision 2.1.1.), seeking agreement 
(subdivision 2.3.2.) and seeking understanding (subdivision 2.3.3.) gestures.
Generally, we have tried to preserve the classification of hand gestures proposed 
by J.B. Bavelas and her group pertaining to our material. The interactive gestures 
pointed out by Bavelas et al. did not always have a correspondence in gestures 
accompanying Estonian oral speech. By making the same interactive gesture 
Estonians may ascribe it a bit different meaning. For example, most of the “general 
delivery gestures”, which have been described as gestures performed by both hands 
were, according to the present study, performed in majority by one hand. Gestures 
in this division were described by J. B. Bavelas and her colleagues most generally 
which leaves more space for interpretation. The hand shrug has definitely been 
considered interactive but the same conclusion can also draw from the study by J.
B. Bavelas et al. (1992:475).
The general delivery gesture (“That’s what I’m saying”) and the hand shrug 
gesture (“What else could I do?”) were quite often outwardly similar and could be 
differentiated by the context.
Often one type of gesture prevailed a number of times — not in case of one 
utterance but in case of a whole part of conversation. Then, another gesture was 
“adapted” and used a number of times. This usage of interactive gestures is 
understandable from the topic's point of view but it probably demonstrates 
something else: a kind of subconscious stereotyping in human movements?
Interactive gestures
Next I will present some examples of interactive gestures: examples 2a-b, e-1, 




(2) [PU: How did this mechanism function? Did the theatre manager himself 
have to keep a sharp eye on everything so that when he did not like 
something he just picked the receiver and called the right number, or how 
did it function?]
(a) KK: And suddenly there was Homeric laughter in the hall.
/Raises his hands a bit from the lap, palms up; “What else could I do?”/
(b) KK: The guys say we don’t understand, damn it, is the fly open or 
what’s up. /Raises his hands a bit from the lap, palms up; “What else could 
I do?”/
(c) KK: I say, the piece had been plaved for three years.
/Raises his right hand forward, palm up; “That’s what I’m saying”/
(d) KK: Grandfather went to India.
/Turns his right hand upwards in his lap; “That’s what I’m saying” ; “Well, 
so what?”/
(e) KK: Well, you understand, this is crazy!
/Shrug his shoulders; “What else could I do?!”/
(f) KK: Well, there weren’t anything like that!
/Raises his hands up for a moment, palms up, fingers spread out; “What 
else could I do?”/
(g) KK: Yep, let’s take this: when we first went to Poland it turned out that 
three guys could not come with us.
/Hands on his knees, thumbs up, unfolds his hands in the lap; “What else 
could I do?”/
(h) KK: I said: but what can we do?
/Shrugs his shoulders, turns hands upwards for a moment in his lap; “What 
else could I do?”/
(i) KK: Or shall we cancel the trip?
/Shrugs his shoulders, keeps the hands in his lap with palms upward; 
“What else could I do?”/
(j) KK: No.
/Spreads hands widely to both sides; “What else could I do?”/
(k) KK: Well, I said, all right, just a moment, where shall I write? 
/Unfolds his hands in the lap; “What else could I do?”/
(1) KK: W ell, that’s it, that’s it!
/Spreads both hands; “What else could I say?”/
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(3) PU: How did these so-called sharp eyes seem to you as persons?
(a) KK: Well, this man who I (1) had to deal with ... umm ... (2) I can tell 
frankly: immensely likeable, wise and serious, normal person.
/(1) Spreads his hands; “What else could I say?”
(2) Spreads his hands; “What else could I say?”/
(4) [PU: Was that environment tiring or did you inwardly so to say discharged 
yourself?]
(a) KK: That’s the reason why I left for school.
/Raises his right hand and makes a circle, the index finger straight; “As you 
can see yourself’/
(5) [PU: Throwing a glance back now, whom was head of the drama 
department before you came there?]
(a) KK: Before that there was Aarne Üksküla.
/Small circle outward with the right hand; “That’s what I’m saying”/
(b) KK: And then there was Eedu Tinn.
/Stabs with the right hand forward, the index finger straight; “That’s what 
I’m saying”/
(c) KK: And then the then rector Venno Laul proposed me to apply for the 
post of head of department.
/Turns the right hand to the front, palm up; “That's what I’m saying”/
[PU: Why did Aarne Üksküla leave from that post?]
(d) KK: Because I’ve been planning the same.
/The right hand above the face, a slight flick away; “That’s what I’m 
saying”/
(e) KK: And I think that it’s, well ... that I’ve exhausted myself.
/А slight circle outward with the right hand; “As you understand yourself’/
(f) KK: I like it. this job.
/А slight flick forward with the fingers; “As you understand yourself’/
(6) (a) [PU: Because when we look at the so-called list of heads of the 
department, then Panso, Üksküla, Tinn. It's made a strange jerk, somehow. 
When we speak to creative people then, well, at this point the change of 
heads of department or change of people has caused various comments. 
Maybe you could explain why Üksküla quitted, why was Eduard Tinn 
suitable for the position in a wider perspective? Why did he have to be 
there? And then you overtaking the job?]
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(b) KK: To tell the truth, I can’t remember ... ten years have passed since that. 
/Flicks outward with the right hand for a moment; “As you understand 
yourself’/
(c) KK: Yea, yes, and then, well, I repeat again (1) that Venno Laul made a 
proposal (2).
/(1) Strikes forward with his right hand for a moment; “As you understand 
yourself’;
(2) Strikes forward with his right hand for a moment; “As you understand 
yourself’/
(d) KK: I said, okay. I agree.
/Holds the right hand in front of him, palm upwards; “As you understand 
yourself’/
In the material it is possible to find examples where the general delivery gesture 
is made by both hands (examples 6 and 7).
(6) PU: When you arrived between the prison walls ... that I’m lost for Estonia 
both inwardly and outwardly ... then there’s one way how to come to 
surface again. / Points forward with both hands, two first fingers straight; 
“That’s what I’m saying”/
(7) PU: And then the school years arrived.
/А small circle outwards with both hands; “That’s what I’m saying”/
Shared information gesture (cf. Table 1, subdivision 2.1.2.).
The following is an example demonstrating the preceding input by the speaker 
but it has one interesting difference from the base model. The reference to the 
speaker's preceding statement is made by negating. A negation or tacit protest is 
expressed first of all in a gesture accompanying the utterance. After the statement 
by the speaker that the listener had held high rank jobs at times when he could not 
fully implement his potential they have spoken about other matters. Then the other 
interlocutor comes indirectly back to this topic and alleges that he held a position 
where he could be active, and refers with his hand gesture that the preceding 
statement was not correct according to his opinion (example 8).
(8) [PU: I’ve got the impression that your strivings in the career ladder yielded 
fruit at the wrong time.]
JA: Now, if we speak about this last period, if we don’t say it was an active 
political life, let’s say, from seventy seven to eighty one when I was head
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of the theatre administration of the Ministry of Culture, then this was, well, 
let’s say, an active theatre-political life.
/А slight flick with the hand outwards, reference to the preceding 
information. /
At the same time there exist more traditional ways of referring to shared 
information. In the following example both parties refer to shared information a 
number of times. PU has metaphorically referred to a fact about JA. At first JA 
speaks of something else, then returns to the statement, agrees to it initially though 
with concessions and then refers to the partner's statement by an interactive 
gesture. For PU agreement with concession is too little and he tries to specify and 
be more concrete by making a counterargument and an interactive gesture with the 
reference to shared information (example 9a-b).
(9) [PU: You have been considered a “grey cardinal” ... ]
(a) JA: Though indirectly, that's another matter I was chairman of that ... 
organizing committee of the joint session of Estonian art unions.
/The right index finger is up, a slight flick with the hand outwards; makes 
a reference to the previous input. /
(b) PU: But you had also been a minister. That was later, yes. The result 
was that you made it to the minister’s office.
/Makes rhythmic circles with the right hand, the index finger straight 
towards the partner; a reference to the previous input. /
The reference to the previous input of the other in the following example 
becomes understandable only after we have presented several preceding replies 
which demonstrate how the interactive gesture was arrived at in the last reply and 
which input was actually meant.
(10) [PU: B u t ... who are your friends in the capital?]
PU: I have in mind ... I mean people who were in the political leadership. 
JA: Well, I would first name Tiit Vähi as ... let’s say ... in my mind the 
most calm, pragmatic and apolitical in a good sense person from among 
the top leadership of Estonia in the last years.
PU: Then it could be added that you plan to leave Viliandi for vet another 
period? /Makes two small circles outward toward the partner with the right 
hand; a reference to the previous input. /
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Digression gestures (cf. Table 1, subdivision 2.1.З.).
There were few such gestures (cf. example 11).
(11) JA: And when Glavlit crossed something out or prohibited something then 
it was forbidden that I ... or not only me ... or an official from the ministry 
told the director or author that, look here, Glavlit crossed these lines out,
see.
/The two fingers of the right hand straight, makes a curve towards the 
interlocutor; “Follow me”/
Elliptical gestures (see Table 1, subdivision 2.1.4.).
As an example of the elliptical display gesture in the group of interactive 
gestures may serve the following utterances (12a). The whole dialogic part, related 
to this topical area has to be presented here in order to bring out that elliptical 
character.
(12) PU: At that time it was a rather prestigious position.
KR: Then we started paying attention to such pieces, which were on the 
razor’s edge.
KR: Who can recall such a piece as “Staging “Hamlet” in the village of 
Alam-Kolka”? It was forbidden. We could not perform it.
(a) KR: That’s how we played. Many other theatrical pieces, but this 
“Village”-piece was an exemplar case.
/Elliptical gesture; a reference to the previous./
The material presented by J. B. Bavelas and her colleagues is experimental and 
they do not consider ambiguous situations whenever possible. But there are a lot of 
them in real life.
Seeking help gesture (see Table 1, subdivision 2.З.1.).
Seeking help in finding a word is one of the most easily identifiable interactive 
gestures. Here are some examples (13 and 14).
(13) KK: But then when he le f t ... and did he leave then ... did he go to Moscow 
for the postgraduate studies or did he already go to th a t ... this ... to take the 
editor’s job in that magazine?
/А thrust down with the right hand, palm upwards; “Can you give me the 
word”/
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(14) KR: When, according to someone’s hints, these ... ah ... men from 
SORVVO arrived.
/Makes a fingerflick towards the addressee, “Can you give me the word”/ 
Keeping the turn (see Table 1, subdivision 2.4.3.).
This gesture is also interactive. It occurred only once (example 15).
(15) PU: But you had been a minister. That was later, ves. The result was that 
you reached a minister’s office.
/The right hand makes a light air-cutting movement; “Don’t interrupt!”/
6.2.2. Topic gestures
Topic gestures illustrate the topic, connected utterances or the part of them. 
Quite often topic gestures “depict” additional meaning to the words in an utterance, 
support or strengthen words in a conversation whereas interactive gestures are di­
rectly targeted at the interlocutor. Generally this supports the results of Bavelas et al.
The following are some examples of topic gestures which add expressive force 
to the utterance and can be presented without illustrative photos (examples 1 6 ,17a- 
c, 18).
(16) [PU: But why Halliste?]
KR: Halliste is a nice place, and besides that ... ah ... all the walls were 
there, weren’t they?
/Raises the left hand higher over the shoulder and makes a wide circle./
(17) [PU: At that time it was a rather prestigious position.]
(a) KR: Then we started paying attention to such cases, which were as if on 
the razor’s edge?
/Raises the right fist up and makes the metronome-movement with the 
index finger. /
(b) KR: Who can recall such a theatrical piece as “Staging “Hamlet” in the 
village of Alam-Kolka”? It was forbidden. We could not perform it.
/The raised right hand finger transforms into a circle outward with the 
whole hand and then inward at full pelt; “finality”./
(c) KR: Being on the razor's edge ourselves, can we remain or not.
/The clenched hand is in front, index finger straight, moving it in a 
metronome-way./
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(18) KR: At that time it was a peak period (1) in the theatres. From the year 
eighty the halls full (2).
/(1) Raises the right hand high above his head.
(2) Repeats the previous movement./
The following two utterances (example 19a-b) present a lot of expressive topic 
gestures. ICR starts talking about an incident in the prison but makes a digression 
after the first utterance and starts describing the walking conditions in the prison
yard.
(19) (a) KR: It was raining outside, pouring. It was the turn of our cell to go out 
for a walk.
/А “sweeping” movement with the hand in front./
(b) KR: By the way, the ... the prison yards are also cells (1), it’s not a big 
yard any more (2) —  we all walk around -, but also small cells have been 
introduced (3), smaller than this room and walls covered by thick wire net 
from above (4) and in there every cell walks around separately and on 
special bridges (5) the wardens move around and watch.
/(1) Makes movements with the hand in front and sideways as if “building” 
a separation.
(2) Makes a circular movement in front with the whole hand.
(3) Brings hands apart in front and down the sides; “building a square cell” .
(4) Two hands as “gable ro o f’ in front of him.
(5) A hand draws a circle in the air./
Interactive gestures are manifested first and foremost in dialogues, topic 
gestures in all forms of communication and surely rather in monologues. This point 
found also support in the material. When KR started talking more profoundly about 
something, “immersed in monologue” so that “forgot” to draw PU in the dialogue 
the number of gestures started increasing (cf. examples 20a-f, 21, 22a-b, 23).
(20) (a) KR: And despite what the whether is like if it’s the turn of your cell 
then you are driven out there.
/А movement forward with the right hand from the neck in full swing as if 
“whipping a horse”/
(b) KR: It was again our turn to go out.
/Moves the hand in front, fingers pointing to the ground. The gesture gives 
expression to the fact that their cell was higher above than the ground 
floor./
(c) KR: We say that we don’t want to go (1) —  we cannot dry the clothes
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afterwards (2), we have only one set of clothes (3), thin and it’s cold even 
in them (4).
/(1) Hands together in front, draws them apart sidewise.
(2) Puts both hands against his breast.
(3) Repeats the previous gesture.
(4) Pulls the front of the shirt with both hands./
(d) KR: No, out, out!
/The right hand curled from the elbow, shaking the fist./
(e) KR: And so with all the cells (1), not only in case of ours (2).
/(1) A patting movement with the right hand; “all of them”.
(2) Strikes against his breast once./
(f) KR: I recall for the first time absolutely distinctly and after that many 
times when I said: “Now, guys, only praying can help us. Let’s pray for the 
rain to stop” .
/Puts his hands together./
(21) KR: The main figure in our cell, a large-scale smuggler, head of a bigger 
cartel (1) looked more than contemptuously (2) at somebody like me, that I 
say that the rain will stop if we pray.
/(1) Makes a clap with his hands in front. The gesture metaphorically 
demonstrates how “important” that person was considered.
(2) Raises the left hand straight up and the right palm forward./
(22) (a) KR: We prayed. We had to come from the fourth — we were highest up
(1) -  we had to come down from the fourth floor (2) to reach the yard.
/(1) Raises the right hand fully up.
(2) The right hand moves downwards to the front, the index finger points 
towards to the ground. /
(b) KR: We reached the yard, the rain stopped.
/Makes a “sweeping movement from the ground”; “finality” ./
(23) KR: The boss also started praying. Every time the rain stopped.
/Makes the same “sweeping from the ground” movement; “finality”./
Gestures in utterances when somebody speaks about something or someone in 
the past or in the future can be characterized quite unambiguously: when speaking 
about the past the speaker points behind, back over the shoulder, etc.; in case of 
future the movements are directed to the front. It has also been pointed out by the 
well-known French researcher G. Galbris (1986: 139; 1987: 73), as well as the 
horizontal and vertical movement (denoting mostly finality, border, obstacle) 
(Galbris 1987: 62-63).
Judging from the examples it can be said that these four Estonians do not make
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forward or backward movements related to the concept of time as often as the 
French do. In the conversation with KK there was more than one opportunity to 
refer back in time but KK used absolutely different gestures for that (examples 24 
and 25).
(24) KK: A few years later Jaan Tooming was the director here, in “Ugala”. 
/The thumb and index finger of the right hand make an inch-measuring 
gesture, finger upwards (cf. Figure 2)./
(25) KK: Well, for Christ’s sake, it was ... Kaarel Kilvet staged it ... a 
performance with songs including a piece, written about 200 years ago, 
where it was written in the text that Grandpa went to India.
/Looks at the interviewer, spreads his hands; “Well about that time” (cf. 
Figure 3)./
But the speakers referred forward in relation to space or objects (examples 26, 
27a, b).
(26) KK: I had staged in the Youth Theatre one children’s musical and then 
“Oliver and Jennifer”.
/Points forward with the right hand, finger straight; [object] (cf. Figure 4)./
(27) KK: A few years later Jaan Tooming was the main producer here (b) in 
“Ugaj_a”_(a).
/(a) Points over the shoulder with the thumb of the right hand.
(b) Points over the shoulder with the thumb of the right hand, but below 
(cf. Figure 5: a [space], b [object]./
7. Conclusion
The analysis of Estonian dialogue demonstrated that it supports rather well the 
classification of conversational gestures proposed by J.B. Bavelas and her 
colleagues. Naturally, the overlap could not have been a hundred percent and that 
was not the aim of the paper. But the author’s interest in hand gestures has arisen 
earlier and the concept of the Bavelas group provided a fair opportunity to check 
on phenomena arising in face-to-face communication. That certain overlaps are 
possible demonstrates the more basic nature of human gestures compared to 
language. But one does not exist without the other and it is too early yet to draw 
wider conclusions. Topic gestures depict concrete meanings iconically and abstract 
meanings metaphorically.
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Our material was not an experimental dialogue but an interview-like 
conversation between two people and —  this proves the point of Bavelas et al. — 
there were considerably less interactive gestures, certain variants did not occur at 
all. General delivery gestures occurred most often. There were quite a few gestures 
of agreement and seeking understanding. This also provides ground for further 
generalizations about human nature. The well groundedness of a new, defensive 
gesture as interactive one needs further investigation. There were also conduit and 
elliptical gestures. Help seeking gestures for finding the right word are inseparable 
of any communicative situation ... Turn-taking gestures occurred to a lesser extent 
because the material was interview-like dialogue.
Topic gestures occur very often. Putting them into words seems harassing them. 
Even picture cannot convey dynamics but seems a less helpless means. Time, 
object and finality are depicted by movements, which can be considered 
stereotypical. Their occurrence here and elsewhere in Europe provides the first 
opportunity for wider generalization. But are the differences cultural or do they lie 
somewhere else one cannot say at the moment. At the time when the world is 
“shrinking” and interculturation takes place, many regional features are loosing 
their characteristics.
Still, it is possible to say that the model developed by J.B. Bavelas and her 
colleagues’ functions outside the area studied by them — i.e. in Estonia.
One of the main functions of a speaker’s gesture is linguistic, that is, to help 
convey meaning to the addressee in an immediate conversational context. 
Absolutely important are both the addressee and the moment-by-moment context in 
which the gesture occurs. This view of gestures requires a microanalytic analysis. 
Gestures are very much like words or phrases in spontaneous conversation.
A gesture can have more than one function simultaneously. The goal of analysis 
should not be only to decide which category we should put a gesture but rather to 
discover at least some of the things a gesture is doing at its particular moment in 
the conversation.
It may be say that conversational gestures are part of speech, in two senses:
(1) they contribute to meaning just as words and phrases do;
(2) their meaning depends upon the whole of which they are a part of (Bavelas, 
in press).
An interpretation of gestures as interactive or topical in function depends on the 
interpretation of the meaning of the gesture at the particular moment it occurred. In 
other words, we must “translate” or explicate the gesture’s meaning. This means
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taking into account both its physical encoding and what it seemed to be conveying 
in conjunction with the accompanying words, intonation, and facial displays at that 
precise moment. Conversational gestures are spontaneous and transient.
The functions served by individual interactive gestures at their moments in 
conversation are quite heterogeneous. But all they have in common is a reference 
to the addressee. Topic gestures work closely with the verbal narrative, illustrate 
this. Interactive gestures also have verbal equivalents. The speaker can insert 
interactive gesture quickly and with minimal interruption of the topical flow. Topic 
gestures convey meaning, fully or partially dependent on the words.
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Abstract




This paper focuses on iconic gestures that accompany speech in the context of 
spatial relations. In this paper, the pointing gestures were studied together with 
Estonian (Finno-Ugric) verbal expressions. The pointing gestures had two 
simultaneous roles: (1) to point to the spatial relations and (2) to image (to 
denote) the most important concept in the sentence that followed. The 
underlined connection between the gesture and the word may be a process or 
certain type of information.




This paper is part of a comprehensive study that deals with the interrelations of 
gestures and speech from various aspects. The paper focuses on iconic gestures 
that accompany speech (Feyereisen and de Lannoy 71-87, McNeill 1-2, 5, 
Hadar and Butterworth 148, 150-151, Beattie and Shovelton 14, etc.) in the 
context of spatial relations. Iconic gestures that indicate space can be called 
pointing gestures or deictics. First, I’ll make an attempt to put my theoretical 
positions in a broader perspective.
1. Cognitivity and language
Many researchers have tried to describe how cognitivity is related to physical 
embodiment. Image schemata are not abstract relations between symbols and 
the external world, the reality, but they organize our experience and under­
standing on the level of physical perception and movements (Armstrong, 
Stokoe, Wilcox 51-52). Human cognition appears to comprehend certain rela­
tively distinct major cognitive systems, which include language; perception in 
general or in its several modalities like vision, hearing, kinesthesia, etc.; a 
cognitive system for cultural structure, etc., as Talmy (231) has pointed out.
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Each major cognitive system has certain properties of organization; many of 
them are comparable across systems, which means that the systems overlap to 
some extent. The organization of language is perhaps unique among the cogni­
tive systems, and language has evolved later than the other systems, which 
include hand gestures. Perhaps these systems overlap, too. I mean that the 
conceptual structure of language largely overlaps with the structures of the 
visual, kinesthetic, reasoning and understanding systems, less so with the 
systems of affective and cultural structure. Kinesthesia is probably one of the 
earliest perception systems.
2. Space and language
According to Spencer, each culture builds up its image about time on the base 
of its image of space. In order to explain spatial cognitivity, it is important to 
study the referential and pointing gestures that accompany speech. Spatial 
changes can be characterized, as well as experienced, through the bodies that 
move through space along a path or trajectory (Radden 17-19). The imaginary 
journey of the subjects, the journey in a person’s mind, does not take place in 
real time. A human being uses as if unreal space —  an imagined journey. It is 
the space imagined by the human being —  a collection of individual items 
whose constancy is secured by the journey. We can categorize spatial change in 
accordance with process as motion. For example, a verb of motion may encode 
the origin and manner of a movement (e.g., “to rush out o f ’), but not the path 
that is supplied by the gesture. Without the verb, however, the gesture may not 
be recognized as a representation of a path. It could also represent the outline of 
an object, for instance (Streeck and Knapp 12-13).
It’s surprising that neither Greek nor Latin has an exact equivalent of 
“space”. The Greek topos means ‘place’, ‘body location relative to another 
body’. The Latin spatium —  from which the English and French space-names 
are derived —  means first of all ‘interval’ or ‘distance between two bodies’. The 
Greek khora is closer to the modern ‘space’ than topos. But khora also means 
‘place’, ‘spot’ or ‘surroundings’ rather than ‘space’. It’s interesting that khora 
sometimes means ‘interspace’ (or ‘space between’), too. The Aristotelian 
philosophy of space is a theory of topos, not a theory of khora (Wright 105).
3. Gestures and language
That is no doubt why many deictic terms are normally supplemented by gesture. 
It is one of the best possible solutions to the problem of angle-specification as 
gestures constitute an analogue system (offering indefinite subdivisions of arc) 
while any linguistic solution will be digital (offering only a small set of broad 
angles or points). Although a gestural system offers excellent design features for
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face-to-face communication, it will fail totally where visual contact cannot be 
established. Moreover, it provides a solution to the communication problem but 
not to the conceptual problem, namely, how an individual should conceive of ang­
les, remember them, and find objects or destinations utilizing them (Levinson 8).
The gesture and the synchronous language entity may denote the same 
underlying ideational unit. According to McNeill (2), the contents of the gesture 
and the synchronized speech need not be identical, and they usually they are 
not. There are related but not identical meanings, which McNeill calls “co- 
expressive”. So, if the gesture and its synchronized со-expressive linguistic 
segments express the same underlying idea unit, they need not express its 
identical aspects. Such paired use of gesture and speech can refer to their 
inherent uniformity or even to inherent parity. Is the idea unit something like a 
language of the mind? A language of the mind is not something on which the 
supposed computation is carried out. Nor does it emerge as a distinctive level of 
cognitive organization from the interaction of a population of neurons within 
the brain. Rather, a language is something that we use, and its usage is inhe­
rently connected to the embodied nature of our interactions with the environ­
ment (Teng 2). Gestures may help to solve the question of language acquisition.
4. Method
Many of studies of iconic gestures are based on the retelling of cartoon stories. 
On the one hand, we need exact experiments. On the other hand, as Beattie and 
Shovelton (26) have pointed out, we need the studies of gestures in everyday 
conversation, too. In this paper, the pointing gestures were studied together with 
Estonian (Finno-Ugric) verbal expressions. The examples come from an experi­
ment where the subjects had to go on an imaginary journey and describe it to 
another person, the ‘guest’. En route the ‘guest’ was shown some historic and 
cultural sights. Each “guide” “went” from starting point to the finish in 10 
minutes. 14 subjects were videotaped. Two aspects were analyzed: (1) the 
gestures that indicated space, spatial relations, or spatiotemporal relations, (2) 
the semantic significance of the concomitant words, phrases, or sentences. The 
gestures that indicated spatial relations were studied together with the conco­
mitant Estonian-language expressions. So, the aim of this experiment, which 
involves face-to-face-interaction, is to understand space-relation gestures and 
coverbal speech. It seems that people automatically pick up information that is 
only present in gestures. The material is still in process.
5. Results
It appears that for some concepts the interlocutor must add a gesture to make 
oneself fully understood. The data indicate that people often use the words like
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‘th is’, ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘this over there’ and ‘on the left’ or ‘on the right’ to 
express which object can be seen on the way.
(1) “Groping”.
Conversation often begins with “groping” each other, and only after such an 
introduction people get more relaxed and gestures appear in the conversation  
(Tenjes 178). In this case the gestures also appeared not just at the beginning of  
face-to-face interaction but som e time later when the interactants had already 
used to each other.
(2) Communicators.
It appears that pointing gestures, which indicate spatial relations, perform a 
strongly com m unicative role. It means that subjects pointed to the left or to the 
right, etc. with or without concomitant words. The extra meaning is 
communicated by means o f the gesture. The pointing gesture has an 
independent meaning and it substitutes the word, which marked the spatial 
relations. It was very common. Some exam ples will be given below.
EXAMPLES.
(The underlined part o f the utterance indicates at what moment the gesture w as 
made.)
(i) Ja siis see väike maia________ siin on humanitaarraamatukogu.
and then this little house-NOM here be-PRES-3SG humanities+library-NOM
‘And then this little house here is the library of the humanities.’ (See figure 1.)
Figure 1. 
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(ii) Jakobi mägi. Ja siia______ jää-b__________ nüüd “Krooks”.
Jacob-GEN hill and over-here stay-PRES-3SG now “Krooks”
See on kella kaheteistkümne-st kella
it be-PRES-3SG clock-GEN twelve-ELA clock-GEN
kuue-ni hommiku-1 ava-tud ja päris selline ...
six-TER morning-ADE open-PART and quite such ...
lahe koht. 
cool place-NOM
Jacob’s Hill. And the “Krooks” pub is over here now . It is open from twelve 
until six in the morning and it’s a rather ... cool place.’ (See figure 2.)
Figure 2.
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(iii) See on seal Vana Anatoomikum.
this be-PRES-3SG over-there old anatomical+theatre-NOM  
T h is  is the Old Anatomical Theatre over there.’ (See figure 3.)
Figure3.
So, in face-to-face interaction the pointing gestures have strongly communica 
tive value in the context o f direction with regard to the egocentric coordinate 
system  (left, right, here, there).
(3) Points and pre-points.
The gesture indicating ‘this over there’, ‘this over here’, etc. appeared very 
often before the most important concept o f the sentence. The concept mostly 
denoted an object or a shape o f the path.
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EXAM PLES.
(The arrows show the main type o f the hand movement.)
(i)
Siit alt lähe-b läbi Lossi tänav,
from here from below go-PRES-3SG through castle-GEN street-NOM
‘Lossi Sreet passes through below u s.’ (See figure 4.)




Kui te nüüd siit mäe-st alla vaata-te, vaat
when you now from here hill-ELA down look-PRES-2PL look!
Г1
sealt paista-b Kuradisild.
from there be seen-PRES-3SG devil+bridge-SG-NOM
‘When you look down from this hill now, look, you can see the D ev il’s Bridj 




Ja sealt saa-b alla las-ta.
and from there can-PRES-3SG down fire-INFINIT
‘And one can fire down from there.’ (See figure 6.)
Figure 6.
This study indicates that the pointing gestures had two simultaneous roles: (1) 
to point to the spatial relations and (2) to image (to denote) the most important 
concept in the sentence that followed. There is a clear semantic link between the 
gesture and the single underlined word in the accompanying speech (Hadar and 
Butterworth 152). It means that the gesture and the language have a common  
base. But is it a unit? According to human overall cognition, the underlined 
connection between the gesture and the word may be a process or certain type 
o f information. There should be an overlapping area between gestures and 
concepts. It shows connections in the deep psychological level in the human 
mind. Heterogeneity is an ancient property o f human consciousness, and this 
mechanism requires the presence o f at least two systems that would not be 
ultimately translatable into each other (Lotman 223, 43).
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According to Spencer, the more developed the entirety, the more it has 
differentiated into parts according to function. Secondly, the more developed it 
is, the more integrated are its parts into the functioning of the entirety (Wright 
33). It seems that this statement can be postulated both for gestures and human 
language. How much does a gesture depend on the peculiarity of language? To 
what extent can we speak about universality? In this case, the pointing gestures 
in spatial relations do not depend on specific language, and vice versa. The unit 
point or the unit process lies deeper in human cognition. What could be innate 
language ability could have a non-linguistic character. Spatial information is 
encoded both into spoken language and the concomitant iconic gesture. 
Similarly to linguistic units, the gestures are also symbols, that is, pairs of 
meaning and form. It remains open what kind of meaning exactly is conveyed 
by gestures. One might say that in a broader perspective the gesture is the 
important link that proceeds through perception, conceptualization, and 
language development.
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The Roman rhetorical tradition acknowledged the importance of 
gesture and considered the appropriate use of gesture an important 
part: of the “actio” of a speech. Quintillian devoted a large portion of 
one of the four books of his Institutio Oratoria to a discussion of the 
proper use of gesture by an orator. Mainstream modern linguistic 
theories have adopted a condescending or downright antagonistic 
attitude toward gesture. Due to a Cartesian dualistic bias towards the 
strict separation of body and mind, and to the concentration on the 
enterprise of accounting for linguistic competence rather than lin­
guistic performance, the gestures occurring in connection with spo­
ken language have generally been ignored as irrelevant (Hirsch 
199:5: 14). This situation is however changing. Linguists are working 
together with communication scientists, anthropologists, psycholo­
gists, and others studying the actual use of spoken language in a va­
riety of everyday situational contexts.
2. Peirce’s trichonomy
In contrast to Descartes, C. S. Peirce realized that knowledge or cog­
nition has three basic semiotic dimensions: iconic, indexical, and 
symbolic. Peirce claimed that these three dimensions of cognition 
were grounded in intuitions of similarity, causality, contiguity in 
space-time and part-whole, and arbitrary conventional connections 
between objects (abstract or concrete) of attention. In Peircian 
semiotics the iconic and indexical dimensions of signs are primarily 
non-verbal, the symbolic dimension is primarily verbal (Hirsch 1995: 
14).
Many classifications of gestures “arise” from Peirce’s sign 
trichonomy. When referring to an object, a sign can be an icon, index 
or symbol. Peirce calls this trichonomy the most important classifi­
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cation of signs. In modem semiotics the sign-function relationship 
(or the sign-object relationship) has become a crucial issue. The in­
dex seems to be the most complex type among these three types of 
sign. Indices are indicating signs. Indication is the simplest and the 
basic type of semiosis. But indexical signs also play a role in very 
complex sign process, such as verbal communication.
In Peirce’s work, the index appears, together with the icon and 
the symbol, as a member of one of the numerous triads abundant in 
the world of our experience. Just as indexicality is conceivable, but 
is not a sign, until it enters the sign relation, iconicity has some kind 
of being, but does not exist, until a comparison takes place. In this 
sense, if indexicality is a potential sign, iconicity is only a potential 
ground. In sum, then, iconicity begins with the single object; indexi­
cality starts out as a relation. The problem, therefore, consists in de­
termining what kind of relation it is (Sonesson 1996: 129).
This brings us to another, rather common, confusion: that 
between indices and indicators. The term chosen by Peirce certainly 
suggests that all indices, like the pointing index finger, or an arrow, 
serve to pinpoint a particular object, to isolate it and bring it out of 
the, typically spatial, context in which it is ordinarily enmeshed; and 
this is indeed what Peirce claims (CP 3.361; 4.56). However, if we 
use the term indicator to describe signs which are employed to single 
out an object or a portion of space for our particular attention, it may 
be argued that they are not necessarily indices in Peirce’s sense, and 
that they are not, in any event, sufficiently characterized by being so 
classified (cf. Sonesson 1989b: 50ff, 60f; Goudge 1965: 65ff). Thus, 
certain indicators, such as pointing fingers and arrows, do presup­
pose a relation of contiguity with what they point to; but this is not 
necessary, or even possible, in the case of many verbal indicators, 
most maps, and the photographic options depending on film, ligh­
ting, and frame described as indexical in the semiotics of photo­
graphy; for, in these cases, the indicative gesture is merely recreated 
at the level of content. At least Peirce would also describe some of 
these examples as not “genuine” indices. On the other hand, real in­
dicators, such as fingers and arrows, are equally contiguous to a 
number of objects which they do not indicate, for instance to the 
things which are at the opposite side of the arrow-head, in the direc­
tion to which it does not point (Sonesson 1989a: 47).
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The lack of definitions suggests that Peirce tended to over-ex- 
temd the notion of sign. In his later days, however, he realized that all 
his notions were too narrow: instead of sign, he should have talked 
of mediation, which should be understood as branching, that is, as a 
crutch (Cf. Parmentier 1994). Some of Peirce’s examples, and many 
of those suggested later, are however of another kind, for, instead of 
presupposing a regularity known to obtain between the “thing” 
which serves as the expression of a sign, and another “thing” which 
is taken to be its content, they transform something which is con­
tiguous, or in a relation of factorality, to the expression, into its con­
tent. These signs may therefore be termed performative indices. With 
contiguity, they give rise to such phenomena as the pronoun ‘you’, 
the finger pointing to an object, the weathercock (as marking the 
here-and-now of the wind), the clock of the watch-maker's (as 
marking the emplacement of the shop); and with factorality, they 
may produce the pronouns T , ‘here’, ‘now’, the finger pointing out 
a direction, etc.
3. Problem with classification of gestures
There have been various competing classifications of gestures in the 
literature, though the terminology has often been somewhat mislea­
ding (see, for example McNeill 1985; Feyereisen and de Lannoy
1991). Typologies of gesture often involve two broad crosscutting 
dimensions: representationality, and convention or autonomy 
(Haviland 1996: 11). The first dimension has to do with whether and 
how the bodily movements that accompany speech depict or repre­
sent the referential content of what is being conveyed by an 
utterance. Some gestures seem tailored to the “meaning” of speech, 
via various semiotic modalities, whereas others, for example, appear 
to be more closely aligned to the rhythm of talk.
D. McNeill and his associates have developed an influential 
classificatory scheme which distinguishes between “iconic” and 
“metaphoric” gestures which bear a relation of resemblance to as­
pects of utterance content, “deictic” gestures which index both conc­
rete and abstract referents, and “beats” which seem to be non-repre- 
sentational (Haviland 1996: 40). The scheme is elaborated and com­
pared with competitors in McNeill (1992). McNeill and others dis­
tinguish between four types of gestures, which have been shown to 
occur with narrative discourse (McNeill 1992).
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1. Iconics depict, by the form of the gesture, some feature of the 
action or event being described; such as ‘he climbed up the pipe’ 
accompanied by the hand raising upwards to show the path (Cassell, 
M cNeill, McCullough 1999: 5). ‘An iconic gesture is one that in 
form and manner of execution exhibits a meaning relevant to the 
simultaneously expressed linguistic meaning. Iconic gestures have a 
formal relation to the semantic content of the linguistic unit’ 
(M cNeill 1985: 354). He also says that ‘Iconic gestures are typically 
large complex movements that are performed relatively slowly and 
carefully in the central gesture space’ (1985: 359). He also claims 
that such gestures accompany ‘only sentences classified as narrative’ 
(1985:359).
2. Metaphoric gestures are also representational, but the con­
cept being depicted has no physical form. An example is ‘the 
meeting went on and on’ accompanied by a hand indicating rolling 
motion. Some common metaphoric gestures are the “process meta­
phoric” just illustrated, and the “conduit metaphoric”, which objec­
tifies the information being conveyed, representing it as a concrete 
object that can be held between the hands and given to the listener. 
‘Metaphoric gestures are like iconic gestures in that they exhibit a 
meaning relevant to the concurrent linguistic meaning. However, the 
relation to the linguistic meaning is indirect. Metaphoric gestures ex­
hibit images of abstract concepts. In form and manner of execution, 
metaphoric gestures depict the vehicles of metaphors’ (1985: 356).
3. Deictics spatialize, or locate aspects of the story being nar­
rated in the physical space in front of the narrator; such as ‘Adam 
looked at Chuck, and he looked back’ accompanied by a hand 
pointing first to the left and then to the right.
4. Beat gestures: small baton like movements that do not 
change in form with the content of the accompanying speech, A beat 
is a ‘simple and rapid hand movement of a type that usually accom­
panies words whose importance depends on multisentence text rela­
tions’ (1985: 354). Beats are not iconic in nature.
One of the crucial and confusing problems with this classifica­
tion is posed by M cNeill’s dividing “iconic” and “metaphoric” ges­
tures into different sub-types in one article, and regarding them as 
one sub-type in the other. ‘There are two further sub-types of iconic 
gesture: conduit gestures and metaphoric gestures’ (M cNeill 1985: 
354). However, as G. Beattie and H. Shovelton have already pointed
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out, iconic gestures may be small and fast, operating in a restricted 
space (Beattie and Shovelton 1999: 14). Let’s turn to more subtle 
and flexible classification of gestures. The deliberating manner on 
classification of gestures we can see in the works of A. Kendon. All 
writers recognize that gesture may function, as an utterance, autono­
mously, independently of speech, and most have proposed a special 
class of gesture to cover this. It has also been recognized that a ges­
ture that occurs in conjunction with speech may relate to what is 
being said in a variety of ways. Thus, most draw a distinction 
between speech-associated gesturing, which somehow provides a 
direct representation of some aspect of the content of what is being 
said, and gesturing that appears to have a more abstract sort of rela­
tionship (Kendon 1986b: 31). D. Efron (1941/ 1972), for example, 
distinguishes as “physiographic” those speech-related gestures that 
present a sort of picture of some aspect of the content and as “ideo­
graphic” those speech-related gestures which, he says, are “logical” 
in their meaning and which portray not so much the content of the 
talk as the course of the ideational process itself. This is one of the 
best typologies. Ekman and Friesen (1969) present Efron's ideas in a 
more systematic way, but some of the subtlety of Efron’s original 
discussion is lost (Kendon 1998). Ekman and Friesen have also 
recognized gestures of “beats” under the term “batons”. Even 
“beats” or “batons” may be metaphorical. As Eli Rozik has pointed 
out, a particular kind of hand gesture, “batons”, is crucial to under­
standing human dialogue in real life and in the theatre. He has 
showed that their main function is to indicate the nature of speech 
acts, and in this capacity hand gestures function in the metaphorical 
mode (Rozik 1992: 129).
Many gestures seem to consist of more than one phase. All 
gesturing that occurs in association with speech and which seems to 
be bound up with it as part of the total utterance is referred to as ges­
ticulation (Kendon 1986b: 31). The particular kinds of relationship 
between gesticulation and the speech it is associated with are dis­
cussed on their merits, and no classification of this is attempted in 
advance. Gestures which are standardized in form and which func­
tion as complete utterances in themselves, independently of speech, 
are referred to as autonomous gestures (this includes the forms that 
are quite often referred to today as emblems) (Kendon 1986b: 32).
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4. Gesture and speech
Events narrated by the speakers are often accompanied by hand ges­
tures. These are used to depict actions and also to portray the spatial 
structuring of situations. Kendon has developed the view that ges­
ture, like speech, serves as a vehicle for the representation of mea­
ning. In organizing a unit of action the individual will make use of 
whatever vehicles for meaning representation there are available. 
These include spoken language, but also included is the possibility of 
representing meaning through visible action, which is called gesture 
(Kendon 1986b: 33).
As Kendon (1998) has pointed out, this “strand” of activity 
(which we also refer to when we use the term ‘gesture’ or ‘gesticula­
tion’) has certain characteristics, which distinguish it from other 
kinds of activity (such as practical actions, postural adjustments, 
orientation changes, self-manipulations, and so forth). These include:
(1) Gestures are “excursions”: the phrases of action recognized 
as ‘gesture’ move away from a “rest position” and always return to a 
rest position (cf. Schegloff 1984).
(2) “Peak” structure: Such excursions always have a “center” 
(recognized by naive subjects as the “business” of the movement, 
what the movement actually “does” or what it was “meant for”). This 
has also been referred to (since Kendon 1980) as the “stroke” of the 
gesture phrase.
(3) Well boundedness: the phrases of action identified as ges­
ture tend to have clear onsets and offsets. This is in contrast to 
orientational changes or posture shifts which sometimes can be quite 
gradual and have no “peak” structure.
(4) Symmetry. If you run a film of someone gesturing back­
wards it is remarkable how difficult it seems to be to see the 
difference from when you run the film forwards. This suggests that 
gesture phrases have symmetry of organization that practical actions, 
posture shifts (and of course spatial movements, etc.) do not have.
An important part of the “kinetics” research is the study of how 
exactly gesture phrases are organized in relation to speech phrases. 
Kendon (1972, 1980) has showed that there is consistency in how 
gesture phrases (which he tried to define in terms of the perceptually 
marked “stroke” -  which is analogous to the central syllable of the 
David Crystal’s (Crystal and Davy 1969) “tone unit” -  and the 
“preparation” and “recovery” phases of action) are patterned in rela­
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tion to the phrases of speech (viewed as intonation units, breath 
groups -  specifically David Crystal’s “tone units”). Kendon has 
showed that in continuous discourse, speakers group tone units into 
higher order groupings and so we can speak of a hierarchy of such 
units, and gesture phrases may be similarly organized. For example, 
over a series of tone units linked intonationally or by an absence of 
pauses into a coherent higher order grouping, the co-occurring ges­
ture phrases are also linked (Kendon 1998). There remains a contro­
versy about the way in which gesture as an activity is related to 
speech. Some investigators appear to consider it simply as a kind of 
“spill-over” effect from the effort of speaking, others see it as some­
how helping the speaker to speak, yet others see it as determined by 
the linguistic choices a speaker makes as he constructs an utterance. 
An opposing view is that gesture is a separate and distinct mode of 
expression with its own properties, which can be brought into a 
cooperative relationship with spoken utterance, the two modes of 
expression being used in a complementary way (see Kendon 1998).
Any utterance is produced in some sort of social situation, it is 
produced under the guidance of some pragmatic aim, it plays a role 
in the interactional setting, it has a content that is being conveyed, 
etc. Gesture may represent some aspects of the content. Depicting a 
path of movement, a mode of action, depicting relations in space 
between objects or entities -  these are what McNeill (1992) has 
called “iconic” gestures. The content that is represented may not be 
descriptions of actual or possible actions, events, spatial relation­
ships, but may be “as i f ’ entities, actions, spatial relationships that 
serve as metaphors for concepts at any level of abstraction (cf. 
McNeill 1992; Calbris 1990; Kendon 1993). Kendon realizes that the 
more abstract and metaphorical the content the gesture pertains to, 
the more likely we are to observe consistencies in the gestural forms 
employed. To the extent that metaphors are socially conventionalized 
we may find that gestures used to represent metaphorical concepts 
will also show social conventionalization.
Many gestures have a pointing component, and many seem to 
be “pure” points. These gestures are under closer investigation in this 
paper. What is pointed to can be actual objects in the world that sur­
rounds the participants (actual object pointing), objects that can have 
a physical location, and do, but are not immediately present (re­
moved object pointing), objects that can have real locations in space,
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but which are not present -  which are given locations for the pur­
poses of current discourse (virtual object pointing), but also things 
that cannot in fact have any sort of object status at all and can have 
no location (metaphorical object pointing).
Pointing gestures -  or rather, gestures which have a clear 
pointing component (Kendon 1998) -  offer themselves as a relatively 
simple kind of gestural action where, by examining the combinations 
of movement, body part and handshape types employed, we might 
rather readily gather data that can bear on the issue of “compo- 
sitionality” in gesture. Kendon has presented an example of two 
people standing and looking at the mountain panorama. One is ex­
plaining the names of the mountains to the other. By extending his 
arm full length, he directs with the index finger his recipient’s atten­
tion to the various peaks. But as he does so, within the frame of each 
successive pointing gesture, he moves his hand in a way that sug­
gests sometimes a curved contour, sometimes a more jagged one. He 
thus combines depictive movement with pointing (Kendon 1998).
However, gestures are not simply symbols, entities for carrying 
meaning about something else, but physical actions with their own 
distinct properties -  for example, they occur at specific moments in 
time and at particular points in space (Goodwin 1986). For the pur­
poses of this paper, the pointing and referring gestures in space may 
be coded as iconic gestures. I would like to refer to A. Merrison 
study (1994) on this issue of iconic gestures. “Iconic gesture -  “Rep­
resentational” gesture visible to the listener. Used for objects, direc­
tions, positions, distances, affirmation and negation (e.g., “drawing” 
the rout/ landmarks in the air; pointing in the directions of the com­
pass; showing estimated distances between thumb and forefinger; 
thumbs-up for affirmation)” (Merrison 1994: 95). In this article the 
working definition of gesture is similar to Kendon’s or Haviland’s: 
the pointing gestures are representationality gestures and they ac­
company speech to depict or represent entities in the space as well as 
the referential content of what is being conveyed by an utterance.
5. Towards cognitivity
In one analysis, McNeill has examined what he called gestures (de­
fined in a way quite similar to Kendon’s notion of the Gesture 
Phrase) in terms of the relationship they exhibited with the concep­
tual structure of the concurrent speech. He has found a close fit
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between the occurrence of a gesture and the occurrence of a speech 
unit expressing whole concepts or relationships between concepts. In 
further analyses McNeill (1979) reports that the “peak” of the ges­
ture (that is to say, the most accented part of the movement which 
Kendon calls the “stroke”) coincides with what was identified as the 
conceptual focal point of the speech unit. McNeill has suggested that 
each new unit of gesture, at least if it is of the sort that can be con­
sidered representational of content, appears with each new unit of 
meaning. Each such gesture manifests, he suggests, a representation 
of each new unit of meaning the utterance presents (Kendon 1986b: 
35). In his later works McNeill (1999) extends these ideas. He has 
put forward some positions about relations of gestures and speech.
(1) Speech and gesture comprise a single system of meaning repre­
sentation. Gesture does not derive from speech, or speech from ges­
ture. Both derive from a deeper idea unit source that they represent 
co-expressively. (2) Imagery is part of utterance meaning. This does 
not mean that utterances automatically refer to imagery but imagery 
grounds categorial content. Dialectic implies that categorial content 
equally affects imagery, as the form of imagery changes in different 
linguistic systems. (3) Content motivates form in gesture. (4) The 
speech-gesture system shows that dynamic imagistic representations 
arise during speaking. These representations are part of the speaker’s 
online thinking for speaking (McNeill 1999: 2).
McNeill’s most important ideas are based on the works of Vy­
gotsky (1962) and Slobin (1987). The underlying idea units are in­
ferred from the totality of communicative events with special focus 
on speech-gesture synchrony and co-expressivity. Following Vy­
gotsky (1962), an idea unit is assumed to be a minimal psychological 
unit; that is, a smallest unit that retains the essential properties of a 
whole, in our case the whole of an image and a linguistically-codi­
fied meaning category, such as McNeill and his associates see in the 
speech-gesture window. They use the gesture’s semantic content and 
its synchrony with spoken linguistic segments to infer the speaker’s 
thought units. Dan Slobin (1987) has introduced a new concept of 
linguistic relativity -  thinking for speaking. He defines it as follows: 
“’Thinking for speaking’ involves picking those characteristics that
(a) fit some conceptualization of the event, and (b) are readily en- 
codable in the language” (Slobin 1987: 435). As McNeill explains,
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the expression, ‘thinking for speaking’ suggests a temporal se­
quence: thinking first, speaking second (McNeill 1999: 6).
Though there is no space for a broader discussion about the lin­
guistic and psychological research trend, it may be said that the idea 
goes back to Vygotsky, and ultimately to Marx. As we know, ac­
cording to Vygotsky, all fundamental cognitive activities take shape 
in a matrix of social history and are products of socio-historical de­
velopment (Luria 1976). That is, cognitive skills and patterns of 
thinking are not primarily determined by innate factors, but are the 
products of the activities practiced in the social institutions of the 
culture in which the individual grows up. Consequently, the history 
of the society in which a child is brought up, and the child’s personal 
history are both crucial determinants of the way in which that indivi­
dual will think. In this process of cognitive development, language is 
a crucial tool for determining the child’s way of thinking because 
advanced modes of thought are transmitted to the child by means of 
words (Murry Thomas 1993).
Vygotsky’s life goal was to create a psychology that would be 
theoretically and methodologically adequate for the investigation of 
consciousness. Since the analysis of consciousness is also a critical 
point in Marxist theories, it is not surprising that Vygotsky uses 
many of Marx’s ideas about the relationship between consciousness 
and practical activity at the societal level and then applies them to 
problems in the psychological analysis of consciousness. Vygotsky 
and Marx share several basic assumptions about the relationships 
between consciousness and activity. First, they both insisted that the 
analysis of consciousness must start with practical activity. Cons­
ciousnesses are constructed through a subject’s interactions with the 
world, which are attributes of the relationship between subject and 
object. Second, the basic components of an analysis of practical ac­
tivity must be interpreted in a functional form. Third, consciousness 
changes as the organization of practical activity changes, entailing 
that an adequate study of consciousness must be historical or genetic. 
Finally, new levels of the organization of practical activity and con­
sciousness presuppose different principles of organization and de­
velopment (Lee 1986: 67). Vygotsky’s greatest importance probably 
lies neither in his Marxism nor his psycholinguistic work, but rather 
in the profound and unique way he introduces a communicative di­
mension to Marxist conceptions of practical activity, thereby pro­
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viding the foundation for a semiotic and functionalist psychology. 
This line of thought makes his contributions valuable not only 
among psychologists, but also among such semioticians as Charles 
Sanders Peirce, Roman Jakobson, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Benjamin 
Whorf (Lee 1986: 66). Let’s turn back to gestures, space and cogni­
tivity.
6. Space and cognitivity
Many researchers have tried to describe how cognitivity is related to 
embodiment. Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991: 172) present very 
much the same argument in their attempt to study cognition not as 
the recovery of a pregiven and labelled outer world (realism) or a 
pregiven inner world (idealism) but as embodied cognition. Image 
schemata are not abstract relations between symbols and the external 
world, the reality, but they organize our experience and under­
standing on the level of physical perception and movements (Armst­
rong, Stokoe, Wilcox 1995: 51-52). Human cognition appears to 
comprehend certain relatively distinct major cognitive systems, 
which include language; perception in general or in its several mo­
dalities like vision, hearing, kinesthesia, etc.; a cognitive system for 
cultural structure, etc., as L. Talmy (1996: 231) has pointed out. 
Each major cognitive system has certain properties of organization; 
many of them are comparable across systems, which means that the 
systems overlap to some extent. The organization of language is per­
haps unique among the cognitive systems, and language has evolved 
later than the other systems, which include hand gestures. Perhaps 
these systems overlap, too. I mean that the conceptual structure of 
language largely overlaps with the structures of the visual, 
kinesthetic, reasoning and understanding systems, less so with the 
systems of affective and cultural structure. Kinesthesia is probably 
one of the earliest perception systems.
According to Spencer, each culture builds up its image of time 
on the basis of its image of space. In order to explain spatial cogni­
tivity, it is important to study the referential and pointing gestures 
that accompany speech. Spatial changes can be characterized, as well 
as experienced, through the bodies that move through space along a 
path or trajectory (Radden 1992: 17-19). In the experiment described 
in this paper, the imaginary journey of the subjects, the journey in a 
person’s mind, does not take place in real time. A human being uses
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as if unreal space -  an imagined journey. It is the space imagined by 
the human being -  a collection of individual items whose constancy 
is secured by the journey. We can categorize spatial change in accor­
dance with process as motion. For example, a verb of motion may 
encode the origin and manner of a movement (e.g., “to rush out o f ’), 
but not the path that is supplied by the gesture. Without the verb, 
however, the gesture may not be recognized as the representation of 
a path. It could also represent the outline of an object, for instance 
(Streeckand Knapp 1992: 12-13).
It’s surprising that neither Greek nor Latin has an exact equiva­
lent to ‘space’. The Greek topos means ‘place’, ‘body location rela­
tive to another body’. The Latin spatium -  from which the English 
and French space-names are derived -  means first of all ‘interval’ or 
‘distance between two bodies’. The Greek khora is closer to the 
modern ‘space’ than topos. But khora also means ‘place’, ‘spot’ or 
'surroundings’ rather than ‘space’. It’s interesting that khora some­
times means ‘interspace’ (or ‘space between’), too. The Aristotelian 
philosophy of space is a theory of topos, not a theory of khora 
(Wright 1996: 105).
There are two different views on the relationships between 
space, time, language and thinking. According to the first position, 
we think about space in the category of time. The other is an oppo­
site position: we think about time in terms of space. Our civilization 
finds it difficult to think in terms of space, and so always negates it, 
substituting the category of time (Frank 1986). The founder of 
psychoanalysis, Freud, noticed that the experience of space is largely 
linked to the unconscious. Just as temporality is foreign to the un­
conscious, he wrote, so space is non-existent for the conscious (Nun- 
berg and Fedren 1979: 285). In his renowned book, Edward T. Hall 
has similarly argued that space remains for most of us The Hidden 
Dimension (1966). These positions have found elaborating and es­
sential support primarily within the theory of overall embodied cog- 
nitivity. Language constrains space and the objects within space, 
both semantically and in cognitive respects. This idea is derived from 
L. Talmy (1983).
Like time, space is not a concrete object accessible to percep­
tion. It is defined as a product of the interconnections established 
between multiple elements simultaneously present in a field. Space is 
thus a plural notion, since forms of grouping will differ for different
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types of material or psychological elements. Concrete spaces have a 
structure different from that of mathematical, logical sets of psycho­
logical groupings. For instance, the interrelations between the mem­
bers of a family, a city, or a region, described from different points of 
view, would present different types of spatial configurations.
It is easy to understand why thinking in terms of space -  that is, 
maintaining a multitude of elements together and interrelated in the 
mind -  is much more difficult for human beings than thinking in 
terms of time. Temporality is established by the simple succession of 
one element after another within the parameters of “before-now- 
after”. But space relates to the ever-changing possibilities of inter­
relationships between a multitude of entities, sharing or not sharing 
some similar characteristics.
Psychology of perception has investigated how human beings 
construct their concept of reality. A first observation recalls that the 
sensorimotor and perceptual relations with reality constitute the 
necessary basis for any further conceptual development in human 
beings. A second outlines a rather paradoxical fact concerning the 
notion of space defined as being made up of the three dimensions of 
height, width, and depth. Only the first two dimensions of space can 
be traced back directly to perceptual correlative data in reality. The 
construction of the dimension of depth does not seem to be based on 
such a connection with specific sensorial stimuli. The depth dimen­
sion is not “seen” as such, like height and width, but is only a 
construct of the perceptual process. In other words, the percept of 
depth appears as the product of internal mental mechanisms working 
on the experience of reality (Saint-Martin 1992).
It follows that space cannot be described in the same way as our 
perception of an object, or part of an object, which we then call ‘a 
tree’ or ‘a color’. The first-acquired human spatial constructs of rea­
lity are based upon a non-EucIidean geometry -  namely, topology, 
which carries a very different set of intuitions (or meanings) about 
matter, relationships, and space. The first spatial organizations deal 
with a reality quite close to the body, and partly internal to it; sub­
sequent organizations concern reality perceived at greater distances. 
The Euclidean representation of space is elaborated later, within and 
upon the basis of topological relations.
Always “hidden” from the senses, the plane of meaning, inter­
preting human experience in the world, refers to various mental and
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emotional operations. Basically nonverbal, semantics finds an exter­
nal representation through the grammatical potentialities of various 
languages, some being verbal and others nonverbal (Saint-Martin
1992).
“But in man’s world -  the world as man sees it and describes it 
in everyday language -  he is, in the most literal sense, the measure of 
all things. Anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism are woven into 
the very fabric of his language.” (Lyons 1977: 690) The English (as 
well as Estonian) system is anthropomorphic in the sense that it takes 
the essential co-ordinates of up/down, front/back, left/right, from the 
oriented human frame. It is egocentric in the sense that the primary 
usage of this system seems to be deictic (‘at my side’, ‘at my front’, 
etc.) -  i.e. it has ego as relatum; as a secondary usage, we can trans­
fer the center of the co-ordinates onto an object, assign it a ‘front’, 
‘back’ and ‘sides’, etc., so that we can use that object as a relatum.
That is no doubt why many deictic terms are normally supple­
mented by gesture. It is one of the best possible solutions to the 
problem of angle-specification as gestures constitute an analogue 
system (offering indefinite subdivisions of arc) while any linguistic 
solution will be digital (offering only a small set of broad angles or 
points). Although a gestural system offers excellent design features 
for face-to-face communication, it will fail totally where visual con­
tact cannot be established. Moreover, it provides a solution to the 
communication problem but not to the conceptual problem, namely, 
how an individual should conceive of angles, remember them, and 
find objects or destinations utilizing them (Levinson 1991: 8). Levin­
son has also found that although the gestures of course accompany 
speech, gestures preserving the fixed bearings of the stimulus often 
occur without explicit mention of the cardinal directions, suggesting 
that the gestures reflect an underlying spatial model, at least partially 
independent of language (Levinson 1996: 124).
7. What may gestures denote?
In some respects, gestures are considered to have the property of ex­
pressing the content of consciousness as words do (Wundt 
1900/1973). This means, in contemporary terms, that gestures and 
words both relate to the mental representations that constitute thin­
king (Kendon 1986a; McNeill 1985, 1999). Some psycholinguistic 
research shows that speech and gesture are probably
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neurophysiologically related (cf. Feyereisen and de Lannoy 1991; 
McNeill 1992). McNeill (1992) has however started to move in a 
more semantic direction and has studied the use of illustrative and 
metaphoric “imagistic” gestures in connection with speech.
As I pointed out earlier, in connection with ideas about thinking 
for speaking, the gesture and the synchronous language entity may 
denote the same underlying ideational unit. According to McNeill 
(1999: 2), the contents of the gesture and the synchronized speech 
need not be identical, and usually they are not. They have related but 
not identical meanings, which McNeill calls ‘со-expressive’. So, if 
the gesture and its synchronized со-expressive linguistic segments 
express the same underlying idea unit, they need not express its 
identical aspects. I understand that such paired use of gesture and 
speech can refer to their inherent uniformity or even to inherent par­
ity. Is the idea unit something like a language of the mind? A lan­
guage of the mind is not something which emerges as a distinctive 
level of cognitive organization from the interaction of a population 
of neurons within the brain. Rather, a language is something that we 
use, and its usage is inherently connected to the embodied nature of 
our interactions with the environment (Teng 1997: 2).
7.1. Substituting role
The studies of how gesticulation is related to the speech it accom­
panies have indicated that it is organized separately, but brought into 
coordination with speech because it is being employed in the service 
of the same overall aim. The detailed rhythmic coordination of ges­
ticulation with speech arises at the level of motor acts. The forms 
that gestures assume are organized directly from original conceptual 
representations in parallel with linguistic forms, but independently of 
them (Kendon 1986b: 35). Gesture and speech must be considered 
separate representational modes which may nevertheless be coor­
dinated and closely associated in an utterance because they may be 
employed together in the service of the same enterprise. A. Kendon 
has shown (1986b) that the utterer is able to employ gesture and 
speech together, but in a differentiated way, each modality playing a 
role complementary to the other in the production of a well-designed 
utterance. A gestural element may be used in alternation with speech. 
Sherzer (1973), in his analysis of the use of the pointed lip gesture 
among the Cuna Indians of Panama has shown how this gesture
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would often be used to stand in for deictic words or for labels for 
objects or places being referred to. He argued that it should be given 
a place in the lexicon of the spoken language. I found similar results 
from the data (though I have never seen a gesture like the ‘lip ges­
ture’ in Estonia in the referring position; the gesture has appeared as 
an emblem, and means something improper). In this paper I labelled 
these pointing gestures communicators, which substitute the word in 
spatial relations. There is no doubt that spoken language has been 
elaborated into a communicative code of extraordinary flexibility and 
generality. Gestures may have important implications for theories of 
mental representation. It is seen that since gestural expressions are 
fully integrated with aspects of speech, they must be planned for to­
gether at the outset. It means that however ideas are stored in our 
heads, they must be stored in a way that allows them to be at least as 
readily encoded in gestural form as in verbal form. There are 
scholars who maintain that ideas are represented in an abstract pro- 
positional format which is the same as the format used to encode 
verbal information (e.g., Pylyshyn 1973). On the other hand, there 
are those who believe that the representation of ideas is modality- 
specific and that visual ideas are encoded in terms of structures that 
are spatial and that are analogous transformations of the things they 
represent (e.g., Shepard 1978). Anderson (1978) suggests that the 
observation that gesture is deployed as an integral part of utterance 
shows that any theory of representation that gives primacy to a repre­
sentational format modeled on spoken language structures will not 
do. A close examination of how gesture and speech are deployed in 
an utterance makes it clear that meanings are not transformed into 
gestural form via spoken language formats. They are transformed 
directly and independently. Thus such meanings, no matter how they 
are stored, are stored in a way that is separate from the formats of 
spoken language, however abstractly these may be conceived (Ken­
don 1986b: 42).
7.2. Anticipating role
Many researchers have suggested that gesture may appear before the 
segment of speech in which the same idea is encoded (see e.g., But- 
terworth and Beattie 1978; Kendon 1980; Hadar and Butterworth 
1997). Gesticular Phrases (Kendon 1980: 224) appear at a very early 
stage in the process of utterance. The way in which the content of an
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utterance appears to be manifested in the Gesticular Phrase suggests 
that the process of utterance has its origin in the organization and 
manipulation of mental representations of images and actions di­
rectly and not, initially, in the organization of forms that can be de­
rived only from verbal language.
In the scientific literature, there currently exist two main theo­
ries about the hand gestures which accompany speech and about 
exactly what these hand movements are doing. First of all, let us re­
fer to David McNeill’s (1979, 1985) central thesis that ‘Gestures 
share with speech a computational stage; they are, accordingly, parts 
of the same psychological structure. The metaphor of a shared com­
putational stage captures the processing aspects of speech: that sen­
tences and gestures develop internally together as psychological per­
formances. The metaphor of a common psychological structure cap­
tures the idea that speech and gesture respond to the same forces at 
the same time’ (McNeill 1985: 350). This theoretical perspective 
differs radically from the more traditional theory of speech and ges­
ture, which maintains that gestures represent quite separate channels 
of communication conveying different information from the related 
speech (Argyle 1975). In McNeill’s theory, speech and gesture 
cooperate to present a single cognitive representation (McNeill 
1985).
This theory contrasts with the other main contemporary theory, 
namely, that of Butterworth and Hadar (1989). They also use empi­
rical observations on natural speech and gesture, but the story that 
they tell from this empirical data seems to be quite different. They 
cite the early research by Butterworth and Beattie (1978), who pre­
sented an example highlighting other possible relationships between 
speech and iconic gesture.
‘when certain problems can be raised’
[hand starts to rise on the word ‘certain’]
The iconic gesture here does not seem to convey any additional se­
mantic information to that conveyed in the linguistic utterance, and 
in McNeill’s terms, to get the full cognitive representation that the 
speaker has in mind, only the linguistic part of the message really 
needs to be taken into account. In other words, the gesture appears to 
be redundant. But what is interesting about this example, according 
to the researchers, is that the gesture (the hand rising) begins a good
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deal in advance of the lexical item with which it is associated (i.e., 
the word ‘raised’), actually being uttered (Bettie and Shovelton 
1999: 3). This seems to show that ‘the speaker knew what the word 
would be, or at least had a pretty good idea, well before he uttered it’ 
(Butterworth and Beattie 1978: 348).
Butterworth and Beattie (1978) then presented some empirical 
evidence to show that this temporal asynchrony between gestures 
and speech was common in samples of spontaneous speech, and that 
hand gestures were associated with low-frequency unpredictable 
lexical items -  the lexical items most difficult for speakers to access 
in the course of linguistic production (see Goldman-Eisler 1958; 
Beattie and Butterworth 1979). Their conclusion was that ‘Gestures 
are products of lexical preplanning process, and seem to indicate that 
the speaker knows in advance the semantic specification of the 
words he will utter, and in some cases has to delay if he has to search 
for a relatively unavailable item’ (Butterworth and Beattie 1978: 
358).
Morrel-Samuels and Krauss (1992) have also produced empiri­
cal evidence to support Butterworth and Beattie (1978) regarding the 
temporal asynchrony between gestures and the associated lexical 
items. They found that ‘gesture onset preceded voice onset by an 
interval whose magnitude was inversely related to the lexical af­
filiate’s rated familiarity (Morrel-Samuels and Krauss 1992: 615). 
The more familiar the lexical item, the smaller the temporal asynch­
rony. They suggest that ‘the hypothesis that gestures do facilitate 
speech production is at least plausible’ (Morrel-Samuels and Krauss 
1992: 620). From the data I also found that the pointing gestures 
might image (to denote) the most important concept in the sentence 
that followed.
As Kendon already pointed out (1986a), meanings are not trans­
formed into gestural form by way of spoken language formats. They 
are transformed directly, and independently. But, some point of 
contact should exist between gestures and language. This point of 
contact could, however, also be seen as a flow of the information. 
Miao (1996) has presented some basic assumptions about informa­
tion processing, which may help to work on gestural research con­
nection with language and overall human cognition.
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8. Method
In the following sections I concentrate on the pointing and iconic 
gestures that accompany speech in the context of spatial relations. I 
examine the data according to the theoretical considerations outlined 
above. Many studies of iconic gestures are based on the retelling of 
cartoon stories. On the one hand, we need exact experiments. On the 
other hand, as Beattie and Shovelton (1999) have pointed out, we 
need the studies of gestures in everyday conversation, too. In this pa­
per, the pointing gestures were studied together with Estonian 
(Finno-Ugric) verbal expressions. The examples come from an ex­
periment where the subjects had to go on an imaginary journey and 
describe it to another person, the “guest”. En route the “guest” was 
shown some historic and cultural sights. The subjects did not know 
that the goal of the experiment was to investigate the gestures. They 
worried about their knowledge of history. All of them know the re­
gion of the town well enough to image the journey and to describe it. 
Each “guide” “went” from the starting point to the destination in 10 
minutes (narrative time). 11 subjects were videotaped. Two aspects 
were analyzed: (1) the gestures that indicated space, spatial relations, 
or spatiotemporal relations, (2) the concomitant words or phrases. 
The gestures that indicated spatial relations were studied together 
with the concomitant Estonian-language expressions. The aim of this 
experiment, which involved face-to-face interaction, was to under­
stand space-relation gestures and coverbal speech in face-to-face 
interaction.
9. Results
It appears that for some concepts the interlocutor must add a gesture 
to make oneself fully understood. It seems that people automatically 
pick up information that is only present in gestures. The data indicate 
that people often use words like ‘this’, ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘this over 
there’ and ‘on the left’ or ‘on the right’ to express which object can 
be seen on the way. Estonian ‘that’ (Est. ‘too’) never appeared, 
though three subjects were bom in Tartu, in region where ‘that’ (Est. 
‘too’) should be familiar. The other subjects came from the west and 
the center of Estonia. In the west and center of Estonia ‘that’ (Est. 
‘too’) does not exist in spoken language or in the dialects. The poin­
ting gestures which had an independent meaning and which subs-
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tituted the word I named communicators, the gestures indicating ‘this 
over there’, ‘this over here’, etc., which appeared before the most 
important concept of the sentence points and pre-points.
(1) “Groping”.
Conversation often begins with “groping” each other, and only 
after such an introduction people get more relaxed and gestures ap­
pear in the conversation (see also Tenjes 1996: 178). In this case the 
gestures also appeared not just at the beginning of face-to-face inter­
action but some time later when the interactants had already got used 
to each other.
(2) Communicators.
It appears that the pointing gestures which indicate spatial rela­
tions perform a strongly communicative role. It means that subjects 
pointed to the left or to the right, etc. with (‘to the left, you can see’ 
+ motion to the left) or without concomitant words (‘here’ + motion 
to the left/right). The extra meaning is communicated by means of 
the gesture. As Levinson, Haviland et al. have showed, many deictic 
terms are supplemented by gesture. The pointing gesture has an in­
dependent meaning and it substitutes the word which marks the spa­
tial relations. It is very common. Some examples will be given be­
low.
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Examples
(1) (See figure 1.)
Siin on_____________ülikooli______________ tennisevaliaku-d1.
here be-PRES-3SG university-SG-GEN tennis+court-PL-NOM
Siin saa-b mängi-da tennis-t. 
here can-3SG play-iNFINIT tennis-SG-PRT
‘Here are the university’s tennis courts. Here one can play tennis.’
Figure 1.
1 The underlined part of the utterance indicates at what moment the 
gesture was made.
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(2) (See figure 2.)
Ja siis see väike maia____________ siin on
and then this little house-SG-NOM here be-PRES'3SG
humanitaarraamatukogu.
humanities+library-SG-NOM
‘And then this little house here is the library of the humanities.'
Figure 2.
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(3) (See figure 3.)
Jakobi mägi. Ja siia_______ iää-b
Jacob-GEN hill-SG-NOM and over-here stay-PRES-3SG
nüüd “Krooks” . See on kella
now “Krooks” it be-PRES-3SG clock-SG-GEN
kaheteistkümne-st kella kuue-ni
twelve-SG-ELA clock-SG-GEN six-SG-TER
hommiku-l ava-tud ja päris selline ... lahe koht.
morning-SG-ADE open-PRT and quite such ... cool place-SG-NOM
‘Jacob’s Hill. And the “Krooks” pub is over here now. It is open from 
twelve until six in the morning and it’s a ra the r... cool place.’
Figure 3.
Thus, in face-to-face interaction the pointing gestures have strongly 
communicative value in the context of direction with regard to the 
egocentric coordinate system ( ‘left’, ‘right’, ‘here’, ‘there’).
(3) Points and pre-points.
The gesture indicating ‘this over there’, ‘this over here’, etc. 
appeared very often before the most important concept of the sen­
tence. The concept mostly denoted an object or the shape of a path. 
According to Kendon, the depictive movement combines with 
pointing. So the hand starts to point the direction, and moves simul­
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taneously to denote the shape of the crucial concept (‘from here’ + 
image the street below or ‘look down’ + shape of the bridge or ‘here’ 
+ shape of the statue).
Examples2
(4) (See figure 4.)
< ->  4—>
Siit alt lähe-b läbi Lossi
from here from below go-PRES-3SG through castle-GEN
tänav.
street-SG-NOM  
‘Lossi Sreet is below us.’
Hand (forefinger) points ‘from here’ and at the same time starts to 
image the street below.
Figure 4.
2 The arrows show the main type of the hand movement.
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(5) (See figure 5.)
Kui te nüüd siit mäe-st alla
when you now from here hill-SG-ELA down
Г1
vaata-te, vaat sealt paista-b
look-PRES-2PL look! from there be seen-PRES-3SG
Kuradisild.
devil+bridge-SG-NOM
‘When you look down from this hill now, look, you can see the Devil’s 
Bridge over there.’
Hand refers to ‘look dow n ' and at the same time starts to image the 
shape o f  the bridge.
Figure 5.
Tenjes 241
(6) (See figure 6.)
\
Vene aja-l seis-i-s siin ...
Russian-GEN time-SG-ADE stand-PST-3SG here
selle ees muidugi suur Lenin. 
this-GEN in front of course big Lenin
‘During the Russian time... a big Lenin was of course standing in front 
of this.’
Hand (forefinger) points ‘here’ and at the same time images the 
shape of the statue.
Figure 6.
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10. Conclusion
This study indicates that
(1) the gestures also appeared not at the initial stage of face-to- 
face interaction but some time later;
(2) the pointing gestures which indicate spatial relations have a 
strongly communicative role and they may substitute the word which 
marks the spatial relations;
(3) referring gestures have two simultaneous roles: (a) to point 
to the spatial relations and (b) to image (to denote) the most impor­
tant concept in the sentence that followed. There is a clear semantic 
link between the gesture and the single underlined word in the ac­
companying speech (Hadar and Butterworth 1997: 152). It means 
that the gesture and the language have a common base. But is it a 
unit? According to overall human cognition, the underlying connec­
tion between the gesture and the word may be a process or a certain 
type of information. As Bouissac has said poetically, gestures can be 
construed as embodiments of information between intending and 
understanding minds (Bouissac 2000). There should be an overlap­
ping area between gestures and concepts. It shows connections in the 
deep psychological level in the human mind. Heterogeneity is an 
ancient property of human consciousness, and this mechanism re­
quires the presence of at least two systems that would not be ulti­
mately translatable into each other (Lotman 1999).
According to Spencer, the more developed the entirety, the 
more it has divided  into parts according to function. Secondly, the 
more developed it is, the more integral its parts are to the functioning 
of the entirety (Wright 1996: 33). It seems that this statement can be 
postulated for both gestures and human language. To what degree 
does a gesture depend on the peculiarity of language? To what extent 
can we speak about universality? The pointing gestures in spatial 
relations do not seem to depend on a specific language. The unit 
point or the unit process lies deeper in human cognition. What could 
be innate about the language ability could have a non-linguistic 
character. Spatial information is encoded both in spoken language 
and the concomitant iconic gesture. Similarly to linguistic units, the 
gestures are also symbols, that is, pairs of meaning and form. Exactly 
what kind of meaning is conveyed by gestures remains an open 
question. One might say that in a broader perspective the gesture is
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the important link between perception, conceptualization, and lan­
guage development.
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Žestid suhtluses ning nende kasutamine 
osutamisel ja viitamisel ruumis. Eestikeelsed näited
Silvi Tenjes
Antud uurimistöös on tähelepanu all osutavad ja viitavad žestid, mis 
kaasnevad kõnega ruumisuhete kontekstis. Teoreetilises osas käsitletakse 
žestide klassifitseerimisega ja määratlemisega seotud probleeme. Osuta­
vaid ja viitavaid žeste pole lihtne üheselt määratleda. Osaliselt on need 
ikoonilised žestid (sh nt ingl referring gestures -  ‘viitavad žestid’), osalt 
lihtsalt osutavad (nt ingl pointing gestures -  ‘osutavad žestid’), mida 
klassifitseeritakse pigem eraldiseisvatena. Sellega seoses käsitletakse 
teoreetilises osas põgusalt C. S. Peirce’i klassikalisi seisukohti märgi 
ikoonilisest ja indeksilisest dimensioonist. Edasi on võrdlevalt vaatluse 
all eelkõige D. McNeill’i ja A. Kendoni žestikäsitlused, aga ka teised 
autorid. Võrreldakse McNeill’i ja A. Kendoni žestide jaotust ning osuta­
vate žestide käsitlust seoses kõnega. Peatutakse ka D. McNeill’i kogni­
tiivsete seisukohtade lähtealustel (Võgotski, Slobin). Ruumi ja kogni- 
tiivsuse seosed on vaatluse all laiemalt. Teoreetilise osa lõpus püütakse 
leida žestide seoseid mentaalse representatsiooniga.
Lähtudes eelnevatest teoreetilistest seisukohtadest, uuritakse osuta­
vaid žeste koos eestikeelsete verbaalsete väljenditega. Näited on 
eksperimendist, kus katseisikud pidid “mõttes” läbima teatud teekonna ja 
kirjeldama seda teisele isikule, “külalisele”. Teekonnal tutvustati “küla­
lisele” teele jäävaid ajaloolis-kultuurilisi vaatamisväärsusi. Katseisikud
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ei teadnud, et uuritakse žeste, nad muretsesid eelkõige oma ajalooliste 
teadmiste pärast. Kõik tundsid kirjeldatavat piirkonda linnas niipalju, et 
teekonda ette kujutada ja sellest rääkida. Filmiti ühtteist (11) katseisikut. 
Analüüsiti (1) žeste, millega osutati ruumis, ruumiseostes või ajalis-ruu- 
milistes seostes; (2) milliste sõnadega või fraasidega žestid kaasnesid. 
Seega, uuriti ruumisuhteid tähistavaid osutavaid žeste koos kaasnevate 
eestikeelsete väljenditega.
Uurimus näitas, et 1) žestid ilmnevad mitte kohe vestluse algul, vaid 
mõni aeg hiljem; 2) osutavatel žestidel, mis tähistavad ruumisuhteid, on 
tugev kommunikatiivne roll ja nad võivad asendada sõna, mis tähistab 
ruumisuhet; 3) osutavatel žestidel on kaks rolli samal ajal: a) osutada 
ruumisuhetes ja b) kujutada (viidata) kõige olulisemale mõistele lauses, 
mis järgneb. Ruumiline info on kodeeritud nii kõneldavasse keelde kui 
kaasnevasse ikoonilisse žesti. Peab olema kattuv ala žestide ja mõistete 
vahel. See näitab seoseid sügaval inimmõistuse või inimvaimu psühho­
loogilisel tasandil. Vastavalt inimese üldisele kognitiivsusele võib alu­
seks olev seos žesti ja sõna vahel olla protsess või teatud liiki informat­
sioon.
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focussed linguistic units 
stress or emphasis 
truncation




pause length in tenths of a second 
lengthening of a sound 
a laughter syllable 
laughter
smiling quality
words pronounced with ingressive airflow 
breathing in, the estimated relative length corres 
ponds to the number of h-s
breathing out, the estimated relative length corres
ponds to the number of h-s
same as above but with closed mouth
difficult to hear what was said but the number of
syllables can be judged, X or - corresponds to one
syllable
transcriber’s best guess of what was said
something has been left out in the example
falling intonation







name, particle, or an abbreviation of a grammatical 
category
clitic -gi (a phonological variant of the clitic -ki/-gi) 
the item was not there in the original
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In the first part of the article, I focus my attention on nonverbal communication 
in society and the new perspective of investigating communication through 
symbolic units. The theoretical part deals with problems related to the paradigm 
of imagistic language, which is connected with gestures’ research. In the second 
part, I concentrate on two types of gestures and their use in face-to-face 
interaction. Gestures of the first type appear during pauses or in word searches 
in the conversation, etc. Gestures of the second type are pointing gestures that 
accompany speech in the context of spatial relations. Both types of gestures are 
referred to as iconic gestures. The gestures share the quality of appearing before 
the lexical unit in the sentence to which they relate in meaning. I also provide 
some examples and discussion about the onset of the iconic gestures and their 
lexical affiliate.
1. Introduction
The work of Birdwhistell (1970), Dittmann (1974), Kendon (1986b, 1995), 
Scheflen (1973), Bavelas, et al. (1992), and many others clearly shows how 
body movements and the flow of speech are intimately linked within an 
individual’s communication system and between interactants. While some 
behaviors may seem less integrated than others, verbal and nonverbal behaviors 
are unquestionably part and parcel of the same overall system of communica­
tion. Just like verbal communication, each body expression or vocal sign con­
veys a meaningful message, which can be received and processed by other 
people. According to the definition of communication by Weaver, commu­
nication will be used ... in a very broad sense to include all of the procedures by 
which one mind can affect another” (Shannon, Weaver 1959). The term com­
munication has two related meanings: the process of transmission of the
44
Gestures as pre-positions 2
message, and the outcome of this process. The transmission process will 
generally be referred to as “interaction” (Schneller 1992).
Nonverbal expressions are also used to transmit messages not expressible 
through words, when words are not available or are inadequate to convey 
sufficient differences, e.g.: emotional and physical feelings, moods, interest, 
attention, reaction, etc. Nonverbal communication also comprises a wide range 
of social functions, for instance: transmission of information, integration of 
action and feelings, social identity, the presentation and protection of the self 
(Eisenberg and Smith 1971). Nonverbal means may even contradict the verbal 
message, usually unconsciously so, creating a state of “double-edged” or 
inconsistent communication (Mehrabian 1971). It is mainly the abstract compo­
nent and content of human communication that is dominated by words, 
although even in this domain, verbal communication enjoys functional non­
verbal support (Schneller 1992).
Gesticulation is often an important component of the utterance unit pro­
duced, in the sense that the utterance unit cannot be fully comprehended unless 
its gestural component is taken into consideration. In many instances it can be 
shown that the gesticulatory component has a complementary relationship to 
what is encoded in words, so that the full significance of the utterance can only 
be grasped if both words and gesture are taken into account (Kendon 1986a). In 
the present article I consider hand gestures, which are also a type of nonverbal 
means. Those gestures are iconic gestures. I also explore their use in interaction. 
Iconic gestures occur during continuous speech and show in their form a 
meaning related to the meaning articulated in speech. In most cases the related 
speech unit is a word, called the “lexical affiliate” (Schegloff 1984a) of the 
gesture (Hadar, Butterworth 1997).
2. “Imagistic” language in communication.
In recent years, there has been renewed interest in and credibility given to the 
examination of visible and verbal behavior as they occur in natural conversation 
(Poyatos 1980). This means interest in “verbal features,” —  that is, human 
language and its “progressional” structuring in real time communication. Such a 
view supports the view of “grammar as symbolism” and “meaning as con­
ceptualization” (Langacker 1988). In order to understand how language works 
and how meaning is constructed, it is necessary to focus on how language 
works in interaction. On the basis of a progressional view of language one can 
understand more clearly the cooperation of verbal and visual features in human 
communication.
It is useful to remember the emergence of new ideas in linguistics, and “how 
it was” in the paradigm of cognition. According to Langacker, language ana­
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lysis should posit that language is symbolic at all its levels, i.e., that gram­
matical constructions are “schematic, less specific, symbolic units” which “em­
body conversational imagery.” “In choosing a particular expression or construc­
tion, a speaker construes the conceived situation in a certain way, i.e., he selects 
one particular image (from a range of alternatives) to structure its conceptual 
content for expressive purposes” (Langacker 1988:7). At a level of greater 
specificity, speakers have vast ranges of options to choose among lexical units, 
each of which profiles objects, processes, qualities, etc. in a particular way.
In this symbolic alternative, grammatical structure itself is inherently 
meaningful, consisting solely of patterns for the structuring and symbolization 
of conceptual content. By choosing one grammatical construction or gram­
matical marker rather than another, one is inherently choosing to construe and 
portray a situation in a particular way —  the difference in form symbolizes a 
meaning difference (Langacker 1990).
Languages, thus, provide their speakers with vast and constantly evolving 
stocks of symbolic units which enable them to conceptualize and represent 
content in a subjective, situationally adapted, and “recipient designed” fashion 
(Streeck and Knapp 1992). Whenever a speaker constructs an utterance, he or 
she “instantiates” units with which he/she describes the process as an impo­
sition of a “profile” onto a given “base” . While languages are repertoires of 
symbolic units and supply “conventional imagery” (Langacker 1988) for con­
ceptualization and expression, there is no categorical boundary between 
repertoire and use. Conceptualization is incorporated in material forms. Fully 
evolved languages provide speakers with vast resources for “alternative” 
conceptualizations, and since everything that has become part of the repertoire 
ultimately derives from creative, situated inventions, much of language struc­
ture is inherently metaphorical. This “imagistic” view of language differs from 
the majority position in communication studies by declaring that “meaning” is a 
feature of —  and at the same time inseparable form —  “material symbols”.
Many researchers have attempted to describe how cognition is related to 
physical embodiment. Image schemata are not abstract relations between 
symbols and some objective, external reality; rather, they organize our expe­
rience and understanding at the level of body perception and movement. Varela, 
et al. (1991) present very much the same argument in their attempt to study 
cognition not as the recovery of a pregiven and labeled outer world (realism) or 
a pregiven inner world (idealism) but as embodied cognition. Communication 
is, thus, an “embodied” process. Rather than using “verbal” and “nonverbal” 
aspects as separate systems, interactants use all of the sensory modalities 
associated with the body.
Just as a hearer perceives speech, whether comprehended or not, as “figure”, 
no matter what the “ground” may be, and just as speech is always regarded as 
fully intentional and intentionally communicative, movements, if they are made
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so that they have certain dynamic characteristics, will be perceived as “figure” 
against the “ground” of other movement, and such movements will be regarded 
as fully intentional and intentionally communicative. We may recognize a 
number of features that a movement may have. Any movement a person pro­
duces may share these features to a lesser or greater degree. The more it does 
so, the more likely the movement is to be given privileged status in the attention 
of another and the more likely it is to be seen as part of the individual’s effort to 
convey meaning. What are normally called “gestures” are those movements that 
partake of these features of manifest deliberate expressiveness to the fullest 
extent. They are movements at the extreme end of the scale, so to speak 
(Kendon 1986b). The word “gesture” serves as a label for that domain of visible 
action that participants routinely separate out and treat as governed by openly 
acknowledged communicative intent.
3. What is gesture? Classification of gestures
There have been various competing classifications of gestures in the literature, 
though the terminology has often been somewhat misleading (see, for example 
McNeill 1985; Feyereisen and de Lannoy 1991). Typologies of gesture often 
involve two broad crosscutting dimensions: represen ta tionality , and convention  
or autonom y  (Haviland 1996: 11). The first dimension has to do with whether 
and how the bodily movements that accompany speech depict or represent the 
referential content of what is being conveyed by an utterance. Some gestures 
seem tailored to the “meaning” of speech, via various semiotic modalities, 
whereas others, for example, appear to be more closely aligned with the rhythm 
of speech. The various typologies of gestures that have been put forward are in 
part attempts to classify gestures in terms of the information they encode, albeit 
at very general levels. These typologies are often logically inconsistent, in many 
cases formed on the basis of rather hasty observation with a good admixture of 
“folk” categories thrown in (Kendon 1998). One of the best is the one put 
forward by David Efron (1941/1972). Ekman and Friesen paper of 1969, one of 
the most cited in the literature, presents Efron’s ideas in a more systematic way, 
but some of the subtlety of Efron’s original discussion is lost.
According to David Efron’s influential views, the problem of determining 
the factors that condition the gestural behavior of a given human group cannot 
be solved by speculative assumptions nor by vague generalizations. There are 
only two legitimate ways of approaching it: (a) the experimental, (b) the 
historical. He has given an example (Efron 1972: 44):
Foreigners talk with their arms and hands as auxiliaries to the voice. The
custom is considered vulgar by us calm Englishmen. ... You have no need to act
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with the hands, but, if  you use them at all, it should be very slightly and 
gracefully, never bringing down a f is t  upon the table, nor slapping one hand 
upon another, nor poking your fingers a t your interlocutor. Pointing, too, is a 
habit to be avoided, especially pointing with the thumb over the shoulder, which 
is an inelegant action. ... You should not be too lively in your actions. ...
Thus reads a passage in a treatise on good manners of the Victorian period.1 
Similar passages may be found in many other social codes of that period. The 
English gentleman of 1870 does not seem to have considered gesticulation an 
innate impropriety, characteristic only of certain non-“Nordic” groups, but 
merely a “foreign” vulgar custom, disliked by “us calm Englishmen”. He seems 
to have assumed, however, that a ll Englishmen of all times were as calm and 
parsimonious in their expressive bodily motions as were apparently the habitues 
of his club. Had he spent some time looking through the window of history, 
instead of leisurely watching from his club window the sidewalks of an exclu­
sive section of Victorian London, he might have learned that a good many of 
his ancestors of the Georgian epoch used to gesticulate as warmly as the 
“foreigners” of his own lifetime (Efron 1972: 45).
The time has come now to investigate gestures, even different kind of 
pointing gestures, which would have been so vulgar an activity in the 19th 
century. McNeill (1985) claims that gestures that ordinarily accompany speech 
can and often do serve referential functions. He also reports on an exhaustive 
study of gestures that accompany speech and comes to several conclusions 
about the nature of gestures (at least those that accompany speech):
1. Iconics depict, by the form of the gesture, some feature of the action or 
event being described; such as “he climbed up the pipe” accompanied by the 
hand raising upwards to show the path (Cassell, McNeill, McCullough 1999: 5). 
“An iconic gesture is one that in form and manner of execution exhibits a 
meaning relevant to the simultaneously expressed linguistic meaning. Iconic 
gestures have a formal relation to the semantic content of the linguistic unit” 
(McNeill 1985: 354). He also says that “Iconic gestures are typically large 
complex movements that are performed relatively slowly and carefully in the 
central gesture space”. He also claims that such gestures accompany “only 
sentences classified as narrative” (1985: 359).
2. M etaphoric gestu res  are also representational, but the concept being 
depicted has no physical form. An example is “the meeting went on and on” 
accompanied by a hand indicating rolling motion. Some common metaphoric 
gestures are the “process metaphoric” just illustrated, and the “conduit 
metaphoric”, which objectifies the information being conveyed, representing it 
as a concrete object that can be held between the hands and given to the listener.
1 Cf. The Habits o f Good Society: A Handbook fo r  Ladies and Gentlemen. By the man 
in the Club Window (London, Low and Co., 1870) pp. 284-285.
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“Metaphoric gestures are like iconic gestures in that they exhibit a meaning 
relevant to the concurrent linguistic meaning. However, the relation to the 
linguistic meaning is indirect. Metaphoric gestures exhibit images of abstract 
concepts. In form and manner of execution, metaphoric gestures depict the 
vehicles of metaphors” (1985: 356).
3. Deictics spatialize, or locate aspects of the story being narrated in the 
physical space in front of the narrator; such as “Adam looked at Chuck, and he 
looked back” accompanied by a hand pointing first to the left and then to the 
right.
4. Beat gestures: small baton-like movements that do not change in form 
with the content of the accompanying speech. A beat is a “simple and rapid 
hand movement of a type that usually accompanies words whose importance 
depends on multisentence text relations” (1985: 354). Beats are not iconic in 
nature.
A. Kendon (1998) has set out in broad terms what appear to be the main ways 
in which gestures are used. Gestures (i.e. phrases of bodily action that have the 
characteristics that permit them to be “recognized” as components of intentional 
communicative action) may be:
• utterances on their own
• they may be employed as components of utterances in alternation with
speech
• they may be employed in conjunction with speech
Gestures usually mean hand movements. It was said that gesture is behavior 
that is treated as intentionally communicative and that such behavior has certain 
features which are immediately recognizable (Kendon 1986b). A gesture is a 
hand movement accompanying speech and acquiring its meaning in the context 
of conversation, or possessing a language-independent meaning (Tenjes 1996). 
However, gestures are not simply symbols, entities for carrying meaning about 
something else, but physical actions with their own distinct properties —  for 
example, they occur at specific moments in time and at particular points in 
space (Goodwin 1986). Pointing and referring gestures in space may be coded 
as iconic gestures. In this article the working definition of these gestures is 
similar to Kendon’s or Haviland’s: pointing gestures are representational 
gestures and they accompany speech to depict or represent entities in space, as 
well as the referential content of what is being conveyed by an utterance.
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4. Iconic gestures
Iconic gestures have been said to be “intrinsically coded”, i.e., they bear natural 
resemblance to the entities they denote. Iconic gestures provide spatial repre­
sentations of shapes, sizes, motions, etc., but these profiles are elaborated and 
become recognizable “as” representations by virtue of the adjacency of other 
gestural units since what an iconic gesture provides is “filled in” with the 
semantic profiles of the words spoken (Streeck and Knapp 1992). Iconic 
gestures are used to display objects, spatial relations, and actions (e.g., 
illustrating the orientation of two robots at a collision scene) (Drakos 1994). I 
agree with Hadar and Butterworth (1997) that the meaning of an iconic gesture 
is typically vague. Whilst iconic gestures often have recognizable physical 
features, their meaning can seldom be derived from their form with any degree 
of certainty. The shape and dynamics of an iconic gesture are not sufficient to 
derive its meaning, which requires also the identification of that part of the 
verbal message to which the gesture relates.
Any utterance is produced in some sort of social situation; it is produced 
under the guidance of some pragmatic aim; it plays a role in the interactional 
setting; it has a content that is being conveyed, etc. Some aspects of the content 
may be represented by a gesture. Gestures depicting a path of movement, a 
mode of action, relations in space between objects or entities are what McNeill 
(1992) has called “iconic” gestures. The content that is represented need not be 
descriptions of actual or possible actions, events, spatial relationships, but may 
be “as i f ’ entities, actions, spatial relationships that serve as metaphors for con­
cepts at any level of abstraction (cf. McNeill 1992; Calbris 1990; Kendon 
1993).
An iconic gesture is typically placed at the onset of or just prior to the 
speech unit to which it relates (Kendon 1983). It means, that the gesture “fore­
shadows” that unit. It aids listeners in the operation of understanding by 
enabling foresight. Iconic gestures “project” upcoming components of talk 
(Streeck 1988).
5. Points as foreshadowed gestures
Gesture-types similarly placed (i.e., pre-positioned) are “points” (Schegloff 
1984b). These are brief motions of the hand with the thumb extended, often in a 
direction away from or to the back of the speaker, and foreshadowing “they”, 
“there”, or “then” (Sreeck, Knapp 1992: 13). They pre-indicate the distance 
location in time or space of an entity about to be referred to in speech. While 
“points” are brief and not visibly attended to by the participants, they are also 
distinct from acts of pointing to locations in the real environment of the inter­
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action. Both of these gestures —  “points” and pointing gestures — are under 
closer investigation in this paper.
Iconic gestures (“points”) foreshadow types of activities the speaker is about 
to be engaged in — for instance, types of speech acts — or to project features of 
the upcoming utterance such as a list. What makes these gestures difficult for 
the analyst to understand is the fact that they often seem to stand in a loosely 
metaphorical relationship to the actions they project. In other words, while they 
project features of “linguistic” action, their imagery draws upon other action 
domains.
The following are some examples about iconic gestures as points or fore­
shadowed gestures used in an interview. The material is recorded in a Tartu TV 
studio, Estonia. The interviewer (marked by initials PU) talks to well-known 
people in Estonian society from the Soviet period, the so-called stagnation 
period. Here I have used one of the interviews where the interviewer PU and the 
respondent KK are talking in a theatre’s backstage room in 1994. The interview 
has been transcribed in detail: speech together with all accompanying hand 
gestures. The underlined part of the utterance indicates at what moment 
(parallel to) the words the gesture was performed. In all cases the question and 
answer contain more than one utterance.
Examples (l)-(3 ):
(1) PU and the Professor of the Department of Drama (henceforth KK) talk 
about the KGB (State Security Committee) during the Soviet period.
1.1.PU :A ga tul-i seda ette?
but come-PST that+PRT up+ADVERB OF PLACE
‘But did it happen?’
1.2. KK: [—] Aga kui palju ol-i ne-i-d
but how many be-PST-3PL these-PL-PRT
asj-u, kus järgmine (1) hommik kell
things-PL-PRT where next moming+SG+NOM clock+SG+NOM
(2) üheksa juba julgeoleku-st helista-t-i, et mis
nine already security-SG-ELA call up-IMPERS-PST that what
su poisi-d eile teg-i-d?
your+GEN's SHORT FORM boy-PL-NOM yesterday do-PST-3PL
Vaat nii.
look+lMPERATIVE’s SHORT FORM so
‘But how many times it happened that next (1) morning already (2) at nine there 
was a call from the KGB asking what your guys were up to yesterday? There 
you are.’
(1), (2) —  raises his right hand briefly and points forward.
These brief gestures point to the following and important part of the utterance: a 
call from the KGB. The gestures convey a sense of ambiguity: they visualize 
time and a forthcoming object; they foreshadow the importance of this object. 
As iconic gestures, they “project” upcoming components of talk.
(2)
2.1. PU: Vaada-tes nüüd pilgu-ga
look-DECLINABLE FORM OF VERB now glance-SG-COMIT
tagasi, siis kes ol-i lavakunstikateedri
back then who be-PST-3SG Drama+Department+SG+GEN
juhataja enne, kui teie sinna jõud-si-te?
head+SG+NOM before when you to that place reach-PST-2PL
‘Looking back now, who was the head of the Drama Department before you 
came there?’
2.2. [—] KK: Ja ( l)  siis ol-i__________Eedu Tinn. Ja (2) tema siis
and then be-PST-3SG Eedu Tinn and he then
läks__________ mine-ma ia (3) see koht jä-i
go+PST+3SG go-INFINIT and this place+SG+NOM stay-PST-3SG
vakantse-ks. 
vacant-SG-TER
‘And (1) then there was Eedu Tinn. And (2) he then went away and (3) 
this position was left vacant.’
(l)-(2 ) —  points briefly forward with the forefinger
(3) —  turns the hand and points briefly forward with the thumb
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There are three points, gestures that refer briefly to then, he and this, 
respectively. The gesture appears just before the word. The first point stresses 
the time (“then”) and at the same time foreshadows the object (Eedu Tinn). The 
second point refers to the same object (“he”) in the second utterance. And the 
third one refers to the distance location in time (“... and this was a vacant 
place”). J. Cassell et al. have a viewpoint that the demonstrative “this” may be 
seen as a placeholder for the syntactic role of the accompanying gesture 
(Cassell, McNeill, McCullough 1999).
(3) PU has wondered how KK took over the position of the head of department.
3 .1 .K K :[—] Ja, ja, ja  siis, noh ... (1) veelkord ütle-n. et
yes yes yes then well again+once say-PRES-lSG that
Venno Laul teg-i ettepaneku.
Venno Laul make-PST-3SG proposal+SG+GEN
‘Yea, yes, and then, well ... (1) I repeat again that Venno Laul made the 
proposal/
(1) —  a slight flick forward with the right hand’s forefinger
The gesture of KK expresses firmly the speaker’s position: all that he says is 
true. At the same time the gesture introduces the following utterance whereby 
the speaker explains the circumstances. Thus, this gesture projects features of 
the follow-up utterance.
Each gesture is constructed differently. Generally, all gestures are initiated 
far before the speech-unit to which they “belong” . They preface speech units 
and prefigure the concepts communicated by them (Streeck 1995). They, thus, 
enable recipients to anticipate conceptual profiles of subsequent talk. The 
semantic relationship between the profiles supplied by the gesture and those 
encoded in lexical units are manifold.
6. Pointing gestures as pre-points in space
Many gestures have a pointing component, and many seem to be “pure” points. 
These gestures are also under closer investigation in this paper. What is pointed 
to can be actual objects in the world that surrounds the participants (actual 
object pointing), objects that can have a physical location, and do, but are not 
immediately present (removed object pointing), objects that can have real 
locations in space, but which are not present — which are given locations for
the purposes of current discourse (virtual object pointing), but also things that 
cannot in fact have any sort of object status at all and can have no location 
(metaphorical object pointing).
Pointing gestures —  or rather, gestures which have a clear pointing 
component (Kendon 1998) —  represent a relatively simple kind of gestural 
action where, by examining the combinations of movement, body part and 
handshape types employed, we might rather easily gather data that can bear on 
the issue of “compositionality” in gesture.
The next examples come from an experiment where the subjects had to go 
on an imaginary journey and describe it to another person, the “guest”. En route 
the “guest” was shown some historic and cultural sights. The subjects did not 
know that the goal of the experiment was to investigate the gestures. They 
worried about their knowledge of history. All of them know the region of the 
town well enough to image the journey and to describe it. Each “guide” “went” 
from the starting point to the destination in 10 minutes (narrative time). 11 
subjects were videotaped. The aim of this experiment, which involved face-to- 
face interaction, was to understand space-relation gestures and coverbal speech 
in face-to-face interaction. (For more about the results see also Tenjes in press, 
and Tenjes 2001.)
Haviland (1996) distinguishes between four different “gesture spaces” : local 
space, narrated space, interactional space, and narrated interactional space (and 
the laminations and transpositions connecting them). This set of distinctions 
replaces an obviously insufficient two-fold dichotomy between “real space” 
(and “real pointing”, which Haviland calls “relatively presupposing” pointing 
gestures) on the one hand, and “symbolic space” (and “symbolic pointing”, 
what Quintillianus called gestural “pronouns” and Haviland calls “entailing”) 
on the other: according to this older view, we either point to a location to direct 
our interlocutor’s attention to it, or we point to a location between us to set it up 
as a symbolic entity for further reference. Haviland, however, shows that we 
use both local and interactional space —  their concrete, physical features —  as 
“props upon which cognition may be externalized” . Although local space and 
interactional space are both physical, real, and concrete, they differ drastically 
in their use as cognitive and communicative props: local space is the specific 
place where we are and that we know about; interactional space is constituted 
through the use of abstract, generic practices (of orienting our bodies, looking at 
one another or away, and so on) that we carry around with us. Cognition and 
communication are distributed across both, and the symbolic potential that we 
gain from them —  for example, for the construction of narrated spaces —  is 
dependent upon their joint use and interaction (Streeck 1996).
During the experiment the gesture indicating “this over there”, “this over 
here”, etc. appeared very often before the most important concept of the 
sentence. The concept mostly denoted an object or the shape of a path.
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According to Kendon, the depictive movement com bines with pointing. So the 
hand starts to point the direction, and m oves simultaneously to denote the shape 
o f the crucial concept (“from here” + image the street below or “look down" +• 
shape o f the bridge or “here” + shape o f the statue).
Examples (4 )- (6 )2:
(4) ~l
Kui te nüüd siit mäe-st alla vaata-te,
when you now from here hill-SG-ELA down look-PRES-2PL
Г 1
vaat sealt paista-b
look+IMPERATTVE's SHORT FORM from there be seen-PRES-3SG
Kuradisild.
devil+bridge+SG +NO M
‘When you look down from this hill now, look, you can see the D evil's Bridge 
over there.’
Hand refers to “look down” and at the same time starts to image the shape ot 
the bridge. (See figure 1.)
Figure 1.
2 The arrows show the main type of the hand movement.
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(5) \
V ene aja-1 seis-i-s siin . . .  selle ees
russian+GEN tim e-SG-ADE stand-PST-3SG here this+SG +G EN in front
muidugi suur Lenin, 
o f course big Lenin
‘During the Russian tim e ... a big Lenin o f course stood in front o f this.’
Hand (forefinger) points “here” and at the same time images the shape o f the 
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(6) ✓
Ja sealt saa-b alla las-ta.
and from there can-PRES-3SG down fire-INFINIT
‘And one can fire down from there.’
Hand points “from there” and at the same time starts to images the path of the 
shooting. (See figure 3.)
Figure 3.
This study indicates that referring gestures have two simultaneous roles: (a) to 
point to spatial relations and (b) to image (to denote) the most important 
concept in the sentence that follows. W. Edmondson has shown on the basis of 
sign languges’ studies that the sign has complex structural properties, which 
expose the integrative monostratal nature of the formalism rather well. He has 
an example where both hands are involved (these can stand for different 
modalities), and one hand is doing two things simultaneously, both in terms of 
its shape and its movement (Edmondson 1996). There is a clear semantic link 
between the gesture and the single underlined word in the accompanying speech 
(Hadar and Butterworth 1997: 152). It means that the gesture and the language 
have a common base. But is it a underlying idea unit (McNeill 1999: 2)?
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According to overall human cognition, the underlying connection between the 
gesture and the word may be a process or a certain type of information.
7. Lexical affiliate and onset of iconic gesture
According to Schegloff (1984a) the word to with the gesture is presumed to be 
related is its “lexical affiliate”. By general consent, some temporal proximity is 
required to determine verbal-gestural coordination: words occurring a few 
sentences away from a gesture would not be considered as lexically affiliated 
with the gesture. The underlying assumption here, accepted by most researchers 
in the field, is that if there is cognitive coordination between the verbal and 
gestural channels, the related processes must temporally overlap. In the 
examples (1)—(6), there is a clear meaning link between the gesture and a word 
in the accompanying speech. On the other hand, Kendon (1985) gives examples 
of gestures related to whole ideas but there is no space for a broader discussion 
about these examples. Most iconic gestures have a preparatory phase during 
which the arm moves to a starting position at a relatively low speed. This is 
followed by the iconic part of the gesture (its “stroke” according to Kendon 
1980) and it is this part of gesture that will henceforth be referred to as iconic 
gesture. Iconic gestures usually start before the related speech event (Butter­
worth and Bettie 1978; Kendon 1980; McNeill 1985; Morrel-Samuels and 
Krauss 1992).
McNeill (1992) holds a very different view of speech production. In his 
view, linguistic processing evolves from generic units, “growth points”, 
containing the meaning of the whole idea-to-be-expressed in an embryonic 
form. In this view, the eventual size of the verbal unit is irrelevant to under­
standing the gesture, but only the analysis of temporal, pragmatic, and semantic 
relations. According to McNeill, gesture and speech arise together from an 
underlying propositional representation that has both visual and linguistic 
aspects; the relationship between gesture and speech is essential to production 
of meaning and to its comprehension (Cassell, McNeill, McCullough 1999).
Conceptualization, in various terminological guises, has been favored as an 
origin of gestures by many researchers on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds. For example, McNeill (1985: 368) presented a case where the phrase 
“he found a knife” was accompanied by a gesture pantomiming the grasping of 
the knife. The most parsimonious explanation here is that the gesture originated 
at a stage prior to linguistic processing, where related, yet different, concepts 
were considered for articulation. Speech then articulated one concept, and the 
gesture the other. McNeill (1985, 1999) has a somewhat different story, 
whereby the gesture originated at a stage of processing where “grasp” and 
“find” joined in a single unit of meaning (the “growth point”) having both
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linguistic and imagistic components. As Hadar and Butterworth (1997) 
suggested, the origin of gesture may be even further down from prelinguistic 
message construction: the speaker may have chosen “grasp” for articulation, but 
then failed to retrieve the word. Instead, “find” was retrieved, while the gesture 
expressed the originally selected concept.
Now, in the majority of cases, the onset of iconic gesture is known to 
precede the onset of the related speech unit (Butterworth and Beattie 1978; 
Morrel-Samuels and Krauss 1992). Hadar and Butterworth have presented a 
model to explain the relation between iconic gesture generation and speech 
production (Hadar and Butterworth 1997: 161-162). The first fundamental 
assumption of the model is that conceptual processing activates visual imagery, 
presumably automatically and presumably to the extent that the features 
involved in the conceptual processing are imageable. Some support for this can 
be found in evidence showing iconic gesture and pantomime as early forms of 
communication. Gesture may occur in the course of reading: it is not the result 
of a fully intentional process. The second fundamental assumption is that a 
visual image mediates between conceptual processing and the generation of 
iconic gestures. The model (see also Hadar and Butterworth 1997: 163) pro­
poses that the visual image facilitates word-finding in three distinct ways: by 
focusing on conceptual processing, by holding core features during semantic 
reselection, and by directly activating word forms in the phonological lexicon. 
Word-finding failures themselves tend to elicit imagery and the associated 
gestures. Conceptual (“message level”) processing constructs or selects a set of 
semantic features to be realized linguistically. The processing may also activate 
a visual image via the preverbal route. The visual image may, in turn, feed into 
the conceptualization process, and hence into subsequent processes of word- 
finding. The idea here is that the visual image will be translated back into 
semantic features that can then engage in conceptual processing. This 
influential model proposes that there is a “direct route” from a visual image to 
the phonological form, which can facilitate the activation of the form. The 
accessibility of lexical processing to visual images has only indirect empirical 
support.
All the available data show that the onset of a gesture precedes its lexical 
affiliate. McNeill (1992, 1999) accounts for this by assuming that gesture 
production starts before lexicalization is achieved; in Hadar and Butterworth’s 
model gestures start before the lexical affiliate is produced, irrespective of their 
processing origin. Some questions still remain. It is not clear why some gestures 
should have sentence-initial onsets, i.e., the gestures start before the selection of 
the affiliate has become relevant in the production of the utterance.
Kendon has already said in 1986 that “Gesture Phrases are not, thus, by­
products of the speech production process. They are directly produced, as are 
Tone Units, from the same underlying unit of meaning.” “Thus, it is found that
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Gesture Phrases are often begun in advance of the Tone Unit to which they are 
related and they are often completed before the Tone Unit’s completion” 
(1986b: 34).
Gestures are fully organized at the outset of speech units that also express 
the representational of content. Evidently then, meanings are not transformed 
into gestural form by way of spoken language formats. They are transformed 
directly, and independently. This means that meanings, in whatever way they 
are stored, are stored quite separate from the formats of spoken language, 
however abstractly these may be conceived. The evidence from gestures thus 
provides that knowledge is stored in complex configurational structures (Ken­
don 1986a). Gesture and speech must be considered separate representational 
modes which may nevertheless be coordinated and closely associated in 
utterance because they may be employed together in the service of the same 
enterprise (Kendon 1986b). Butterworth and Hadar have claimed that iconic 
gestures in speech are largely attributable to aspects of lexical search and such 
gestures play an important functional role in lexical retrieval.
8. Conclusion
Iconic gestures are designed to communicate; they provide imagery and 
kinaesthetic profiles. Gestures receive the attention of the listener and thereby 
become components of conceptual understanding. Gestures are functionally 
adapted to the requirements of understanding in human communication. There­
fore, one has to examine how these structures aid listeners in the processing of 
speech.
It is appreciated when speakers have the ability to make themselves under­
stood because of the unconscious intelligence of their bodies, that is, their 
hands’ competence is surrounding speech with subtle, intricate, and “telling” 
spatial imagery. This is possible because listeners, too, have the capacity to 
process abstract spatial imagery. As Bouissac has said, gestures can be 
construed as embodiments of information between intending and understanding 
minds (Bouissac 2000).
Like language-units, gestures are symbols, i.e., pairs of meaning and form, 
but exactly what types of meaning are conveyed by gestures remains an 
unresolved question. In a broader perspective one can see that gesture is a 
critical link between the evolution of perception, conceptualization, and 
language.
48
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The present study investigates how metaphoric gestures and verbal expressions 
are related in Estonian. Two slightly different aspects have been studied: (1) 
which type of gestures co-occur with Estonian verbal metaphoric expressions, if 
any; (2) how do metaphoric gestures work in different conversational situations 
in Estonian. Two essential theoretical considerations are presented: (1) the 
connection between iconicity and metaphoricity in language, (2) the connection 
between linguistic relativity and metaphorical gestures or metaphorical verbal 
phrases. While the metaphors and metaphorical gestures in Estonian data 
seemed generally compatible with the classification of metaphor proposed by 
Lakoff and Johnson (“localism” in expressions “up is good”-“down is bad”), the 
other which suggests that the relationship between metaphor and linguistic 
relativity may be more complicated than it first appears.
INTRODUCTION
“It may well be that world history is the history of a certain number of 
metaphors” —  this is how the famous Argentine author J. L. Borges begins his 
short story “Pascal’s Sphere”. We could agree with his claim if we define 
metaphor in a broader sense. If it defines the metaphor in a broader sense as 
bases of thought, in which case all the languages are so intertwined with 
metaphors.
The present study investigates how metaphoric gestures and verbal expres­
sions are related in Estonian. As Cienki (1998) has already shown, verbal 
metaphoric expressions do not necessarily co-occur with metaphoric gestures, 
or vice versa. This paper focuses on the hand gestures that accompany speech. 
Two slightly different aspects have been studied: (1) which type of gestures co­
occur with Estonian verbal metaphoric expressions, if any; (2) how do meta­
phoric gestures work in different conversational situations in Estonian.
1
THE FUNCTIONS OF METAPHOR
Metaphor is the use of an expression in a novel and figurative sense on the basis 
of similarity. The understanding of metaphor as a figurative use of word makes 
it ubiquitous; however, it also blurs the concept of the metaphor. One of the 
main functions of metaphor is that it enables us to name things by means of 
other things. It allows associating the things described according to those fea­
tures that are important at the moment and ignoring the others. Word meanings 
are multifaceted, and the content of both poetic and philosophical thinking is 
primarily a kaleidoscopic association of meanings and semantic components in 
new combinations. There is no doubt that one of the aims of this kaleidoscope 
game is to maintain order and stability in people’s attitudes (Kaplinski 1997: 
220). It could well be one of the functions of metaphor.
The use of metaphor presumes the presence of two levels —  the levels of 
description and comparison. The latter could be regarded as a kind of micro­
cosm, a world picture, which the human being has designed as simple, clear, 
and concrete enough. The objects of the comparison level are sufficiently 
distinguishable from one another, and are often clearly opposed to each other 
with respect to such features as good-bad, low-high, black-white, etc. If we 
ascribe a name of the comparison level to an object of the description level, we 
will express a clear and traditional attitude to the described. It is important that 
the level of comparison should be relatively limited. The attitude to the base 
word will be transferred to here. The existence of such a comparison level that 
is divided into clear-cut antonymic concepts helps us to orient ourselves in the 
world, where objects are too complicated and unstable for us to shape a certain 
attitude towards them. The metaphor then is a method of simplifying the 
intricate and diverse reality, making it more “palatable” to the human (Kaplinski 
1997: 221). This is another function of the metaphor, related to the first one.
PROBLEMS WITH CLASSIFYING GESTURES
There have been various competing classifications of gestures in the literature, 
though the terminology has often been somewhat misleading (see, for example 
McNeill 1985; Feyereisen and de Lannoy 1991). Gesture typologies often in­
volve two broad crosscutting dimensions: representationality, and convention or 
autonomy (Haviland 1996: 11). The first dimension has to do with whether and 
how the bodily movements that accompany speech depict or represent the refe­
rential content of what is being conveyed by an utterance. Some gestures seem 
tailored to the “meaning” of speech, via various semiotic modalities, whereas 
others, for example, appear to be more closely aligned to the rhythm of talk.
D. McNeill and his associates have developed an influential classificatory 
scheme distinguishing between “iconic” and “metaphoric” gestures, which bear 
a relation of resemblance to aspects of utterance content, “deictic” gestures,
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which index referents both concrete and abstract, and “beats” which seem to be 
non-representational (Haviland 1996: 40). The scheme is elaborated and com­
pared with competitors in McNeill (1992):
J. Iconics depict by the form of the gesture some feature of the action or 
event being described; such as ‘he climbed up the pipe’ accompanied by the 
hand raising upwards to show the path (Cassell, McNeill, McCullough 1999: 5). 
‘Iconic gestures have a formal relation to the semantic content of the linguistic 
unit’ (McNeill 1985: 354).
2. Metaphoric gestures are also representational, but the concept being 
depicted has no physical form. An example is ‘the meeting went on and on’ 
accompanied by a hand indicating rolling motion. Metaphoric gestures include, 
e.g., the “process metaphoric gestures” just illustrated, and the “conduit meta­
phoric gestures”, objectifying the information being conveyed, representing it as 
a concrete object that can be held between the hands and given to the listener.
According to this definition, metaphorical gestures include many more 
gestures. The material that I collected includes an example, where the speaker 
points at the supermarket and tells the interlocutor, “This big house over there is 
the supermarket”, at the same time making a rectangular gesture with both 
hands in the air designating the big quadrangular shape of the supermarket. 
While analyzing the present material, I did not treat such and similar examples 
as metaphorical gestures although D. M cNeill’s definition would allow it. 
‘Metaphoric gestures are like iconic gestures in that they exhibit a meaning 
relevant to the concurrent linguistic meaning. However, the relation to the 
linguistic meaning is indirect. Metaphoric gestures exhibit images of abstract 
concepts. In form and manner of execution, metaphoric gestures depict the 
vehicles of metaphors’ (McNeill 1985: 356).
One of the crucial and confusing matters about this classification relates to 
McNeill’s dividing gestures into “iconic” and “metaphoric” in one article and 
regarding them as representatives of one sub-type of gestures in another. ‘There 
are two further sub-types of iconic gesture: conduit gestures and metaphoric 
gestures’ (McNeill 1985: 354). Let us turn to a more subtle and flexible classifi­
cation of gestures. What I can consider a better classification of gestures —  the 
one proposed in the works of A. Kendon. Gesture may function as an auto­
nomous utterance and may occur in conjunction with speech in a variety of 
ways. Thus, most draw a distinction between speech-associated gesturing that 
somehow provides a direct representation of some aspect of the content of what 
is being said, and gesturing that appears to have a more abstract sort of 
relationship to speech (Kendon 1986: 31). The latter would include metaphori­
cal gestures as well.
It is not always clear, which types of gesture co-occur with a verbal phrase. 
As we know, on the one hand, metaphor entails iconicity. On the other hand, 
iconicity entails metaphor (Hiraga 1998). If we accept this view, there is no 
contradiction between the parts of M cNeill’s classification. Hiraga’s views help
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to establish the mutual relationships between hand gestures and language more 
clearly.
METAPHORICITY IN SPEECH AND GESTURES
Since the theory of nonverbal metaphor is quite complex, we will restrict the 
discussion here to quote some remarks by Eli Rozik (1992: 132): “(a) metaphor 
conveys meaning that essentially does not differ from literal description. ... The 
same hand movement can be both indicative and metaphorical.”
I agree with Max Black that a successful metaphor is realized in discourse 
and need not be treated as a riddle. Metaphorical statements occur in specific 
and relatively complete acts of expression and communication. According to 
Black, a statement will be identified by quoting a whole sentence, or a set of 
sentences, together with as much of the relevant verbal context, or the nonverbal 
setting, as may be needed for an adequate grasp of the actual or imputed 
speaker’s meaning (Black 1993: 24).
When we examine examples of discourse, we can also find evidence that 
mode of expression in gesture and mode of expression in speech can have much 
in common. Thus co-speech gesturing is often employed to provide concrete 
visual images of actions, shapes, spatial relationships or movements through 
space that are metaphors for abstract concepts (McNeill 1987, Calbris 1990). It 
is notable that the metaphors employed in gesture are the same as the metaphors 
that find expression verbally. The verbal metaphor receives gestural expression. 
A. Kendon (1991: 7) has given a few examples to illustrate this. In a group 
discussion of a psychiatric case, with five psychiatrists and a social worker as 
participants, the social worker who had had an interview with the patient was 
asked to explain what she had learned about the patient during the interview. At 
the beginning of her reply she says: “I saw her one time, to get some back­
ground information, I didn’t get very much, but I picked this up all through her 
conversation.” An element in the background information that she goes on to 
describe is what she refers to as something she had “picked up” during the 
interview. This is thus being referred to as something that can be treated as a 
physical object, which can be “picked up.” As she says “picked this up” she 
makes three upward movements with her open hand, as if picking something up 
from an imaginary surface.
At another point in the same discussion, the social worker is commenting on 
the rapidity and readiness with which the patient had expressed certain ideas. 
She said: “She spoke very rapidly and this was all coming out very sponta­
neously.” In saying “this was all coming out” she is using the metaphor of the 
person as a container, and ideas or feelings as flowing out of the container. As 
she said this, she also expressed the metaphor gesturally, making a broad out­
ward sweeping movement with her hand, just before she says “all” —  thus
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providing a visual image of the outward flow of something that she also 
mentions in her speech.
Another very widespread metaphor is to speak of time as if it were space. If 
we are speaking about ourselves in relation to the past or the future, we often 
speak as if the future is ahead of us and the past is behind. Gestures in 
utterances about something or someone in the past or in the future can be 
characterized quite unambiguously: when speaking about the past the speaker 
points behind, back over the shoulder, etc.; in case of future the movements are 
directed to the front. It has also been pointed out by the well-known French 
researcher G. Galbris (Calbris, Montredon 1986: 139; Calbris 1987: 73, Calbris 
1990). G. Calbris (1990) gives examples of French speakers who give a forward 
lift of the chin or a forward movement with the hand as they refer to something 
that, for them, is in the future, or make a backward movement with the head or 
point the thumb backwards over the shoulder as they refer to something in the 
past. Estonians similarly make forward movements to refer to the future and 
backward movements to refer to the past but they may also refer back in time 
using absolutely different gestures. Speakers appear to refer forward in relation 
to space or objects (Tenjes 1996: 187-189). If the same metaphors can find 
representation in both gesture and speech, it would seem that both modalities 
are drawing on the same representational substrate. This seems to be related to 
the internalizations of our sensory, especially visual perceptions and manipula­
tions of the physical world. Recent work on metaphor in cognitive linguistics 
provides additional support for this idea. It appears that the metaphors that 
predominate in discourse employ as their vehicles motor manipulation of space 
and objects within it and sensory experience, especially visual experience. In 
large part, intellectual activity is represented in spoken language through meta­
phors that draw upon our visual experience of the world (Lakoff 1987; Johnson 
1987; Danesi 1990; Sweetser 1990). If thinking is an internalization of overt 
transactions with the external world, then it is no accident that language, if it is 
regarded as a means of representing this process for others by way of socially 
shared symbols, should make extensive metaphorical use of such visual expe­
riences and perceptuo-motor processes. Nor should it be surprising that when 
gesture is employed to express abstract content it should do so in the same way 
(Kendon 1991: 8).
ANALYSIS OF THE ESTONIAN-LANGUAGE MATERIAL
Metaphor serves as an essential aid, and certain things can be expressed most 
precisely only metaphorically. Metaphor plays an important role in the thinking 
process. It seems that most of all it is associated with the sense of sight. 
Thinking in time (in space-time) is the same as sight in space. Their relationship 
is a reflection of the inevitable relationship between space and time in us. Our 
consciousness is not merely a mirror —  a memory thread ties each of our per­
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ceptions to something in the past. We have no pure present — memories bring 
the past dimension into it and expectations imply the future. Imagination and 
thinking combines it all into new pictures and thoughts (Kaplinski 1980).
In this paper, metaphoric gestures were studied together with Estonian 
(Finno-Ugric < Ural-Altaic) verbal expressions. The examples come from four 
different sources:
(1) From the weekly-review program Brauser (video recording from the 
Estonian TV);
(2) An experiment where the subjects had to go an imaginary journey and 
had to describe it to another person;
(3) Students’ free conversation about the event of an Estonian historican 
finding the oldest Estonian settlement place, dated from 11 000 years ago;
(4) The 1999 election campaign in Estonia (video recording from the 
Estonian TV).
People construct cognitive models of more abstract phenomena on the basis 
of their earlier more concrete experiences, the first level of which is constituted 
by their immediate physical and bodily experience. One of the basic transfer 
mechanisms is metaphorization, whereas the transfer does not occur for 
individual words but is largely regulated by the entire source domain (Lakoff 
1990). Thus, when interpreting the cognitive model of more abstract domains, it 
is important to adequately fix its source domain(s). The so-called localism 
hypothesis in semantics (Lyons 1977) tells us that our images of physical space, 
the conceptualization of space, serves as the basis for many cognitive models 
with an abstract content. For example, most temporal expressions (enne 
‘before’, pärast ‘after’, (millegi) järel ‘after something’ originate in spatial 
expressions, and psyche originates in metaphorical space. Psychic states and 
processes are conceptualized rather generally as certain spatial regions, where 
one happens to find oneself, where one arrives, which one leaves, or gets out of, 
etc (Õim 1997: 259).
After Lakoff and Johnson (1980), there are three major types of conceptual 
metaphor —  structural, orientational, and ontological metaphors. I used this 
distinction in exploring my data. To sum up, 30 examples included 13 metapho- 
lrical gestures that gave a metaphorical meaning to the phrase, and 17 meta­
phorical expressions were accompanied by a gesture. The metaphorical gestures 
accompanied by verbal phrases included 4 orientation metaphors, 12 ontological 
metaphors, and 1 structural metaphor.
CONCLUSIONS
It appeared that although metaphoric gestures did co-occur with verbal meta­
phoric expressions, it was not very common. Hand gestures, which can be both 
indicative and metaphoric, may occur very often. The mapping line from source 
to target was seen in verbal metaphoric expressions and the concomitant gestu­
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res, but v/as not clearly seen in gestures, which occurred in indicative positions. 
It may be concluded that
(1) Verbal metaphoric expression is often accompanied by metaphoric 
gestures in positions where the underlying concept is the spatial domain up- 
down. We use our knowledge of physical space to structure our understanding 
of emotions or consciousness (about sources and targets in Estonian mental 
worldview see also Õim 1997). These gestures are like iconic gestures 
according to McNeill (1985: 354).
(2) Metaphoric gestures often “express” the concepts greatness, grea t 
number, very important, very beautiful, not im portant a t all, very ugly, either 
independently (finish the verbal phrase or sentence) or with concomitant verbal 
phrase, irrespective of the conversation. Most of these gestures seem to be 
iconic, too.
(3) There were slightly more autonomous metaphorical gestures than meta­
phorical expressions with concomitant gestures. A metaphorical gesture 
provides a linguistic expression with metaphoricity. In a metaphorical expres­
sion with a concomitant gesture they both contribute to the efficient conveyance 
of the meaning.
DISCUSSION
It seems that metaphor belongs first and foremost to language. Metaphor be­
longs to gestures in the pantomime, theatre, etc. In everyday conversation 
metaphorical gestures either accompany metaphorical expressions or act inde­
pendently, supporting either the entire phrase or concept. Without language, 
however, comprehension would be more difficult. Thus, metaphor belongs 
rather to language, and iconicity belongs rather to the hand. Language has 
developed from manual pointing to symbolic meaning, and metaphor gives a 
new (meaning) facet to a bleached word. If metaphor belongs to language, and 
if one speculates that language originated from hand gestures (G. Hewes 1973a; 
1973b; 1976, A. Kendon 1991, U. Place 1998 and M. Corballis 1999), then 
iconicity, metaphoricity, and symbolism in language become fully under­
standable. Pointing and referring hand gestures were the first means of com­
munication. The transition to articulated speech occurred step by step, and the 
role of the hand diminished. The primary ‘metaphorical transfer’ occurred when 
the iconic meanings of hand gestures became meanings expressed by voice. 
They came to be used as symbols with a certain meaning. In the course of time 
there occurred a ‘second metaphorical transfer’ — the expression was perma­
nently transferred to other similar situations. It would be more accurate to say 
that from this moment on one is dealing with ‘metaphorical transfer’ as a certain 
process, where symbols become new metaphors and new meanings emerge. In 
this process the hand cannot act any more as the performer of the primary role
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because it has delegated this role to language. On the other hand, it has still 
maintained many functions that are not fully clear as yet.
No language is fully translatable into another language, and some verbal 
metaphors in Estonian cannot be found in English. At the same time it was the 
Estonian metaphorical expressions that were accompanied by gestures. What 
does that indicate? When we compare the material to the conceptual metaphors 
suggested by Lakoff and Johnson, we come across many ontological and 
orientational metaphors. There are also some structural metaphors, but their 
number is smaller. It seems that we conceptualize reality in the same manner 
across different cultures and languages. “Localism” seems to be universal.
When looking at how metaphorical expressions or metaphorical gestures 
function in Estonian, we can see, however, that in many cases they do not have 
a metaphorical equivalent in English. Therefore, I had to ask from myself Why 
is it so after a ll?  Where is the p lace  where the gesture and language m eet 
before the expression is u ttered  (many studies of gestures have indicated that 
they do meet)? Professor Haldur Õim ((2001,) personal communication) has 
suggested that the solution may be offered by the idea of an in term ediate layer  
in language. As we know, this idea comes from the 19th-century linguist 
Wilhelm von Humboldt. Language classifies the world, and each language does 
it differently. Language may have a deeper layer, the inner form  according to 
Humboldt (in German innere Sprachform). Both gestures and language-specific 
metaphors originate in there. Our everyday language — the verbal layer — 
reveals words and gestures. The metaphors are situated in the verbal layer, but 
the metaphor originates  in the intermediate layer.
Perhaps gestures reflect image schem ata , not just underlying concepts. How 
do we understand the source domain in the first place? Mark Johnson 
endeavored to answer this question by proposing that meaning was grounded in 
repeated patterns of bodily experience. These patterns give rise to what Johnson 
called im age schem ata, which provide the cognitive basis for the concepts and 
relationships essential to metaphor. Referring to the previously mentioned 
intermediate layer in language, one might say that language-specific metaphors 
are not bound by language. There exists certain linguistic relativity as well as 
schemata. Im age schem ata  is an excellent idea, but one need not derive them 
from English. Metaphors are not located but originate  in the intermediate layer 
as a result of very different and complicated kinds of ‘refraction’. ‘Refraction’ 
is similar to the way light is refracted on the sphere. This is what makes the 
finding of the ground for metaphors, gestures, and word meanings in general so 
complicated and interesting. Language may also have a sub-linguistic deep 
layer that is universal. Thus, language is a multi-layered phenomenon, and 
metaphor is not universal. Each language has a language-specific layer that 
gives rise to metaphors and gestures. It is the intermediate layer. And gestures, 
too, have an intermediate layer, where everything is refracted and reflected. The 
universal layer enters the intermediate layer, is refracted, and the fragments are 
scattered all over the surface layer of language. How can we then establish how
what is universal is expressed in a certain language? By way o f conclusion we 
can once again quote the short story “Pascal’s sphere” by Borges. At the end of 
the story the author writes, “It may well be that world history is the history of 
different intonations o f various metaphors”. But this is another story.
EXAM PLES
(1) ‘mitu aste-t spekuleerimis-t’( ‘lot o f speculation’)
several stair-SG-PRT speculating-SG-PRT  
( ’stair o f thinking’>concrete object is transferred to mental 
sphere>personification>ONTOLOGICAL MP) 
m etaphoric phrase + m etaphoric gesture  (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1.
(2) ‘jumala-st hea koht’ ( ‘a perfect place’) 
god-SG-ELA good place 
(gesture refers to up>good is up> ORIENTATIONAL MP) 
autonom ous m etaphoric gesture  (See Figure 2.)
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Figure 2.
(3) ‘trepp tule-b vastu’ ( ‘there is a stairwa\
stairway com e-PRES-3SG towards
(personification>ONTOLOGICAL MP) 
m etaphoric phrase + m etaphoric gesture  (See Figure 3.)
Figure 3.
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(4) ‘otseselt’ ( ‘found it personally’)
directly
(direct>orientation>ORIENTATIONAL MP) 
m etaphoric phrase  + m etaphoric gesture  (See Figure 4.)
Figure 4.
(5) ‘ne-i-d katseklaas-i nalj-u’
these-PL-PRT test-tube-SG-GEN joke-PL-PRT  
( ‘his test-tube baby jok es’)
(life/entity is joke>STRUCTURAL MP) 
m etaphoric phrase  + m etaphoric gesture  (See Figure 5.)
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Figure 5.
(6) ‘mõte hakka-s jooks-m a’ ( ‘he started to think’)
thought start-PST-3SG run-INFINIT 
(personification>ONTOLOGICAL MP)
m etaphoric phrase  + m etaphoric gesture  (See Figure 6.)
Figure 6. 
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(7) ‘tunda end ülendatu-na’ ( ‘to feel great’)
feel-INFINIT self-SG-PRT elevated-SG-ESS  
(gesture refers to up>orientation>ORffiNTATIONAL MP)
m etaphoric phrase  + m etaphoric gesture  (See Figure 7.)
Figure 7.
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ABBREVIATIONS
3 — person 
ELA —  elative 
ESS — essive 
GEN —  genitive 
INFINIT —  infinite 
MP —  metaphor 
NOM — nominative 
PL — plural 
PRES — present tense 
PRT —  partitive 
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